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This thesis explores the construction of identity amongst the second generation of 
South- Korean migrants to Germany in Frankfurt am Main, focussing mainly on 
women. Overwhelmingly, when talking about migrants the German media focus on the 
Turkish minority. Literature follows a similar pattern. However, West Germany 
recruited South Korean nurses and miners during the 1970s as labour migrants. Today, 
they and their children constitute the largest South Korean minority in Europe. In this 
thesis I examine the second generation of the Korean minority in relation to broader 
discourses on migrants and integration in Germany, and trace the dynamics of 
identification and self-understanding. Central to these are narratives of shared 
experiences, of having Korean parents and of living in German society, particularly in 
relation to discourses in which they are identified as foreigners. Korean parents impart a 
sense of “Korea” as a source of timeless tradition and practices; whereas “Germany” is 
a setting for their everyday lives. These shared experiences are mobilised as a 
framework for negotiating identities. In contrast to the essentialist understanding of 
identity invoked by Germany society, the second generation describe themselves as 
kyopo, a Korean term meaning “Korean living in a foreign country” and which, in the 
German context, means “Second-generation German-Korean living in Germany”. This 
thesis looks at the ways Korean-Germans articulate the possibilities and limits of kyopo 
identity in relation to narratives and discourses on ‘Koreanness’ and ‘Germanness’, and 
in the context of social interactions. I focus especially on the ways in which this occurs 
for women, whose experiences are often marginalised in the process of kyopo identity 
negotiation. They are caught between the need to expose the problems of male privilege 
and the desire to unite with Korean-German men to contest the German discourse on 
integration and foreigners that confines them both.  
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1.Introduction  
 
I have never been interested in football. My parents have never been interested in 
football. Still, beginning three days before that World Championship match Germany 
versus the Republic of South Korea in 2002, my parents developed a sudden interest. I 
was studying in the UK at the time and a few German friends had invited me to watch 
the game in our students’ union pub. I must have mentioned that to my parents, who – 
separately- called every day from Germany. My Father wanted me to support ‘our 
national team’- the German team. My Mother wanted me to support ‘her national team’- 
the Korean team. In the end, on match-day, I had decided to stay neutral. But in a pub 
filled with Germans
1
, who had come to watch the game, the only two Korea-supporters 
sat down beside me.  
When the game was over, the Germans celebrated and the Koreans were disappointed. 
The game dashed South- Korea’s hopes of becoming football world champion. My 
Mother was disappointed, my Father gloated, and I? I was the only person in the pub 
who had both won and lost! I suffered the gloating from my German friends, and the 
cross looks from the present Koreans when I toasted the German victory. Since then, I 
make it my business to be fully disinterested in football, but during the celebrations 
afterwards my German friends asked me how my parents had met. Germany and South 
Korea seemed worlds apart.  
My mother-like most other Korean women in present-day Germany- was one of the 
many nurses that came to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG or ‘Germany’ 
henceforth) in the late sixties and early seventies. The by far largest number of labour 
migrants to Germany came from Turkey, totalling 27% of all Gastarbeiter [guest-
workers] in the FRG in 1975 (Rist, 1978:66) and numbering more than a million. The 
comparatively small number of Koreans migrating to Germany began their influx in 
1970 after a bilateral agreement between South Korea (Korea henceforth) and the FRG 
                                                 
1
 ‘Germans’ and ‘German’ here and throughout, refers to members of the Caucasian majority society. 
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(Booth, 1992:110). The agreement intended to recruit men for work in the mining area 
and women as hospital staff. Roughly 10,000 women and 8000 men migrated from 
Korea to Germany (cf Han, 1991, Yoo, 1991, Beckers-Kim, 2005; Hyung, 2008). Today 
it is estimated that roughly 32.000 Koreans are living in Germany, thus constituting the 
largest Korean minority in Europe.  
 “They live(d) their lives silently [lautlos],” Young-Ja Beckers-Kim (Beckers-Kim 
2008:13) writes about the Korean migrants to Germany. The word lautlos means ‘quiet’ 
or ‘noiseless’, indicating that someone or something doesn’t draw attention to 
themselves or itself. Referring to the first generation of Korean migrants, it means that 
they lived away from the spotlight and never tried seeking attention. “After some time, 
they [the Korean migrants] decided to stay, and from then on called their host country 
their Wahlheimat [chosen home/homeland]” (2008:13).  
People- especially in Germany- tend to be surprised hearing about the Korean 
community. Everyone in Germany has encountered Turkish migrants, and may be 
aware of Italian or Greek migrants, all of whom migrated during the ‘Economic 
Miracle’ after WW2, but the history of Korean migration to Germany did not seem to 
have entered the broad public consciousness. In official statistics on migrants the 
Korean community vanishes under the heading ‘other’. In debates about integration in 
Germany, public attention, the media and politicians focus on the Turkish minority. And 
in moral panics about crime rates amongst young people with migrant parents, young 
people with an Asian background are explicitly excluded in newspaper reports
2
. 
Phenotypical appearance makes the Korean community visible within the majority 
society, but lacking the numbers of other migrant groups, and being wholly 
‘unproblematic’, the Korean community continues living quietly in Germany.  
The second generation is educated and middle class. In the course of time large numbers 
have become naturalized German citizens, and they live and work in Germany. The 
second generation does not make the news, as the Turkish second generation does. 
There are no public debates about integrating the second generation of German Koreans 
into the majority society. While this may have a lot to do with their numbers, they also 
appear, on the whole, ‘unproblematic’ for the majority society. So unproblematic that 
the Korean-German Network (KGN) - an organization of Koreans in Germany- once 
                                                 
2
 Cf Die Zeit (25.03.2009 online edition).  
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claimed that the Korean community in Germany is the best integrated migrant 
community, and that the second generation is fully integrated.  
My research stemmed from simple curiosity at first. How, if the newspapers were 
constantly filled with articles about integration and the problems of second generation 
migrants in Germany, was it possible that the Korean second generation had integrated 
so successfully? Considering the constant German debates about integration and the 
Turkish second generation, I wanted to find out what had gone so differently for the 
Korean second generation. One of the key motifs in debates about integration seemed to 
be the perceived unwillingness of second generation Turkish migrants to integrate and 
take on a German identity.  
The question of identity seemed to lie at the heart of integration debates about second 
generations. And the debates about identity invariably seemed to use the treatment of 
women to draw boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Below, I will outline some of the 
discourses on identity and gender in Germany, and the theoretical approaches I have 
chosen to explore the negotiation of identity amongst second generation German 
Korean women. Beginning with past approaches to the question of second generation 
migrant identities in Germany, and the mobilization of gender to draw boundaries, I 
posit that such discourses and approaches are too limiting to gain a full understanding of 
the complex processes of identity negotiation. However, looking at these discourses and 
approaches helps identifying the areas that they cannot sufficiently explain, thus 
providing points of departure.  
According to Ang (2003) identity is the basis for social order. There are other bases and 
different theories for social order, but the relatively modern concept of identity as a key 
concept of social order is at the focus of many recent theories. Much has been published 
about the concept of identity (for example: Giddens, 1991; Hall, 1992; Sarup, 1996; 
Jenkins, 1996). The term ‘identity’ has proved a powerful tool in exploring diverse 
social transformations across political, economic, gendered, ethnic etc, spheres. For 
many theorists, national identity -as opposed to other identities- enjoys a privileged 
position, compared to other identities. The idea that national identity is based on a 
people’s “essence” and therefore remains basically unchangeable is bound up with 
political connotations that give it a privileged status. One can argue the same for other 
identities, such as ‘gay’ or ‘queer’ identities, which can be and sometimes are highly 
10 
 
 
politicized and connected to high emotional properties, but few other identities have 
been so formalized and institutionalized as national identity. Today’s political world 
system is based upon nations- the nation amongst nations as a spatially finite category, 
each defined in the first place by a set of clear-cut and internationally recognised 
borders (Smith, 1998:95). National state officials define national identity by opposing it 
to “the other”, among other things, through the introduction of ID cards and passports. 
This separates the national from the alien, stressing the rights and obligations of the 
individual national. It creates a boundary between them and those that do not share 
those rights and obligations, but also stressing the ethnic unity of the nation and a 
shared belief in “blood-relatedness” (Jager, 2003).  
Existing past approaches in Germany, tended to construct the second generation of 
migrant children as victims of an inevitable culture conflict that would lead to an 
identity crisis. According to Polat (1997), in German academia much has been written 
about conflicting cultures and value systems that migrant children need to negotiate, 
leading to inevitable identity crises, especially amongst the children. As the first 
generation of guest-workers raised families, the question of identity for the children 
became of interest. Polat (1997) summarizes that ‘identity-crisis’, ‘identity-diffusion’ 
and ‘identity-confusion’ were the central topic in research dealing with the identity of 
migrant children (1997:35). Having an identity crisis is considered an inevitable fact 
amongst migrant children, who are “stranded between two cultures, in conflict with 
their parents, facing the difficulty of negotiating two incommensurable value systems” 
(Parker, 1995:12).  
In a similar vein, authors like Heitmeyer (1997), regard identities as bounded and 
separate, thus mutually exclusive. Using such approaches, he has concluded that the 
second generation of Turkish migrant children resist integration into the German 
majority society. Rather than Turkish youths having an ‘identity crisis’, he portrays 
them as given the choice between two conflicting identities. In his work, he argues that 
Turkish migrant children are content living with Islam and Turkishness, and therefore 
had no interest to integrate, and actively resisted. Such approaches are limiting for 
understanding the complexities of identity. Using such an approach to analyze identity, 
conclusions such as Heitmeyer’s (1997) seem logical, since one must choose between 
two mutually exclusive identities. An identity crisis is the only logical outcome.  
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In conjunction with renewed debates on integration and identity, gender came into focus 
again in Germany, particularly with regards to migrant populations. ‘Identity politics’ 
tend to harden ethnic
3
 and gender boundaries, and homogenize and naturalize categories 
and group differences (Yuval-Davis, 1997:119). Notions of what it means to be female 
influence notions of masculinity, and in this context, ideas about women and the 
treatment of women highlight the project of creating boundaries that impact on the 
discourse on German national identity: “The oppression of women within Islamic 
culture exacerbates the social problems of the Muslim minority [in Germany] that 
refuses its women education almost everywhere and denies them personal self-
fulfilment.” Jürgen Krönig writes in Die Zeit [46/2005]. In other words: As long as 
‘they’ treat ‘their’ women badly, ‘they’ cannot become ‘us’.  
In public discourse, the idea of the emancipated German woman, fully equal with men, 
having all citizen’s rights and economic independence, symbolizes social progress. 
Compared to that, the ‘oppression’ and ‘victimization’ of migrant women is used as 
evidence for the chasm separating guest-workers and Germans. Chin (2007) writes: 
“The treatment of women […] became the primary litmus test to determine whether 
foreigners- and especially Turks- possessed the capacity to function effectively within a 
Western liberal democratic society” (2007:143). 
Gender has not been absent from academic literature about migrants in Germany, but 
has been discussed since the late 1970s and early 1980s. According to Chin (2007), the 
emphasis on women in this literature developed out of a progressive impulse to move 
beyond the caricature of the male guest-worker that dominated German public 
imagination in the era of labour recruitment. The new focus was part of a bid towards 
recognizing migrants and their families as de facto immigrants, and to understand the 
complexities of guest-workers’ lives (2007:162).  
However, the initial attempt to understand complexities shifted away from highly 
nuanced efforts at cultural understanding to a recurring trope of the imprisoned, 
imperilled Turkish woman (2007:162). In recent academic texts the focus has shifted 
again. While some writers (such as Özkara, 1990; Lajios, 1991; Nieke, 1991; 
                                                 
3
 ‘Ethnic’ and ‘ethnicity’ are complex terms, often used interchangeably with ‘national’ or ‘cultural’, 
where they seem to “describe a ‘racial’ grouping” (Smith, 1998:45). I use ‘ethnicity’ in Smith’s (1998) 
sense as descriptive of “a unity […] based on the powerful myth of a presumed common ancestry and 
shared historical memories” (1998:46).  
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Heitmeyer, 1997) have argued the oppressiveness of traditional Turkish family 
structures for women that negatively influence their children, others have attempted 
more nuanced understandings. Opitz (1986) explored the lives of Afro-German women, 
arguing against an image of ‘orientalised’ womanhood and racial prejudices. Atabay 
(1998) has taken an ethnographic approach for understanding the gender relations 
amongst second generation Turkish migrants, showing the complex understandings of 
gender by both sexes, and the possibilities for positioning oneself. Piper (2003) looked 
at Thai migrant brides and sex workers in Germany, and their understanding of gender 
and gender relations. Mandel (2008) discusses Turkish women and headscarves, and the 
representation of Turkish women, and how head-scarves are used as a means of 
resistance to outward (German) pressure and expectations of ‘what a Turkish woman 
should look like.’  
Comparing the dates of writing, it appears that both tendencies coexisted and continue 
to coexist. If I claim that there is a shift, I argue that it has come from an ethnographic 
understanding that in my estimation has begun to permeate other areas. It remains to be 
seen whether or not this trend continues. Journalistic approaches, however, are still 
looking for sensational head-lines that are by and large not concerned with presenting a 
more nuanced picture. Recently there has been a surge in stories about ‘honour-
killings’, in which family members- usually of Turkish origin- kill a young woman for 
some misdemeanour, like ‘wanting a western lifestyle’. Representations of guest-
workers in the media have focussed on the Turkish minority and representations of 
Turkish women as constantly oppressed, and subject to discrimination, while casting 
Turkish men as patriarchal and inherently oppressive. The ongoing head-scarf debate in 
Germany highlights the complexities of gender, national identity and integration. In 
Germany, women and girls with their heads covered often encounter negative reactions; 
attempts have been made to prevent them from wearing scarves (Mandel, 2008:304). 
Some German school teachers have prohibited girls from wearing scarves in the 
classroom. The head-scarf has become a symbol of the continued “domination of the 
man over the woman, a practice with continues to be observed in Turkey” (Chin, 
2007:175).  
Approaching the question of gender from the current predominant perspective is 
unhelpful. Migrants are conflated with ‘Turks’, migrant men are all ‘oppressive and 
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patriarchal’, and migrant women are all ‘oppressed and victimized’. Such assumptions 
of essential cultural differences drive a wedge between foreign and German women, and 
foreign and German men. What these debates about gender and migration do is to create 
a dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘them’, ascribing identities that are mutually exclusive 
and a discourse about assimilation, rather than integration.  
The second generation of Korean migrants in Germany does not fit easily into these 
discourses. On the surface German and Korean identity seem mutually exclusive. The 
Korean nation is constituted in a narrative centring upon blood and soil (Kim, 1997). 
Similarly, the German nation, until the year 2000 operated under a strict form of the jus 
sanguinis for naturalization. These two approaches, which both centre on a narrative of 
blood-relatedness, create a difficult position for the second generation of Korean 
migrants to Germany. According to the Korean narrative, they are Korean. According to 
the German narrative, they are Korean too. They do not fit into a German national 
narrative, but they live their lives in Germany and large numbers are naturalized 
German citizens. They fit into the Korean national narrative, but they are German 
citizens and their everyday lives are in Germany.  
“We’re not Koreans, we’re not Germans- we’re kyopos,” many of my informants used 
to say to explain to me how they identified and who they were. Kyopo is a Korean word, 
meaning ‘Korean living in a foreign country’. In that sense the word is used in Korea, 
and overseas. The second generation of South-Koreans (‘Koreans’ henceforth) in 
Germany uses it to describe itself, meaning specifically ‘second-generation German- 
Korean in Germany’. The first generation goes by various names, depending on the 
context. Often members of the first generation refer to themselves as Koreaner 
[Koreans] exclusively, and distinguish the first from the second generation. Others use 
hyphenated names, comparable to ‘Asian-American’, like Deutschkoreaner [German-
Korean], which indicate the specific situation, distinguishing them from what is 
variously known as ‘real Koreans’, or ‘Korean Koreans’ or ‘the Koreans in South 
Korea’, all of which refer to South-Koreans exclusively and not to North-Koreans. 
Amongst the second generation the use of Deutschkoreaner is much more wide-spread, 
but during my fieldwork in Frankfurt am Main, my informants preferred the term kyopo. 
In the German discourse on integration, such a hybrid identity appears an anomaly at 
best, the sign of an identity crisis at worst.  
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In this study, I used national identity and notions about essentialized identity as points 
of departure. The construction of national identity both in Korea and Germany can shed 
light upon the difficulties migrants encounter in their host societies, but to understand 
kyopo identity in everyday life, the rigid constructions of German or Korean identity are 
too limited. The German state has recently tried to emphasise civic citizenship focussing 
upon the legal aspects i.e.: a citizen’s rights and duties as an individual as defined in 
‘territorial nations’ (Smith, 1986), thus moving away from the idea of national 
citizenship by blood, and de-essentializing German identity. Soysal (1994) argues for 
such a post-national citizenship, as does Brubaker (1992), suggesting post-national 
citizenship based upon dual membership: that is, membership in one nation and 
membership in another state in which one is a resident. While such theories imply a 
solution to ongoing debates about second generation identities, I argue that such 
compartmentalizing is essentialist in conception too, and contains a “unitary notion of 
culture, constructed through closed and originary forms of narrative” (Parker, 1995:37). 
Divorcing civic citizenship from cultural identity only serves to highlight the 
complexities of identity. So, I used these fixed identities as a point of departure to 
explore the tension between “recognizing the subject as decentred and culture as hybrid, 
and acknowledging the political exigencies of constructing and affirming collective 
identity” (Parry, 1992:30). From that position, German and Korean identities begin with 
a fixed set of attributes, thereby situating German-Koreans in a theoretical space ‘in 
between’ conflicting cultures. However, in the course of my research, “the multiplicity 
of identities, which simultaneously inhabited different material and symbolic spaces, 
negotiated different languages and did not sustain themselves by idealizing pure and 
untainted pasts” (Parker, 1995:35), demonstrated the limits of essentialized identities. 
 The focus on identity in my research allows me to stress how individuals’ identity is 
shaped through shared points of commonality that are grounded in everyday life. Many 
social theorists have argued for a ‘soft’ understanding of identity, stressing the 
importance of narrative to social life and a constructivist approach to identity.  Identity 
becomes a flexible and capacious concept, subject to open-ended negotiation. Brubaker 
and Cooper (2000) argue that the social sciences have surrendered to such soft and 
flexible approaches to identity, and that the word has come to mean either too much, too 
little, or nothing at all. Brubaker and Cooper (2000) argue that the constructivist stance 
on identity, to soften and to acquit it of the charge of “essentialism”, stipulating that 
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identities are malleable, fluid and multiple, leaves no reason to talk about identities. 
Instead, they suggest using less ambiguous terms, like identification. Brubaker and 
Cooper (2000) question how, if it is fluid, it can harden, congeal and crystallize; or, if 
constructed, how one can understand the sometimes coercive force of external 
identifications. (2000:01). Rightly, they assert that “identity” is a key term in the 
vernacular idiom of contemporary politics, and claim that  “conceptualizing all affinities 
and affiliations, all forms of belonging, all experiences of commonality, connectedness 
and cohesion, all self-understandings and self-identifications in the idiom of ‘identity’, 
saddles us with a blunt, flat, undifferentiated vocabulary” (2000:02). 
While I agree that encompassing all of the above in the idiom of “identity” may seem 
blunt and undifferentiated, regarding identity as a category of practice has its place in 
the social sciences, precisely because it is “the vernacular idiom of contemporary 
politics”. Identities, to paraphrase Claude Lévi-Strauss, are good to think with, because 
we use “identity” and different “identities” as categories to organize the world around 
us, and depending on the circumstances, prioritize one form of identity, over another. 
Because the concept of essentialized identity is so central to debates about integration in 
Germany, I posit that employing the concept, and exploring it as a practice, sheds light 
onto the complexities of human interaction, self-understanding and underlying societal 
and ideological structures. I argue that identity is a relational category of practice, which 
is continually renegotiated, or as Parker (1995: 173) put it: “Identities are formed in two 
ways; as narratives of self-production, and through defences against unwelcome 
attributions made by others”. This formation, as an ongoing process, synthesizes 
“internal self-definition and one’s ascription by others” (Jenkins, 1996:20). Identities 
are always linked to the context in which they are lived and therefore are dynamic in 
formation, meaning that they are grounded in the mundane details of social interaction, 
habits, routines and practical knowledge (Edensor, 2002:17).  
Like Hall (1989) I consider identity to “always [be] constructed through memory, 
fantasy, narrative and myth. Cultural identities are the points of identification which are 
made within the discourses of history and culture. Not an essence, but a positioning” 
(1989:71). This ‘positioning’ is done in different ways and on different levels, not only 
individually, but serving as a basis for creating community, or dividing it. And if 
identities are indeed ‘good to think with’, then exploring the process of positioning, the 
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narratives of self-production and the ascriptions by others, show the limits and 
possibilities of the social order Ang (2003) claims identities are the basis of, and how to 
challenge it. In this study I attempted a more holistic approach, by also exploring social 
interactions and habits, as a way of articulating the possibilities of identity, and its 
limits.  
I focus on women, since gender relations are used as a way of determining whether or 
not a migrant group can ‘become’ German, but: “in any consideration of gender, too 
exclusive a focus on either sex can itself be misleading” (Cowan, 1990:07). Gender is a 
relational reality, making it impossible to study exclusively male or female worlds. As 
Flax emphasised, “As a practical social relation, gender can be understood only by a 
close examination of the meanings of ’male’ and ‘female’ and the consequences of 
being assigned to one or the other gender within concrete social practices” (Flax (1987) 
in Cowan, 1990:8).  
Gender, like identity, is an organizing principle that exists on two levels: it is a 
relational concept that determines everyday social practices and activities, and a thought 
construct or category that helps making sense of particular social worlds and histories 
(Flax, 1987:630). As a relational concept gender never is and never can be as monolithic 
as the above German representations have cast it. A more nuanced understanding of 
gender is needed in analysis to move away from the recurring trope that pitches a 
seemingly inherent non-German identity against another by using gender. I am not 
advocating returning to the well-intended German example of the early 1980s, which 
sought to understand migrants and their families via looking at women. Such an 
approach divides migrants into male migrants and ‘their’ women and families. While 
this approach has yielded results that are at odds with the current representations- 
showing much more complexity than the current representations- approaching gender as 
a relational concept is much more helpful. One cannot study gender in isolation, so 
looking at German-Korean second generation women always entailed looking at 
German-Korean men; as well as the men and women of the majority society, to gain a 
deeper understanding of everyday social practices and activities, and their ways of 
negotiating identity. 
In chapter 2, I set the scene of these social practices and activities, explaining my 
methodology and limitations. I undertook my fieldwork in Frankfurt am Main, which is 
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home to a large Korean community. I introduce myself, the city, and explain how I 
arrived and met my informants. Some of my personal background is important to 
explain my methodology and limitations. 
Chapter 3 provides a brief history of migration to Germany, theoretical background on 
the construction of ‘Germanness’, gender, integration and discusses existing literature 
on migrant second generations in Germany. Identities are not independent actors, but 
my discussion concerns the identities of people, who live in a certain environment that 
informs them, and the ways in which they negotiate identities.  Thus, a complete 
understanding of identity requires an analysis of historical circumstances that inform the 
present day. To contextualise the present day situation of the second generation of 
Korean descent in Germany, I explore an understanding of ‘Germanness’, the history of 
migration to Germany, and policies and efforts at integration, with particular focus on 
second generations.  
I ask: what impact, do the discourses on Germanness and gender have on the situation 
of second generations? What does ‘integration’ mean in Germany? What are the aims of 
integration? How does the media and literature conceptualize second generations? What 
discourse is employed to talk about second generations? How are the kyopos situated in 
those discourses? 
In chapter 4, I discuss the particularities of Korean migration to Germany. Identities 
have to be situated historically, so I look at the particular circumstances of South Korea 
at the time of their migration, focussing on the construction of gender and identity in 
Korea. Then I discuss first generation Korean women’s experiences in Germany and the 
present-day situation. I ask: what were the specific historic circumstances of Korean 
migration? What experiences did the women make? Has the experience of gendered 
migration put the Korean migrants to Germany into a unique position?  
Chapter 5 builds on chapter 4, exploring cultural legacies and change that inform the 
self-understanding of the second-generation. I discuss pre-migration cultural influences, 
focussing on family experiences, norms and cultural frameworks. I explore traditional 
Korean family structures and the role of women within the family. Then I look at family 
patterns of Korean migrants to Germany and ask: Have they changed? And if so, how? 
How have these experiences shaped and influenced the self-understanding of the second 
18 
 
 
generation, especially women? What impact do visits to Korea have? How do they 
position themselves, in relation to their Korean parents, their German everyday 
environment and Korea?  
Chapter 7 explores integration and the limitations of kyopo identity. The German 
discourse on integration, in which identity and self-identification are seemingly at the 
heart of successful integration, seems inclusive. But is it open to all foreigners to 
integrate successfully? What does it mean for the kyopos? How do they situate 
themselves within the larger debate? How do the kyopo women see themselves?  
In chapter 8, I look at ways of performing kyopo identity. Having explained the 
discourses surrounding identity negotiation, I show how this is done in a particular 
space- the karaoke bar- where identity is enacted as a narrative of self-production. I ask 
how this is done through performance. How is continuity and discontinuity with the 
parental ‘Koreanness’ expressed and performed? What impact does the everyday 
German environment have? What role does gender play? What are the possibilities and 
limitations of kyopo identity for young women?  
German debates on integration of migrant second generations still focus on ideas of 
culture conflicts and identity crises. Drawing together all these issues in the conclusion, 
it is possible to see how kyopos negotiate identity as an opportunity that rejects the static 
and monolithic constructions of essentialized Germanness and essentialized 
Koreanness. The kyopos narrate and negotiate their identity within those discourses, 
drawing on static concepts, but situate themselves as neither/nor and instead 
conceptualize their identity as a hybrid identity based on shared experiences. However, 
there are limits to how they can construct their identities, and these limits apply 
particularly to women.  
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2. ‘Going home to study myself’: Frankfurt am Main and the Kyopos.   
 
In the introduction, I gave a brief insight into the history of migration and present-day 
issues surrounding migrants in Germany. Here, I intend to explain the geographical, 
demographical and methodological circumstances of my fieldwork, as well as 
introducing my key informants that reappear in the following chapters. To put all of this 
into context, I will first provide some background information on myself, as using 
myself as a lens will help towards an understanding of the community and the research 
as a whole. Then, I will briefly explain my larger, geographical fieldsite and how it 
presents itself, and the actual, social fieldsite. I will then explain my methodology and 
the limitations I encountered, how I set about making contacts, and situated myself 
amongst my informants, and finally introduce some key informants.  
 
2.1. ‘Going home to a foreign country’- An insider ethnography?  
 
The anthropologist’s past is relevant [only] in so far as it relates to the anthropological 
enterprise, which includes the choice of area and study, the experience of fieldwork, 
analysis and writing (Okely, 1992:01). Thus, it is vital to reflect upon the 
anthropologist’s self in order to contextualise that research. Not only is personal history 
relevant to explain an initial interest, but it is also necessary in order to comprehend the 
manner in which I, as the fieldworker, was received and re-contextualised. Hastrup 
(1992) points out that the field is not “the unmediated world of the ‘others’, but the 
world between ourselves and the others”, thus the encounters within the field as part of 
a wider discourse depend very intimately upon the person of the fieldworker. All 
ethnographers are after all positioned subjects (Rosaldo, 1984:192), their position being 
defined by certain factors, such as age, gender, outsider status, lived experience and so 
on. Fieldwork is intersubjective, making it pivotal to gain an understanding of the 
‘unnamed fieldworker’, who to the ‘unnamed informants’, after all, is as real a person as 
one to the other.  
An explanation of the researcher’s past and position will be helpful in understanding the 
issue of access. ‘Othering’ is part of the anthropological practice; however, the identity 
of others is relational (Hastrup, 1992:121), depending very much on the fieldworker 
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herself, her mode of access and her positionality in the field as well as the way she is 
perceived. With an insider ethnography, in particular, certain issues arise: for one, 
insiders can never be expected to be ‘objective and scientific’ and for another, the 
process of studying an alien culture is missing. Influenced by the relationship with one’s 
own group, the anthropologist apparently cannot distance herself from her group and yet 
has already done so by choosing to study it (Hovland, 2003:01). Therefore it is crucial, 
from the very start, to establish the researcher within the field to comprehend the 
methods used to gain access and gather data, as well as the subsequent analysis of 
findings. ‘Fieldwork and analysis constitute a unified praxis’ (Scholte, 1974:438) 
intricately interwoven with the person of the fieldworker herself, whose position in the 
field provides the necessary premise to the analysis.   
My research was intended to be an ‘insider ethnography’: the study of one’s own group, 
which seems to go against anthropological reason. It appears that when the 
anthropologist goes home to do fieldwork, it becomes difficult to separate the difference 
of the world out there, the field, from the normality of home. The assumption therefore 
could be made that an ‘inside ethnographer’ will never be able to conform to the 
principles of the rite of passage that fieldwork is, as the insider can never be expected to 
be ‘objective and scientific’, and the process of studying an alien culture is missing (cf, 
Abu-Lughod, 1991; Hastrup, 1991 etc).With the intention of studying second-
generation Korean women in Germany, the endeavour of an ‘insider ethnography’ 
appeared clear-cut. I expected an insider ethnography and, within a short period of time, 
found myself an outsider and a foreigner in a country whose language is my mother 
tongue. Having spent several years living and studying in the UK, I found that I was 
missing a vast knowledge of everyday references, not only startling me, but those 
around me. My flatmate’s girlfriend, herself an exchange student from Latin America, 
spent the first two weeks helping me out. The ‘Johann Wolfgang Goethe Universität’ 
also had a project involved in greeting foreign students helping them to get acclimatized 
to their new surroundings. I obtained a very kindly mentor whose help proved 
invaluable to me in dealing with the puzzling ways of everyday life.  
Thus, while in some respects my research did involve returning ‘home’, it is important 
to grasp that the concept of an ‘insider ethnography’ as I expected one, must be used 
with caution. My definition of self, my own experiences and my expectations did not 
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firmly position me either as ‘the other’ or ‘the insider’, but in between different 
concepts and perceptions that I will discuss in more detail later in the context of meeting 
informants. With an interest fuelled after lengthy periods of rejection and alienation by a 
clash of perceptions, leading me from England back to Germany into an area of 
contested identity, positioned me awkwardly as the ‘other’ insider on several levels for 
Germans, German-Koreans and myself.  
 
2.2. Frankfurt am Main- The fieldsite 
 
I chose Frankfurt am Main (Frankfurt henceforth), as a viable site for research. It 
currently hosts the largest part of the Korean migrants, numbering approximately 5000 
people. The city is better known for being a centre of international trade, housing the 
German Stock Market and a renowned international book fair, being a financial centre 
as well as being famous for being the hometown of Johann-Wolfgang von Goethe, one 
of the most famous German poets, for whom the university is named.  
Frankfurt is a popular destination for tourists. Its Altstadt [Old Town] was mostly 
destroyed by Allied bombing in WW2, but a few famous medieval structures remain 
that are popular with tourists. After the war, Frankfurt missed out on becoming the new 
capital to Bonn, but having been an important centre for trade and finances since the 
Middle Ages, it retained its important position in German trade and industry. 
International trade fairs have been held since the Middle Ages in the city, and other than 
being a tourist attraction, the city is now a leading centre of trade. The city is also home 
to the European Central Bank, and serves as a hub for traffic on rail, road and by plane. 
Since Germany’s largest airport is close by, the old town is usually rather crowded with 
tourists, especially in summer.  
While it sounds busy and crowded, Frankfurt itself has a population
4
 of 660 289 
inhabitants of which 169 539 are Ausländer [literally: outlanders/foreigners]. With 31 
690 i.e.: 19.1%, Turkish nationals are the largest foreign minority in Frankfurt, followed 
closely by Serbian and Croatian nationals
5
. On its website, Frankfurt welcomes visitors 
                                                 
4
 http://www.frankfurt.de/sixcms/media.php/1977/37_Einwohner2005Quartal3.pdf 
5
 http://www.frankfurt.de/sixcms/media.php/1977/37_Einwohner2005Quartal3.pdf 
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as ‘the most international city in Germany6’. The city prides itself on being 
cosmopolitan, advertising by calling itself a ‘global village’7, claiming internationality 
as a ‘Leitmotif’ and priding itself further on the peaceful nebeneinander [side by side] of 
over a hundred nationalities per square kilometre.  A very glitzy new skyline of 
skyscrapers contrasts with half-timbered houses, and sushi-bars can be found alongside 
restaurants serving traditional local specialities. German Gemütlichkeit [cosiness] 
coexists in harmony with the buzz of international life
8
. Away from the main pedestrian 
precinct, the Zeil and the Altstadt, Frankfurt is very cosy. It has a provincial feel of 
slowness to it, and away from the main traffic arteries, one can find street cafés, beer 
gardens and sleepy little restaurants. The nightlife is distributed over the entire city 
rather than one location. The city claims that it combines the old with the new and 
different cultures living peacefully side by side or next to one another, as well as being a 
friendly tourist destination. I highlight this again to explain that Frankfurt as presented 
towards the outside world by various authorities and tourist agencies, attempts to show 
itself as very open and friendly towards others, but at the same time indicates that 
outsiders are expected to live peacefully next to native Frankfurters, not in their midst. 
Added to that is the tourist population that comes and goes, and particularly in popular 
places leads to interactions in which anyone looking different is automatically assumed 
to be a tourist, hence incapable of speaking German. In later chapters I will show that 
this constant ‘othering’ plays a large role towards understanding the German-Korean 
self-understanding, so it should be noted here already.  
Rents in Frankfurt are comparatively high, and the cheapest quarter to live in, is the 
Gallusviertel, which traditionally is an immigrant quarter. Many students choose to live 
there precisely because the rents are cheap. I learned this while I was looking for a 
flatshare, slowly building up a knowledge of Frankfurt, and the different 
conceptualizations of the city’s areas. While looking for a flat, I had my first suspicions 
that I might not actually do an ‘insider ethnography’. “Making the exotic familiar and 
the familiar strange” (Okely, 1996:05) as an anthropological endeavour, something that 
the anthropologist does, didn’t happen. Instead, I was the one feeling out of place and 
not ‘at home’ at all.  
                                                 
6
 http://www.fr http://www.frankfurt.de/sis/Stadtportrait.php 
ankfurt.de/sixcms/detail.php?id=stadtfrankfurt_eval01.c.317693.en 
7
 http://www.frankfurt.de/sis/Stadtportrait.php 
8
 http://www.frankfurt.de/sis/Stadtportrait.php 
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My eventual location also had the benefit to be closely situated to the Korea Haus 
[Korea House]. The Korea Haus would play an important part in my research, so it was 
providential that I found a place close by. During the time of my fieldwork, the Korea 
Haus was a restaurant with a small karaoke-bar attached, and mainly stood out as high-
rise building that had the words Korea Haus in neon lights on the side. It did not stand 
out particularly from other buildings facing the main train station, all of which sported 
similar neon lighting and advertisements, mainly for airlines. Unobtrusive and 
unnoticed in general, the building was reminiscent of what Beckers-Kim (2008) writes 
about when describing the German-Korean migrants as living their lives quietly.  
The practicalities of arriving and establishing oneself bodily, are coupled with the 
practicalities of arriving and establishing oneself within the fieldsite as a research space. 
Establishing myself within Frankfurt only increased the sense that I had gained while 
flat-hunting that I might not find myself doing a ‘straightforward’ insider-ethnography. 
This sneaking suspicion made me contact the University of Frankfurt’s international 
students’ welcome project, designed to provide foreign students with mentors to help 
them get acclimatized. The project organizers were somewhat puzzled by my request, 
but immediately helpful and my mentor proved to be a great help, later also in 
establishing contacts with the German-Korean population.   
While in some respects my research did involve returning ‘home’, it is important to 
grasp that the concept of an ‘insider ethnography’, as I expected one, must be used with 
caution as my definition of self, my own experiences and my expectations did not 
firmly position me either as ‘the other’ or ‘the insider’, but in between different 
concepts and perceptions. My German flatmates considered me ‘the other’, because of 
habits I had picked up in the UK that struck them as foreign. The German-Koreans saw 
me in the same way as my flatmates, and- since I had grown up isolated from the 
Korean community in Germany- didn’t see me as one of them. Thus my own struggles 
with positioning myself on several levels, finding my own identity questioned and 
myself categorized, determined the methods I used in gaining data. This experience is 
familiar both to anthropologists who return ‘home’ to carry out fieldwork and among 
migrants, who are never really ‘at home’, whether in the host country or when they 
‘return’.  
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2.3. Meeting the German-Korean minority in Frankfurt- Demographics, Limits, 
Research Questions, Methodology and Ethics 
 
In this section, I discuss my sample of informants and the limits of said sample. I will 
then outline the research questions I formulated, and explain my methodology and 
ethics, before making some general observations about my community, and introducing 
some of my informants.    
Demographics and Limits 
I spoke with 63 male and female informants in formal interviews, ages ranging from 17 
to 65. Of the total number, twenty informants never did a second interview. Below is a 
break-down according to gender, number of informants, age, class and education.  
 
Age  Gender Generation Parentage  Occupation Class Numbers 
17-19 Female Second Korean Still attending 
school 
Middle 
Class 
11 
19-32 Female Second Korean 
(one 
exception) 
Attending 
university/white 
collar work 
with finished 
degree (one 
exception) 
Middle 
Class 
32 
60-65 Female First Korean  Retired/nursing/ 
white collar 
work 
Middle 
Class 
6 
20-33 Male Second Korean 
(one 
Attending 
university/white 
Middle 
Class 
14 
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exception) collar work 
with finished 
degree 
N/A Male First Korean N/A N/A N/A 
 
A further 34 informants are not included for lack of formal interviews. All of these 
informants fall into the age bracket 20-32 (21 females, 13 males), were either studying 
or had finished a university degree, and were middle class.  These informal informants I 
met repeatedly over the course of my fieldwork, at various parties and other gatherings. 
As acquaintances, we would chat, but for assorted reasons, mostly due to time-
constraints or conflicting schedules, never set up a formal interview. One of the obvious 
shortcomings of this sample is the lack of first generation male voices, and the thin 
sample of first generation female voices. At the time of my fieldwork, I focussed on the 
second generation and women, so failed to take male first-generation voices into 
account formally. The number of first generation females is limited for the same 
reasons.  
The seemingly odd distribution of ages deserves a quick explanation: Due to the 
migration pattern and the comparatively short window of migration to Germany, the 
first generation were all roughly the same age, and began families in a relatively narrow 
window of time. There is a sharp delineation between the first and second generation. 
Because of this narrow window of time, in which the second generation was born, the 
younger age bracket is quite small.   
For the first generation, the above sample does not accurately reflect occupation. While 
the number of nurses is high, interviews and personal conversations revealed that the 
range of occupations among first generation women is greater than indicated in my 
sample. The reflection of age, occupation and class for the second generation, both male 
and female, however is correct, and representative for the whole second generation of 
German-Koreans. According to Beckers-Kim (2005), 95% of second generation 
German-Koreans have achieved the Abitur. Thus, my sample accurately reflects the 
overall academic achievements, and the social mobility of the second generation.   
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One striking absence in the above sample requires some explanation. I only had two 
informants who had a German parent as well as a Korean parent. Being of 
German/Korean
9
 heritage myself, and the perception my informants had of me initially, 
lies at the root of this shortcoming. Realizing how my informants saw me, initially, 
made me abandon such plans as attending Korean lessons in order to evade an 
impression that I was searching for my roots; indeed, I quite often positioned myself as 
‘entirely German’ in thinking and acting. At the same time, being a ‘half and half’ 
provided me with a privileged position in gaining access since it was expected of me to 
be ‘drawn to Korean culture’, giving me the opportunity to oscillate between the 
‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ position. In other words, my mere presence highlighted an 
ongoing discourse. It is a truism that you know about yourself via the way others see 
you. In the same vein you learn about others via the way they see you. My Korean 
connection provided me with a source of access, while at the same time my ‘half and 
half’ status kept me in a position of liminality to a certain degree, allowing me to 
examine notions of Koreanness and Germanness.  
Abu-Lughod (1991) sums up the dilemma of the “halfie anthropologists” as: “[When] 
they position themselves with reference to two communities, […] when they present the 
Other they are presenting themselves(1991:469).” Parker (1995), a half Chinese, half 
British researcher, studying the processes of identity negotiation amongst young 
Chinese people in the UK, had similar experiences. He claims that a “commonality of 
experience was implicit throughout the discussions “(1995:244). He goes on to say that 
shifting his positionalities was a feature of his discussions to elicit responses. He quotes 
one of his informants saying about him:  
“By having a dual/multiple identity you were both easy to relate to and yet 
sufficiently distanced. Had you been white there may have been resistance, and 
had you been Chinese there may have been reluctance to be fully critical. Your 
uniqueness and position both insider and outsider makes you an ideal 
interviewer” (1995:245). 
While I would not call myself, an ‘ideal interviewer’, my informants’ perception of me 
provided opportunities. It brought out issues of what it means to be German or Korean, 
problematizing integration. One of my informants said that as a ‘half-Korean’ “you are 
exotic enough to attract attention, but not too outlandish”, implying once more that 
                                                 
9
 Henceforth German/Korean denotes having one German and one Korean parent, unless otherwise stated.  
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‘half-Koreans’ have it easier integrating. In my fieldwork my being perceived as ‘half 
and half’, with all the attached stereotypes about what it is to be a ‘half-Korean’, served 
as an initial point for discussion in constructing kyopo identity.  
I expected to meet second-generation German-Koreans like myself, however, thinking 
that we would have much in common. In the beginning of my fieldwork, I fully 
intended to look at second generation German-Koreans who had two ethnically different 
parents and those that had two Korean parents. I soon changed to focussing on second-
generation German-Koreans with two Korean parents, once I had gained access to the 
community. At the time, there were few persons active within the community who had 
one German and one Korean parent. Proportionally, the vast majority had two Korean 
parents or were Ganzkoreaner [Full Koreans], and very few who were Halbkoreaner. 
But therein lies one of the limitations of this study: all my main informants and most of 
those active within the community that I met have two Korean parents. That ignores a 
large number of Halbkoreaner, who are not represented in this study.  
 
Research Questions 
Below, I outline my research questions that I set out to answer. They provided the 
framework for this study, beginning with an undifferentiated understanding of identity, 
which, in the course of my research, changed towards a dynamic understanding of 
identity formation and negotiation. My research questions were as follows: 
 
- Can the ideal of ‘civic citizenship’ or post-national citizenship actually 
bridge the discrepancies between popular discourses of belonging? Is the 
rise of the European Union and its laws upon migration and stress on 
civic rights a defining moment for the demise of the importance of 
national identity or do national sentiments linger and provide obstacles 
for the integration of migrants? Can ethnic boundaries become 
permeable by employing a civic and territorial discourse as suggested by 
Brubaker (1992)?  
 
- In light of this, is it a useful concept that will provide the children of 
migrants with a distinct identity allowing identification with a state 
(rather than a nation) or does the underlying construction of 
‘Germanness’ as well as the construction of ‘Koreanness’ inhibit a form 
of civic identity for German-Koreans, and other mixed-background 
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persons ? And thus, is ‘civic citizenship’ merely a concept used to brush 
over the discrepancies?  
 
 
- How do second generation women position themselves in relation to 
their parents, their community and the majority culture? How does the 
construction of gendered national identity influence their self-
understanding? What impact have changing kinship patterns and 
traditional values had upon the process of self-understanding both for the 
first and second generation women? How is the discrepancy between 
different experiences and processes of socialisation reconciled and 
consolidated? How far are obvious differences in looks playing a 
conscious role in the determination of difference? What and how does 
this influence every-day lives? 
 
- Do second generation women actually ‘have to make a choice’ between 
seemingly conflicting and devaluing concepts of identity or can they 
reconcile their own understanding of themselves in a hybrid identity as 
hinted at by usage of the term ‘Reiskartoffel’, making allowances to both 
discourses? And is the second generation a fully accepted part of German 
society, as KGN [Korean-German Network] states? What impact does 
naturalisation have, if any at all? 
 
 
  
Access 
In this section, I will provide a brief overview over the opportunities for access to the 
community, and how I went about making contacts. Then I will discuss the questions I 
asked, and discuss how these were operationalized for interviews and observations.  
As Gupta & Ferguson (1997) point out: “One does not just wander onto a ‘field site’ to 
engage in a deep and meaningful relationship with ‘the natives’. The ‘Field’ is a 
clearing whose deceptive transparency obscures the complex processes that go into 
constructing it”(1997:5). Multi-sited fieldwork is no longer a novelty in anthropology. 
The discipline has moved away from ideas about ‘the field’ as a bounded place in the 
classical Malinowskian image of fieldwork (1997:11), towards an approach that 
decentres ‘the field’ and then “recovering it as one element in a multistranded 
methodology for the construction of […] ‘situated knowledges’” (1997:37).  In essence, 
for me, the dispersed community in Frankfurt made me “focus on shifting locations 
rather than bounded fields” (1997:38) and seek locations for meeting.  
29 
 
 
Amongst the organized spaces are churches. There are different evangelical churches 
catering to the German-Korean population, holding services in Korean, and one 
Catholic congregation. The fragmented nature of the evangelical churches, and the 
competition for new converts from those churches made it inopportune for me to 
participate in religious life. But as it turned out, many of my informants knew one 
another from attending church together as children, but had long stopped attending 
services.  
Another publicly organized space was the annual Sportfest [Sports Celebration], held in 
summer each year, in different locations. At the time of my fieldwork it was held in 
Frankfurt. Organized by the Korea Verband E.V, this sporting event takes place every 
year on Korean Independence Day on the 15
th
 of August. An hour long ceremony 
commemorates Korea’s liberation from Japanese colonial rule, followed by assorted 
sporting events with teams from different cities competing. It usually ends with a party 
and concert- with a band or artist from Korea- for the second generation. The Sportfest 
is a meeting space for the first and the second generation, which I will return to in 
chapter 5 “You have to have Korean parents to understand”.  
Sometimes in collaboration with the Korea Verband, kyopos organize weekend 
seminars for the kyopos, to discuss issues and a variety of topics, often connected to the 
process of identity formation. These take place in different locations and generally last 
for a weekend. While some of my informants attended them, they generally agreed that 
“it’s a good opportunity for meeting friends and drinking”, outside the guided seminar 
hours that they described as ‘lecturing us’. Some of the seminar topics during the time 
of my fieldwork were directed mainly towards Korea, Korean history and asking 
whether the second generation was ‘losing Korean culture’. At the time of my fieldwork 
these initiatives seemed to be geared towards fostering a Korean sense of identity, while 
the ‘meeting friends and drinking’ aspect was more informative of the processes and 
dynamics between social actors in interpreting their sense of identities.  
Another – more localized and purely second generation - initiative by kyopos, for 
kyopos were organized parties that took place in and around Frankfurt. The organizers 
rented the location- either a club or a pub- and anyone could attend. There was usually a 
cover fee of a few Euros that went towards renting the location. One of the organizers 
told me that the initial rationale behind organizing such parties was to provide a location 
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for kyopos to meet outside churches and away from the first generation, and to foster a 
sense of community. I describe on such party in more detail in chapter 6 “The Good 
Foreigners”. This particular party took place in a university pub, being one of the 
smaller ones. Other parties took place in grander venues, like popular nightclubs in 
Frankfurt, or the Christmas party in a hotel bar.  
Generally the parties were announced via kyopo.de, an online forum established for the 
second generation of German-Koreans. The same forum provides a means of making 
contacts with other kyopos, announcing parties and other get-togethers, and discussing a 
variety of topics. Unlike other forums like asia-zone.de, this forum in particular serves 
kyopos across the entire country. The kyopo forum was very helpful in gaining access. 
Before setting out into the field, I posted about my move on the forum, and established 
a few contacts, which in turn helped me gain more contacts. I posted a few topics on the 
forums, mainly dealing with asking for practical advice about Frankfurt and where to 
find a flat, as well as asking for people to volunteer to participate in my research. Within 
a few days, I had a good number of helpful and welcoming replies.  
Another mode of access turned out to be my student mentor, provided to me by the 
University of Frankfurt, who not only helped me with everyday issues, but with finding 
contacts via friends of friends. I used a snowball system in getting to know people, but 
also at parties simply asked people if I could interview them. Using the snowball system 
aided in finding informants who did not attend the parties, but who were still part of the 
community, and meeting them in informal situations.  
 
Methodology 
When researching in a social science context the vast availability of methods ranging 
from quantitative to qualitative presents the researcher with several difficulties as to 
which methods may be best suited for a particular project. Quantitative methods may be 
able to outline general trends and commonplaces, yet they are ill-suited to provide an in-
depth understanding of the workings of a particular social group (Mullings, 1999). As I 
intended to study a group that had not been intensively studied before, I used qualitative 
methods.  
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Methods such as life story interviewing have been used towards understanding a 
previously invisible group. However, there are pitfalls to using such a method 
exclusively. “A memory is never simply a record of the past but is constantly being 
reworked into new kinds of sense according to the needs of the present” (Dawson, 
1990:45). Thus, while autobiographical memories are valuable in the exploration of 
identities, one must not overlook that such narratives are produced for an intended 
audience. Such narratives are “always open to revision and repositioning, and our life 
can never be comprehensively told by any one narrative” (Bristow, 1991:121). Life 
histories as a sole method are limited in scope and fraught with difficulties.  
To gain a better understanding, I attempted to establish a rapport with my informants 
and beside life stories, also used open-ended interviews, to explore the processes and 
dynamics of social actors experiencing and making sense of the world, and themselves. 
Using open-ended and informal interviews alongside life histories and formal 
interviews of set questions, enabled me to develop a more dialogic approach that 
provided other insights. Most of these interviews took place in cafés and tended to turn 
into conversations, which proved more insightful than formal interviews. Equally, 
conversations in bigger groups in an informal environment, such as pub, would often 
yield different insights than interviews. Comparing these incidents to life histories and 
interviews with the same informants, the processes and dynamics became clearer.  
For first interviews, I had a formal set of questions, covering age, parentage, occupation 
and nationality. The next question concerned the parents’ migration, their respective 
ages, nationality and current occupation. I would ask about visits to Korea, linguistic 
abilities, and whether my interview partner felt German or Korean, why, why not. In 
first interviews, I would also ask about what my informants considered typically Korean 
and typically German. After the first interviews, certain trends already began showing in 
repetition. For example, nearly all of my informants had mentioned the concept of 
‘Han’ as typically Korean. I discuss Han further in chapters 5 and 7.  There was no set 
interview schedule. Interviews tended to take several hours, which is one of the reasons 
some initial participants fell away. I have not directly quoted these interviews in this 
thesis, but did use them to help me identifying overall trends. Due to the length of 
interviews, I requested interviews, but was dependent on informants finding time in 
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their schedules. It was by no means planned for an interview to take up several hours, 
but especially informal interviews and life histories tended to take time.  
Further interviews took place over a period of time. Later interviews were informal and 
open-ended, discussing either issues the informant had thoughts on or wanted to clarify, 
or the trends I had tentatively identified. Such trends included a limited number of visits 
to Korea, a gendered experience of growing up, parental stress on education, and 
observations about the majority society. In an effort of asking questions that were not 
leading, I would usually repeat the informant’s own words as a question, or read back 
the notes I had taken, usually leading to further clarification. After observations, I 
would discuss my observations with participants in informal conversations, gaining 
deeper insights and perspectives.  
Themes, both predicted and unanticipated, began crystallizing during the course of my 
fieldwork already, during the process of transcribing interviews and notes. With these 
themes and findings, I returned to my initial research questions to answer them, finding 
that the answers I had, required a more nuanced exploration of identity in a wider sense. 
Activities and discussions I had participated in, indicated that identity was a process of 
continuous production of hybridity.  In order to open up this issue and to conceptualise 
it fruitfully, in a grounded “conversation” with my fieldwork data, I therefore turned to 
a number of books that addressed and theorised identity, of which I found Jenkins 
(1996), Hall (1996) and Parker (1995) especially stimulating and useful.  
 
Ethical Considerations 
Due to the limited size of the population I studied and my own relation to it, I placed 
particular stress upon informed consent and confidentiality. Abiding the Association of 
Social Anthropologists ethical guidelines, I took all necessary measures to ensure that 
confidentiality and anonymity were guaranteed. I was well aware that my position as an 
‘insider’ lead to my obtaining information that might otherwise not be freely given and 
thus always ascertained that informed consent was given for me to use the information 
obtained.  Yet, informants tend to forget that researchers are researchers, especially with 
regards to ‘insider ethnography’ and the question arises whether important information 
is being told a friend and would not have been given otherwise (Sarsby, 1984: 132). 
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‘Informed consent’, which expresses according to the ASA “expresses the belief in the 
need for truthful and respectful exchange”, makes it clear that consent must continually 
be renegotiated, should provide for privacy and always fully inform informants of what 
is written about them.  
Seeing that individual researchers have made their own choices as to what constitutes 
‘ethical research’ and is appropriate in their specific contexts, so I found solutions to the 
dilemmas I faced with specific regard to the nature of the community I was studying. 
That meant not using information that might have been helpful to protect participants. 
Another dilemma I often faced was that participants would express curiosity about their 
friends’ interviews, and sometimes tried guessing what others might have said. I 
continuously asserted that the confidentiality I guaranteed them, extended to others. 
Keeping the distance and making the informant aware of that distance at the same time, 
in some cases lead to alienation on the side of the informant, compromising the 
research. Again, I did not use information I obtained from participants who declined all 
further meetings, with the exception of noting down general trends, before destroying 
notes and interviews. Throughout my research I abided by the ASA guidelines and did 
my utmost to prevent possible misconduct and harm to the very best of my knowledge 
and ability.  
 
2.4. Meeting the Kyopos- General Observations and some personal introductions 
 
After some general remarks about the second generation, I will introduce some of my 
key informants. I’ve chosen the following four women, because they represent different 
age groups within the second generation and appear frequently throughout this study. 
After introducing them, I will briefly introduce three kyopo men that also appear in the 
course of this study. While these are certainly not the only voices and social actors that 
have played a large role in my research, I have chosen to introduce others at appropriate 
moments, where their voices and experiences are contextualised. Kathrin and Jong-Soon 
are present throughout this study. Johanna is particularly prominent in chapter 4. They 
all share the same basic background and the experience of being German-Korean with 
two Korean parents, but their particular experiences depend on their age. My male 
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informants Klaus, Jens and Alex reappear throughout, but are particularly prominent in 
chapter 6. 
Generally, in interviews, when I asked informants about their parents they often used 
the expression der Klassiker [the classic] as shorthand to say that their mother had come 
to Germany as a nurse, and their father as a miner. They distinguished themselves thus 
from ‘the younger ones’ or the ‘Korean-Korean kids’, meaning the children of Korean 
parents who had come to Germany in more recent years to work for multinational 
corporations in Frankfurt. They also distinguished themselves from students that way, 
who had come over from Korea, specifically to attend university in Germany.  
One of the factors that distinguished the kyopos without such articulated differences 
were names. Most of my informants had a German first name. The reasoning behind 
that varied from their parents wanting to give them a ‘German name for a German life’ 
to ‘the Germans can’t pronounce Korean names anyway’. There were exceptions 
amongst my informants, and also those who had a ‘German’ and a ‘Korean’ name, but 
in everyday life they mostly used German first names.  
Another practice was language. At kyopo parties, amongst friends, or in the karaoke bar, 
German was the main language of communication. While some of my informants spoke 
Korean, and some knew rudimentary Korean, German was the one language everyone 
knew and spoke fluently. Generally my informants referred to particular foods or drinks 
by their Korean names, but used German in conversation. However singing was done 
mostly in Korean. I explain this ambivalence in more detail in chapter 7 “Doing 
Karaoke, Doing Identity”, but note here that while that may appear odd at first glance, 
it’s not truly as odd within a German context as it sounds. Since foreign-language music 
on the radio and TV is common in Germany, singing along in a foreign language that 
one doesn’t necessarily understand is not uncommon.  
Finishing the more general observations, I am compelled to point out the significance of 
smoking. During the time of my fieldwork, almost all of my informants smoked, 
especially the kyopo women. Friends from Korea tell me that Korean women shouldn’t 
smoke in public, and my female informants told me how much their parents objected to 
their smoking. Again, this is discussed in more detail later, but worth noting here to 
present a fuller picture of my informants.  
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Kathrin: 
Kathrin alerted me to the issues surrounding smoking. Kathrin and Jong-Soon were best 
friends and in their teens when I met them. They were still at school and living with 
their parents. They were part of the lower age-spectrum of the second generation, had 
experienced historical events like the end of the Cold War, which facilitated air travel to 
Korea, and the German- German unification, as children. They had grown up with the 
renewed debate around integration within Germany.  
I met with Kathrin via the online forum for kyopos. At the time, she was still at school, 
just doing her Abitur. Bubbly and lively, she was the youngest of three children, and 
one of two daughters of two Korean parents. Her mother was a former nurse, and her 
father, who had come to Germany as a miner, had obtained a degree and worked for an 
international corporation in Frankfurt. Unlike her older brother and sister, Kathrin spoke 
Korean and told me that she had spent many summers as a child in Korea. She was 
several years younger than her older siblings, and explained that when they were her 
age, her parents hadn’t had the money to pay for expensive journeys to Korea. Also, her 
mother hadn’t been home much in those days, but as their financial situation improved, 
she stopped working and focussed on raising Kathrin, also teaching her Korean.  
Kathrin was petite, lively and articulate. She enjoyed karaoke, she enjoyed fashion and 
she enjoyed grumbling that her parents wouldn’t allow her to colour her fashionably 
short hair and objected to some of the fashions, calling them ‘trampy’. Like Johanna she 
was critical of the parent generation, especially when it came to the preferential 
treatment she saw her parents giving her brother. Gender issues mattered very much to 
her, and presented an on-going source of conflict to her mind. She often said that 
finding a kyopo boyfriend would make it easier for her, since she could introduce him to 
her parents and he would share some of the same experiences, being a German-Korean. 
But she was in two minds about the issue, and mostly would conclude such musings, 
stating that all kyopo males were spoilt by their mothers, which left only a German as a 
possible boyfriend. All of this, she usually said through a cloud of smoke, chain-
smoking one cigarette after another.  
Jong-Soon: 
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Jong-Soon was Kathrin’s best friend at the time. She was also in her late teens, also 
finishing school and equally petite. A little more reserved than Kathrin, she still shared 
a love for karaoke, fashion and grumbling. Jong-Soon was the younger of two 
daughters. Her parents were a former nurse and a former miner, though they had started 
their own business in Frankfurt. She had an older sister who was just finishing her 
degree at university, and she had recently got into trouble with her parents after 
deciding to leave their church to become an atheist.  
Jong-Soon spoke some Korean, but was more comfortable with German. She was also 
less critical of the first generation, and didn’t share Kathrin’s concerns about gender 
issues. As far as Jong-Soon was concerned, it was not an issue that had to greatly 
concern her. She enjoyed ‘traditional Korean patterns of behaviour’, as she called it, for 
kyopo men, which included buying drinks for her. Being at school still and constantly 
short of cash, she regarded such things as an opportunity for herself. Jong- Soon and 
Kathrin enjoyed partying and generally enjoying themselves, but through a haze of blue 
smoke between us, as they lit up one cigarette after another, they were always willing to 
discuss their views and experiences with me.  
Johanna: 
Johanna was older than Kathrin and Jong-Soon at the time. She was within the middle 
spectrum of age for my informants, had attended school during the 1980s and hadn’t 
had the economic possibilities during the time of the Cold War to travel to Korea often. 
At the time I met her, Johanna was a student at the university. She was doing a degree 
in economics and considering doing a PhD once she was done with her first degree. 
Johanna was the friend of a friend, who had mentioned my research to her, and she had 
volunteered to participate via her friend, who carried the message back to me. Since I 
was in the UK at the time, we e-mailed a few times and set up a meeting eventually, 
when I arrived in Frankfurt.  
Having grown up in Frankfurt, she was the only child and daughter of a nurse - Mrs 
Kim- and a retired mechanic- Mr Kim. Both her parents had come to Germany as 
Korean guestworkers, who met in Germany, married and settled. Johanna did not speak 
Korean, but spoke fluent French, English and had German as her mother-tongue. She 
had done several foreign exchanges at university, her last one to France, where she 
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studied for a year. At present, she was living in a house-share with several friends from 
university.  
Tall and athletic, she never wore make-up and didn’t colour her long hair fashionably, 
as some younger kyopo women enjoyed doing. She cycled everywhere and usually wore 
jeans, dark jumpers and a dark rain jacket. All of her clothes were by popular brands 
manufactured for outdoors activities, as were the sturdy shoes that she always wore. 
When going out in the evening, she generally switched the hiking boots for trainers or 
shoes, but had no patience for fashion.  
Johanna was always critical of the Korean community as a whole, and liked keeping to 
the periphery, although she knew a lot of kyopos from church, meetings or parties. 
Being a student and often abroad, she maintained contacts with her friends, but 
remained critical of the first generation, and particularly of what she called ‘the gossip 
mongering’ within the Korean community. ‘Everyone knows and always has to know 
everything,’ she used to complain to me, swiftly followed by the question whether I had 
interviewed this or that friend of hers yet, and what they had said. She did it on purpose 
to make a point, but indeed, she was right: many of my other informants did try asking 
me for gossip. Johanna had a German boyfriend, whom she was keeping a secret from 
her parents. She was critical of what she was doing in keeping him secret, and intended 
to tell her parents eventually. She did not intend to tell them- ever- that she smoked like 
a chimney. Fully aware of such issues, she enjoyed discussing the differences between 
‘Korean parents’ and ‘German parents’, and comparing her upbringing and life with that 
of her German friends.  
Alex, Klaus and Jens: 
The three men are Klaus, Jens and Alex. Klaus and Jens were friends, and Alex and 
Jens were friends, and while Klaus and Alex got along, they were only friendly. Alex 
was in his late twenties and a student at the university. He was the son of a nurse and a 
former miner, who had gone into white collar work eventually. He had grown up in 
Frankfurt as an only child. He usually dressed very much in Johanna’s style, a style that 
was popular amongst part of the student population, especially those who cycled a lot. 
He generally preferred dark clothes fit for outdoor activities, and like most others 
smoked a lot.   
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Klaus was the oldest of the group, working in the city for a bank, after he had finished 
his university degree. He was the only son of two Korean parents, who had started their 
own business. His mother had come to Germany as a nurse, but his father hadn’t come 
to Germany as a miner, but as a university student. Tall, sophisticated and articulate, he 
would always wear shirts, trousers and leather shoes.  
Jens was in his mid-twenties, had just finished his degree and begun a job in the city. 
The only child of two Korean parents, he- unlike Klaus and Alex- spoke Korean, and 
enjoyed visits to Korea. Lively and friendly, he had a great interest in Korea and all 
things Korean, and would help me out with explanations and translations. Together, all 
three went to the same parties and venues as Jong-Soon and Kathrin, and sometimes 
Johanna.  
 
2. 5. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I attempted to show some of the issues, methodologies and limitations in 
my research. I have also tried to establish my fieldsite as a social sphere of changing 
location, rather than a fixed place. I have introduced some of my informants here; I will 
introduce others where appropriate and elaborate on some of the issues I have raised. 
Other issues, like religious worship in German-Korean life in Frankfurt, the 
conceptualization of ‘half and half’ and their self-conceptualization, while important, 
exceed the scope of this study.  
It is important to note that my research questions provided began with a vague notion of 
tension between essentialized identities, and everyday lived experience. I set out to 
explore that tension to understand how the second generation of German Koreans make 
sense of themselves and their environment within the framework of such tension. I 
found creative ways of positioning, self-narration, communality and ways of 
representation that encompass the multifaceted experience of being and continuously 
becoming kyopo in Germany.  
In the next chapter, I will explore underlying racial ideologies of Germanness to 
contextualize the history of migration and integration, which situate the second 
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generation within a specific framework. I will briefly discuss existing literature to 
provide further context for the exploration of second-generation identity negotiation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. ‘Germany makes people into foreigners’: Discourses on national self-
understanding, race, migration, integration and second-generation identity 
 
“There are no foreigners in Germany, Germany makes people into foreigners10.” My 
mother made that statement. She was annoyed with the way an unsuspecting member of 
the majority society asked her when she would return to her Heimat [Homeland]. 
Having lived and worked in Germany for some thirty years by then, having married and 
raised a family in Germany, my Mother considers Germany her Heimat. But the person 
who asked the question reacted to her Asian appearance and assumed that she does not 
belong. It was a reminder for my Mother that after so many years, others still consider 
her a foreigner- someone who belongs elsewhere and may return there eventually. 
Everyday othering or ‘making people into foreigners’, as my Mother calls it, are 
reminders of an understanding of Germanness and belonging, based on the jus 
sanguinis, which until the year 2000 granted citizenship in Germany “on the basis of 
ethnic lineage or blood” (Watts, 1997:9). The idea of Heimat as a physical and 
emotional space- like a country- belonging to a certain people that are all connected by 
blood was written into German laws that way. One of the underlying ideas that I will 
explore in this chapter is the idea of ‘belonging’ within a German context, and what 
‘Germanness’ means. The German state has struggled with accepting that it has become 
an immigration country, and these days still struggles with finding a concept for 
integration. Only in 2005, despite the fact that immigration has played a leading role in 
the economic development of the country since the post-war period, did the German 
state declare itself an immigration country.   
                                                 
10
 In Deutschland gibt es keine Ausländer, Deutschland macht Ausländer.  
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Migrants have long become part of Germany’s social fabric, the most prominent group 
of migrants being Turkish guest workers, although their permanence was not the aim of 
official policies. As a direct consequence, the Federal Republic of Germany has not 
pursued a policy of permanent integration for migrants, although many of them have 
been living in Germany for over three decades. Some migrant groups are more visible 
than others, receiving little public attention, such as the Korean
11
 community in 
Germany. In July 2003 there were 29,700 Koreans living in Germany 
12
, mainly 
consisting of former nurses and miners sent to Germany during the 1960s and 1970s. 
Statistically, this is a small number, which limits direct contact with the vast majority of 
German society. The Korean community has been present in Germany for up to forty 
years and remains inconspicuous.  
To contextualise the present day situation of the second generation of Korean descent, 
and the limits of free identity formation in Germany, in this chapter, I will first provide 
an overview of the history of migration to Germany and outline the expectations the 
German government had about the nature and scope of such migration. This only 
reaches as far back as the 1950s, when the first ‘guest-workers’ [Gastarbeiter] arrived 
from Italy. The term ‘guest-worker’ in itself needs specific attention and helps 
explaining the complexities of the current debate. This context and the expectations are 
necessary to explain the present situation of second generations in Germany, since they 
directly informed policies.  
I will then explore the majority society’s views and subsequent relationship with 
migrants. In order to do this, it is necessary to explore the construction of a national 
self-understanding of ‘Germanness’ by looking at ‘race’ and gender. How do these 
constructs inform the present debates? What impact does that have on the situation of 
migrants to Germany?  
The construction of Germanness, gender and the historical facts of migration to 
Germany go hand in hand with state policies concerning integration. Only after looking 
at the history of migration and the ideas that surrounded the recruitment of ‘guest-
labour’ can one contextualise current debates about integration. ‘Integration’ is a 
fashionable word in Germany these days, used in the media and by politicians as a 
                                                 
11
 NB: ‘Koreans’ refers indiscriminately to naturalized citizens of Korean ancestry as well. ‘Korea’ unless 
otherwise indicated means ‘The Republic of South Korea’. ‘Germany’ refers to the ‘Federal Republic of 
Germany’ unless otherwise indicated.  
12
 Informationsdienst der Republik Korea, Seoul, Korea/www.korea.net April 2005  
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solution that will create a harmonious society of German citizens and so-called 
Deutsche mit Migrationshintergrund [Germans with a migration background
13
]. I ask 
what ‘integration’ means in Germany. Looking at policies and measures over the last 
few decades, I will then look at the effects and consequences. I will ask: What are these 
measures? What are the aims? And what are the current concerns?  
Many public debates centre on the second and third generation of the Turkish minority 
and the problems of integration. I will attempt to contextualise such debates by looking 
at some of the literature surrounding second generations, drawing in particular on the 
few available sources written directly about the second generation of German-Koreans. 
I argue that discourses on Germanness, gender and integration provide a framework that 
is restrictive, confusing, and obfuscating underlying ideas about race.  Consequently, 
the discourse about identity and integration, becomes a discourse in helplessness that 
veils the underlying ethno-cultural German national self-understanding and shifts the 
responsibility of integration to the migrants. But migrants cannot ‘integrate’ into a 
society that perpetuates an ethno-cultural self-understanding, which excludes those 
“who carry their foreignness in their faces” (Stolcke, 1995:8). 
This exploration in its entirety will provide the context of history and limitations of 
identity formation, which I will add to in the next chapter, by looking at the experiences 
of the first generation that came to Germany.  
 
3.1.‘Guests who stayed’- The history of migration to Germany 
 
In this section, I will look at Germany’s history as an immigration country, and the 
policies and issues surrounding migration. First, I will give an overview over the history 
of migration to Germany, beginning after WW2. The policies and the nature of ‘guest-
labour’ help towards understanding the debates that followed. I will explore the 
different classifications for migrants, and public attitudes towards them to explore the 
current debates surrounding integration, beginning with the German reunification. All 
                                                 
13
 Someone with a ‚migration background’ is someone who was either born outside Germany to non-
German parents and got naturalized or someone with one, or two non-German (or naturalized) parents. 
For more information: http://www.integration-in-
deutschland.de/SubSites/Integration/EN/00__Home/home-node.html?__nnn=true 
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of this serves to explain the complex discourses that surround the lives of kyopos, and in 
which they situate themselves.  
For decades, the Leitmotiv of German immigration policies has been that Germany is 
not an immigration country (Rist, 1978; Brubaker, 1992; Chapin, 1997; Chin, 2007; 
Mandel, 2008, etc).  Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States appear as 
typical examples of immigration countries, each having drawn much of its population 
from foreign lands over the past few centuries, whereas Germany appears a country 
from which people emigrated. The German public has long forgotten migrants such as 
the Huguenots who settled in parts of Germany after the revocation of the Edict of 
Nantes 1685, though French surnames remain, and has equally forgotten the Polish 
migrants who came mainly to the Ruhr area to work in the coal pits and steel industry, 
and by 1907 numbered approximately 950,000 (Chapin, 1997:05).  
Migration is not a new phenomenon to Germany, both in terms of emigration as well as 
immigration. Academics (Uhlig 1974; Wilpert 1977; Rist 1978; Bade 1992; Salim 
1997; Koschyk, 1998 etc) have long pointed out that Germany is a country of 
immigration. The realization is not a new one, and in spite of repeated claims from other 
politicians -like the ex-Chancellor Kohl- others recognized that in spite of policies to the 
contrary, Germany had become a country of immigration a long time ago. But rather 
than going back as far as looking at Huguenot migration to Germany in the 17
th
 century, 
salient to this discussion is looking at more recent migration movements to Germany.  
Salim (1997) divides migration to Germany after WW 2 into three phases, beginning in 
1955. After the war, in spite of the large populations of Germans driven out from the 
former Eastern parts of Germany that settled largely in West Germany (Brubaker, 
1992:168), by the mid 1950s, the demand for labourers exceeded the supply. The lack 
of labourers first became apparent in agriculture, and soon led the Federal Republic to 
lobby strongly for “an abolishment of restrictions regarding working foreigners and the 
creation of freedom of movement’ on a European level” (Salim, 1997:33). In December 
1955, the first treaty with Italy followed, after which Germany recruited Italian 
labourers, especially for agriculture. Several factors made foreign recruitment of labour 
viable in the following years: the economy continued growing, East Germany closed its 
borders and built the Wall so that the flow of labourers from the East ceased; demand 
for workers kept exceeding local resources; increasing numbers of young men were 
inducted for national service in the army, shorter working days and increased social 
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insurance costs, etc (1997:33). During the boom years after the war, the Bundesanstalt 
für Arbeit [Federal Employment Institute ] asserted repeatedly that economic growth 
could only be sustained through the short-term, temporary importation of Gastarbeiter 
[guestworkers] , creating a series of recruitment treaties with countries that had labour 
surpluses: Italy, 1955; Spain and Greece, 1960; Turkey, 1961 and 1964; Portugal, 1964; 
Yugoslavia, 1968 (Chapin,1997:11) and South Korea officially in 1970, (Booth, 
1992:110).The number of foreign workers rose from 1.7% of all workers in 1961 to 
6.5% in 1970, to 11.9% in 1973 (Salim, 1997).  
The second phase of migration to Germany began in 1973 when the economic downturn 
began with the so-called ‘Oil-Crisis’– as a result of the Middle Eastern War 1973. 
During the economic downturn, the German government instituted the Anwerbestopp 
[recruitment stop]. The number of foreigners employed in Germany decreased as 
workers whose contracts ran out left the country, and sank from 11.9% in 1973 to 7.5% 
in 1987 (1997:34). Nonetheless, the number of foreigners living in Germany rose from 
4.3% of the total population in 1973 to 7.3% in 1988. The reason for this is that after 
1973, the number of workers’ families that joined foreign workers in Germany 
increased. The initially limited stay of foreign workers turned into a permanent situation 
(Brubaker, 1997:35). During the 1970s this increasingly led to social concerns about 
integration, causing some German states, especially Bavaria and Baden- Wurttemberg 
to discourage settlements of migrants, by instituting a system of ‘rotation’ of foreign 
workers, and supporting the Federal Government’s decision to stop recruiting foreign 
workers entirely in November 1973 (1992:172). However when the Anwerbestopp 
[recruitment-stop] came, it was too late to halt migration to Germany, and had the – for 
the government- adverse effect that migrants settled rather than going back and forth, 
since that possibility was taken away. Instead, the decision prompted a surge in the 
immigration of family members (Brubaker, 1992:172), leading to a permanently settled 
population of migrants. 
Salim’s third phase began in 1989, which saw another rise of foreigners joining the 
labour marker (1997:35). Due to Germany’s naturalization laws, the rise in numbers of 
foreigners employed in Germany is easily explained: The second generation of migrant 
children began joining the labour force (1997:35). Hence, the rise in numbers of 
foreigners on the labour market does not actually tell us anything about migration, but 
more about German citizenship laws and integration. Events in Salim’s identified third 
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phase (1997:35) sparked a renewed debate about migrants and integration. This third 
phase therefore merits closer attention, since it brought to the fore issues that remain 
unsolved. As indicated above, permanent immigration was not a goal and the 
government ignored the possibility that guest workers could become long-term 
immigrants (Chapin, 1997:10). Earlier European experiences with ‘return migrants’ 
supported the idea that many of the workers would return home voluntarily. Roughly 
25% of Europeans migrating to the United States in the 1870s returned home, and in the 
1890s 45% returned (Chapin, 1997). However when the economic downturn came 
policy makers’ beliefs in the guest-workers’ short-run orientations, and that the market 
forces would regulate the number of foreigners, were disappointed, when the anticipated 
mass-exodus did not occur (Chapin,1997:12). Since many guest-workers decided to stay 
in Germany for an extended period, it is not surprising that family reunification led to a 
rapid increase in the foreign population. Until 1973 mainly young men had come to 
Germany, but afterwards, more and more relatives of guest workers migrated in family 
reunification programs, and thus the incentives for returning home decreased. Especially 
during times of recession fewer guest workers returned to their homelands since permits 
for coming back to Germany were harder to come by (Chapin, 1997:17).  
The recruitment of South Korean nurses and miners did not halt in 1973, but continued- 
for the nurses- until 1977 (Yoo, 1991). Shortages of qualified hospital staff made nurses 
valuable workers and put them into a privileged position. Many German hospitals didn’t 
want to lose nurses that had worked there, and helped the women to find ways of 
staying beyond the three years that their contracts ran for (Yoo, 1991; Han, 1991). I will 
discuss in the following chapter 4 “Yellow Angels” just how privileged the nurses’ 
position was, compared to that of other guestworkers, but suffice to say at this point that 
the Korean nurses- in the eyes of their immediate environment- had begun transcending 
their temporal status as guests.  
The belief that as ‘guests’ foreign labour migrants would eventually return ‘home’ 
effectively created a two-tiered society. Through legal regulations the ‘imported’ force 
was separated from the host-society, which moreover implied that they were supposed 
to maintain a distinct cultural and ethnic identity (McNeill, 1986). The word Gast 
meaning ‘guest’ implies that such workers were expected to ‘go home’ eventually, 
which a large number did not do. ‘Temporariness’ being one of the defining characters 
of the guestworker scheme in theory defined that there was no need for the ‘Guest’ to be 
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incorporated into the host society (Soysal,1994). The term ‘guestworkers’, which has 
recently been used less often, underlined the ambiguity of the migrants’ status, 
indicating that by definition they are staying a limited period of time, as guests, and are 
not expected to settle. Guests are also bound by the rules and regulations of the hosts, 
and guests rarely feel ‘at home’ in foreign environs (Mandel, 2008:55). Furthermore, 
they are workers, meaning that they were reduced to their economic value, 
marginalizing and objectifying these migrants, while at the same time pre-empting the 
question of integration, since guests always return home. If one, as Rist (1978) writes, 
accepts the rationale frequently espoused in Germany that these people are guests and 
therefore not immigrants, then there cannot be any question that the guest workers have 
come to Germany to work and not to spend their lives there. Thus it would not be 
appropriate to “consider measures to foster social and cultural integration (Rist, 1978)”.  
In the early days the German state did not even provide a clearly defined information 
policy for the migrants as their temporary stay was taken for granted. Migrant 
broadcasting was soon instituted with the two-fold reasoning that it could provide 
helpful and practical information and integrative orientation concerning the adaptation 
of the new social and cultural environment, while at the same time it was intended to 
maintain links with the migrants’ national cultures by means of information from and 
about the sending countries (Oepen, 1984).  Seventy percent of those broadcasts were 
devoted to the maintenance of bonds with the home countries and their national 
identities indicating that they provided hardly any support for the integration into 
German society and culture (1984:115). Germany continuously tried persuading guest 
workers to return home, abolishing restrictions that limited emigration, improving 
information to migrants, and providing cash inducements for those returning to their 
original homelands upon surrendering their work and residency permits. In addition 
social security contributions were refunded immediately upon their arriving in their 
home countries. All of these measures failed (Chapin, 1997:18).  
While Germany still persisted in denying that it had become an immigration country 
and continued calling its migrants ‘guests’, those guests had settled down. At the time 
Rist (1978) was writing, many ‘guest’- workers had long since brought their families to 
Germany, and were raising families. A case in point would have been my mother who 
had married, settled down and had her first child that year. It was unlikely- though not 
impossible- that she would leave Germany again. Initially, the migrants rarely saw 
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themselves as permanent settlers (Brubaker, 1992:171), however by the early 1970s, 
there were already signs that the ‘guests’ were increasingly staying. The birthrate to 
immigrant parents rose, so that between 1966 and 1970 it increased by 140 percent 
(1992:172).  
By the time of the economic downturn, in the early 1980s, the ‘guests’ still hadn’t left. 
Despite government incentives, many had made their lives in Germany, were raising 
families, and had children in school already. One could say that life got in the way of 
the best-laid plans, and West Germany began to wake up to the fact that it had “called 
for labourers, but humans came” (cf, Chin, 2007; Mandel, 2008 etc) .   
 
 3.2.‘The threat of foreign men’- Germanness, Race and Gender 
 
Historically, Germany’s national self-understanding and its understanding of race, are- 
euphemistically- troubled. The Federal Republic, by way of laws and education, has 
tried to engage in Vergangenheitsbewältigung
14
 to come to terms with the Nazi past. 
The central part that ‘race’ played in the atrocities of the Third Reich, and the close 
connection of the term to the Nazi years and said atrocities, renders ‘race’ a loaded 
word. Nonetheless, to further an understanding of current debates about integration, one 
must look at how the past has influenced the present, how the term ‘race’ has evolved, 
is understood, marginalized and yet present within a German context. Some theories are 
necessary to explain and explore German national self-understanding as an ethno-
cultural one, and a discussion of gender adds another layer of complexity, that is 
important when discussing migrants and integration.  
 I posit that ideas about masculinity and femininity in Germany, and the construction of 
men and women are vital to bringing nuances to the national self-understanding as an 
ethno-cultural nation that influences the discourse on migrants. If, as Chin (2007) 
writes: “The treatment of women […] became the primary litmus test to determine 
whether foreigners- and especially Turks- possessed the capacity to function effectively 
within a Western liberal democratic society” (2007:143), then an understanding of the 
construction of German masculinity and femininity and different roles is the basis for 
this test.  
                                                 
14
 Idiomatically translated it means to come to grips with the past, which in this case means acceptance of 
guilt, and trying to ensure that the past doesn’t repeat itself.  
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The problem with establishing a German construction of gender is that gender is a 
relational concept, yet within national discourse is used as a monolithic one. Gender 
relations are dynamic and concepts of gender are subject to change, however in national 
discourse static conceptions are often used to justify and consolidate an ideal type of 
national community. Therefore what follows is a theoretical discussion of how male and 
female roles were, and are constructed within a German national context, by first 
looking at the theoretical framework, before looking at specific circumstances of 
evolving gender relations to roughly the time of the first wave of labour migration to 
Germany.  
The crux of the matter here, I argue, is that the German insistence on the idea of and the 
discourse surrounding a Kulturnation [Culture nation], veils the core ethnic 
understanding of Germanness, ignoring the racism inherent. The German national self-
understanding is that of a people connected through blood and soil, and the Vaterland is 
a male nationalizing project, which both ignores and problematizes migrant integration.  
As part of the Vergangenheitsbewältigung, every pupil attending public schools will 
hear about the founding myth of the first German unification
15
 - which roughly 
corresponds to Smith’s (1986) theory that ethnic nations are gradually or 
discontinuously formed on the basis of pre-existing ethnie and ethnic ties so that ethnic 
ties become transformed, mobilized, territorialized and politicised. The conception of 
the nation is different from the civic one as it stresses genealogy, populism, customs, 
dialects and nativism, or ‘Kultur’. Myths and symbols create a “web of significance” 
(Geertz, 1973), which not only provide moral charters for nations but also create 
solidarity and distinctiveness from others.  
The idea of the German Kulturnation
16
 as compared to the French Staatsnation- [State-
nation] is perpetuated in German history schoolbooks, elevating language, shared 
culture and the idea of being an ethnic Volk above the importance of the state, as the 
founding principle of Germany. This stress on common Kultur that binds a nation and 
moves away from ‘bad’ nationalism based on the racial notions of the Third Reich, and 
veils the underlying German self-understanding of the German people as a nation of 
sanguines. “Nation is when one sees and speaks with one another. Nation is when one 
                                                 
15
 1871, when the small German states united to form the Empire.  
16
 ‘Culture-nation’ meaning a nation whose people are connected via common culture rather than sharing 
a state. Compare ‘Staatsnation’ (‘State-nation’), meaning a nation whose people are connected via sharing 
the laws and territory of a common state.  
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can look back on a shared history, when one has grown up and lives in the same culture; 
Nation is when one speaks the same language.” (Fischer & Wirtz, 1998:491). Thus the 
perception of Germanness remains strangely devoid of express political and ethnic 
implications, being seemingly based upon a common culture and language.  
The Third Reich, its ideologies and the Holocaust, appear like an anomaly in this 
perception. Every pupil also hears about it, and how horribly misguided understandings 
of ‘race’ determined the fate of millions of innocent people. It is a dark chapter of 
German history that the national effort of Vergangenheitsbewältigung is trying to come 
to terms with, partly, I argue by perpetuating the idea of a benign ‘Kulturnation’ and the 
myth that the German people, sharing a culture, created a nation for themselves. 
Blatantly, the implications of a benign effort for a greater good, involving everyone 
participating in German culture, ignore the political realities and machinations of the 
day, while serving as a continuation of an inclusive, non-dangerous nationalism, unlike 
Social Nationalism. Stolcke (1995) argues that such perceptions make for a “rhetoric of 
exclusion” (1995:1) that is based on cultural fundamentalism, after racism has been 
discredited politically. Instead of employing racist rhetoric, “the idea of cultural 
distinctness is being endowed with new divisive force” (1995:2). In this rhetoric, 
immigrants are constructed as a threat to the cultural integrity of the nation, and social 
tensions are attributed to the presence of immigrants with alien cultures rather than to 
racism (1995:3). 
While German history textbooks frame the national self-understanding in cultural terms, 
legislative measures indicate a different understanding that underlines Stolcke’s (1995) 
point. Until recently, in Germany, the 1913 system of pure jus sanguinis
17
, with no trace 
of jus soli
18
, continued to determine the citizenship status of immigrants and their 
descendents (Brubaker, 1992:165). That is to say that “German citizenship has always 
been attributed only to descendants of German citizens (1992:72). And “the 
restrictiveness of German citizenship vis-à-vis immigrants […] reflects the ethno-
cultural understanding of nation-state membership, according to which 
Staatsangehörigkeit
19
 presupposes and expresses Volkszugehörigkeit
20” (1992:51).    
                                                 
17
 “Right of the blood”- is the policy by which citizenship is determined by having an ancestor who was a 
national or a citizen of the state.  
18
 “Right of the soil”- is the policy by which citizenship is determined by birth in the territory of a state.  
19
 Literally: belonging to a state, meaning nationality.  
20
 Belonging to a people 
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Even with a substantial second generation immigrant population, the jus sanguinis 
remained in place and became an anomaly, heightened by the influx of ethnic German 
immigrants since 1988 (1992:165). In accordance with this idea of the ethnic ‘Volk’, the 
Alien Act of 1990 says that “Germany is not a country that accepts immigrants” and the 
vast majority of its citizens are native born with centuries-long family ties to Germany 
(Chapin, 1997:1). Germany seems content considering itself a homogenous construct in 
spite of a long history of migration and the fact that one in ten residents is legally 
classified a foreigner (1997:3). What the official narrative on ‘Germanness’, how it 
came about and how it fits into the present notion of the European Community 
disguises, Germany’s laws state somewhat more clearly: You are either born an ethnic 
German with centuries-long family ties to Germany or you are simply not German.  
Rather than looking at the Third Reich, the postwar years and the time of regeneration, 
provide a better understanding and a layer of complexity to highlight the present debates 
surrounding gender and race. It would far exceed the scope of this work to address all 
the highly complex issues surrounding gender and the nation, but several points need 
addressing. The above outlined national self-understanding seems devoid of gender, yet 
implicitly addresses it by stressing family-ties and blood-relatedness, meaning that 
while the way in which national identity and the nation are conceptualized in such meta-
narratives on ethnic nations, they are at the same time conceptualized as large families. 
This underlying idea of the national family makes exploring gender important, 
especially in relation to race.  
Central to this is exploring the effects of defeat in WW2 on concepts of masculinity and 
femininity. The defeat in WW2 led to a demasculanization of German men, and an 
eventual reassertion of male authority, in which discourses on race played an important 
role (Fehrenbach, 1998:04). The experience of defeat went hand in hand with narratives 
of sexual violence perpetrated on women by occupying soldiers. According to 
Fehrenbach (2005) the rapes committed by the Red Army became “one of ‘the founding 
mythologies” (2005:50) of the West German state, while the rapes perpetrated by 
German soldiers in Russia were largely ignored
21
.  
                                                 
21
 The public largely ignored the crimes perpetrated by the German army during WW2. In 1995 the image 
of the ‘unblemished’ German army was called into question in a travelling exhibition about its crimes, 
sparking public debate.  
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As the Cold War emerged, so too did the stylized West German narratives about 
‘Asiatic’ Red Soldiers that served to recast the German nation as the victim of a 
Barbaric bolshevism
22
 (2005:50). Traditionally German masculinity was defined in 
terms of three P’s: protectors, providers and procreators (Fehrenbach, 1998). Defeat in 
war had robbed German men of that role, leading to a threat to native masculinity and 
patriarchy (Fehrenbach, 2005:54). In West Germany many narratives about the 
demasculinization of German men focussed on French Moroccan troops and African-
American GIs (Fehrenbach, 1998:05). In post-war society men of a different skin colour 
than that of the majority society were considered sexually deviant and violent.  
Looking at abortion can provide a further layer of complexity. In postwar Germany, the 
legal status of abortion was unclear, which allowed for considerable leeway in the 
interpretation of existing rules. Fehrenbach (2005) quotes a memo to district officials 
and health workers in 1946 that explicitly states that “a secret decree was issued by the 
Bavarian state government according to which the termination of a pregnancy is 
possible in cases of rape by coloured troops” (2005:58). In practice that meant that 
abortion was tolerated if a German woman had been violated, as long as the perpetrator 
was non-Caucasian, and especially if the perpetrator or alleged perpetrator was black. 
Initially, racial stereotypes about sexually predatory black males thus could work in 
favour of a woman seeking abortion, but within months of defeat images of the 
“pathologically promiscuous and materialist ‘Negerliebchen’ or ‘nigger-lover’ were 
popularized” (2005:61). This meant that women who chose to enter relationships with 
mainly- African-American GIs were vilified
23
. In some cases this went as far as German 
men attacking the German girlfriends of US soldiers to shear their heads (2005:63).  
The lingering national- socialist ideology of Rassenschande [racial disgrace] certainly 
had a lot to do with such claims of betrayal. In postwar Germany, authorities and 
academics were trying to revamp racial understanding and practice in Germany 
                                                 
22
 Similar narratives existed during the 3
rd
 Reich.  
23
 While all of this at first glance seems to play into the theories on nationhood and seems removed from 
everyday lives, such attitudes were alive and well when I was a teenager in the 1990s, living close to a US 
army post in Germany. It was a minor village scandal, when a friend of mine introduced her African-
American GI boyfriend to her family. The gossip at the time rumoured that she couldn’t find a ‘decent 
German boy’. Not only older relatives, but also young people repeated these accusations. My social 
environment at the time made a difference between Amiflittchen (Americans’-slut) and Negerflittchen 
(niggers’-slut), making a clear racial divide that indicated that they generally considered ‘Americans’ to 
be Caucasians. Interestingly, years later, I asked friends from the North of Germany whether there were 
any corresponding names for German women fraternizing with British troops, but none of the young 
people I spoke to, knew of any.  
51 
 
 
(Fehrenbach, 2005:75), particularly in trying to deal with the children of German 
women and African-American soldiers. These children were subject to anthropological 
studies in the 1950s. However,  what the anthropological studies of the time show is that 
“race” and ”difference” were used as the defining criteria of a group of approximately 
5000 children, and how the biological racist hygienic model of society continued 
unquestioned (Campt & Grosse, 1994).  
While other European countries moved away from racism, the heritage of racial hygiene 
and eugenics remained in Germany. Thus, for example, a study by the anatomist and 
anthropologist, Eugen Fischer, dating back to 1904, seeking to establish Mendel’s 
genetic inheritance laws among humans, while looking at the mixed-race population in 
a German colony in Africa, remained a definitive work in the field of human genetics 
within Germany, until the 1960s (1994:54). Speaking about the group known as 
“Rehoboter Bastards”, he writes that “in this racial ability [intelligence], our Bastards 
are far inferior to the Europeans, as are all Bastards. [...] That negates all evidence for 
so-called equality and equal value, shown by a few highly talented Bastard individuals.” 
(Fischer, 1961:01) 
Some challenged such discourses, and called for rethinking the concept of race, 
especially in light of the Nazi past, like member of parliament Luise Rehling, in a 
speech in 1952 did. Others saw the biracial children in Germany as a serious social 
problem, due to their paternity and racial difference (Fehrenbach, 2005:76). The West 
German Government debated them in parliament, and conducted surveys to establish an 
empirical basis on which it could initiate “negotiations so that Negermischlingskinder 
[Negro mixed blood children] be raised – where possible- in the homelands of their 
fathers” (2005:77). It has to be said that the children inherited German citizenship from 
their mothers. They were born German, but due to phenotype and the lingering negative 
associations, they were clearly not German enough. Bluntly put, being German meant 
being white.   
Plans to send the children to North Africa instead, further illustrate this point. Catholic 
missionaries spoke against the plan, because “the Europeans and the Africans despise 
them. [...] The mixed blood child rebels against the sting of disdain” (Campt& Grosse, 
1994:03). Thus the plan came to nothing, and the children remained a German 
‘problem’. However, what is also remarkable about the above quote is the 
unquestioning assumption that racial biology is destiny, making all biracial children the 
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same, hence the missionaries speak about them in the singular. An anthropological 
study by Walter Kirchner, conducted in the 1950s about these children, similarly and 
unquestioningly used assumptions about racial biology, stating that the “Negro 
inheritance” gave the children a tendency to be hotheaded, impulsive, wilful and 
disobedient, which could however be counteracted with nurturing and appropriate 
socialization (Fehrenbach, 2005:91). Kirchner’s study stands out insofar as it takes into 
account the social environment of children, which harbours its own problems. As 
mentioned above, the German girlfriends of African-American soldiers were vilified, 
and often suspected of being prostitutes or having a weak moral character. 
Anthropologists and social workers saw the German mothers of biracial babies as 
troubled, disruptive or of below average abilities, where they detected behavioural 
lapses in the children. This gendered analysis continued to legitimate assessments of 
women who engaged in interracial relations as immoral or asocial. Social pathologies 
were understood to stem from problems of socialization and family dynamics, and 
therefore maternal failure. (2005:105) 
The postwar Republic attempted moving away from its understanding of race, but relied 
heavily on the gendered analysis. Fehrenstein quotes the historian Ruth Feldstein as 
saying that “representations of women as mothers developed in conjection with debates 
about who was a healthy citizen and what was a healthy democracy”, claiming that the 
same argument can be made for Germany during that period of time (2005:105). As the 
nucleus of the nation, the family as the cradle of future citizens, was a focal point of the 
Federal Republic stressing the domestic role of women as mothers which was supported 
by leading parties of the day such as the CDU [Christian Democratic Union] who were 
seeking to “re-domesticate women to resolve the post-war crisis of the family” 
(Jarausch & Geyer, 2003:258). While legal equality appeared to be guaranteed within 
the constitution, amendments
24
 were aimed at sacralising marriage, motherhood and the 
family and the re-domestication of women into their traditional roles of virtuous 
femininity and motherhood.  
                                                 
24
 While the West German constitution guaranteed equality between the sexes in Art 3, Paragraph 2. 
(1949), it then swiftly proceeded in amendments to reconstitute the traditional separation of roles with the 
Ehegesetz [marriage law] 1957, in which women were ‘allowed’ to work in as far as this did not obstruct 
their ‘duty in marriage and family’ and also making it a woman’s duty to work if ‘her husband cannot 
support the family’. Housework was regarded as the norm for woman’s work within this law and 
expressly said so. This, combined with the constitution’s article 6 that placed marriage, motherhood and 
the family under the particular protection of the state, served to undermine the alleged gender equality. 
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The lingering notions about ‘race’, and the idea of a threat to German women, and 
therefore families, from dark-skinned – meaning: foreign- men impacted on migrants to 
Germany. National discourses that relegate women to the ‘home’, where gender 
relations become constituitive of the ‘essence’ of cultures (Yuval- Davis, 1997:43), 
construct threats to women as threats to an entire national culture and people.  
Newspaper articles in the late 1960s emphasized too much foreign influence and the 
dangers to German women and girls, presented by seductive Südländer [Southlanders] 
(Chin, 2007:61). Südländer in this case refers to the Mediterranean area without 
reference to a particular country of origin, but it is assumed that the men in question are 
darker skinned than stereotypical Germans.  In the late 1960s this would have referred 
to the guestworkers from Italy, Portugal, Spain, Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia.  
Summarizing one might argue that far from succeeding with 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung, the overt topic of race has become a taboo, and the Third 
Reich’s racial ideologies, though openly rejected, lingered long into the postwar years. 
The debate about national self-understanding and belonging, in its effort to move away 
from the form of nationalism leading to the Nazi atrocities, has shifted into the 
seemingly benign and inclusive realm of culture, deriving its legitimation from the myth 
of the German Kulturnation.     
Yet, the laws on citizenship, and the postwar Negermischlinge, coupled with gender 
relations, throw such benign cultural inclusivity into sharp relief. Only those born 
German are German, because their parents were German, and their parents before them, 
creating a family of sanguines. The Negermischlinge threatened that fiction, and the 
debates and studies surrounding them, show racial ideologies prevailed, even though 
these were German-born children. How deeply ingrained ideas about ‘race’ are, is 
indicated by a 2003 case in which a spokesman for the Wiesbaden Police asked for 
information about a Neger [Negro]. His reasoning was that he said it so that “everyone 
would know what is meant” (Hyung, 2008:140). This isn’t an isolated case. A Berlin 
judge used the same word “because a black man is a Neger” (2008:140). Similarly, the 
term Mischlingskind is still in use; and it is often used without any self-consciousness. 
In fact, during the time of my fieldwork, I regularly walked past a billboard advertising 
a charity looking for donations to send to the Mischlingskinder in Uganda. Many of my 
informants used the term to describe half-German and half Koreans, although they 
mostly preferred the term “halb und halb” [half and half].  
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The unpalatable history and continuing issues with race behind the term, come out in 
everyday discussions. Often speakers will gush about how pretty Mischlingskinder are, 
and/or will worry in the same breath about future difficulties with identity. As with the 
thoughtless use of Neger, such usage and the accompanying worry are revealing about 
how deeply ingrained the racist heritage is. Unfortunately, ‘race’ is a bad word in 
Germany, due to the connections to Nationalsocialism, rendering an open and 
constructive public discussion difficult, but it cannot be ignored as contextual for the 
debates surrounding migrants and integration in the following section.  
 
 
3.4.‘Anatolia is only one tram-stop away’- Public discourses on migrants and 
integration in Germany 
 
The discourses surrounding foreigners attempt to define the vague concept of 
integration and re-define Germanness. Beginning there, I look at different models of 
integration in Germany, and the difficulties surrounding them, before discussing the 
perceived place of immigrants in German society, and perceptions and discussions 
surrounding migrants and integration, dichotomizing ‘good’ and ‘bad’ foreigners.  
German citizenship law changed in 2000 to allow for a form of the jus soli, meaning 
that presently children born in Germany can gain German citizenship under certain 
conditions. These include at least one parent having been resident in Germany for up to 
eight years or having indefinite leave to remain
25
. But changes in law do not mean 
integration. Currently public debates focus particularly on the integration of the Turkish 
minority, but there is no clear definition of ‘integration’.  
At different times, different concepts and solutions were raised, but the debates about 
foreigner relations can be articulated through three main positions: closure, culture and 
coexistence (Barbieri, 1998:73). The first pertains to the idea that Germany belongs to 
ethnic Germans alone and considers foreigners a threat. The second stresses culture as a 
concept that is distanced from overt references to ethnicity and race, privileging the 
willingness or unwillingness of foreigners “to transfer their national loyalty and to take 
                                                 
25
 http://www.bundesregierung.de/nn_646700/Content/DE/StatischeSeiten/Breg/IB/Einbuergerung/gp-a1-
voraussetzungen.html 
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on a German cultural identity (1998:74)”. The final position suggest the possibility of 
Germans coexisting with others, where the ‘basis for inclusion is the membership in the 
state society (that is, involvement and participation in the economic and social structure 
of the community’ (1998:75).  
The first model is based on the assertion of fundamental differences between peoples’ 
genetic make-ups and traditions, which asserts the presence of foreigners as a threat. 
This position was directly taken by a group of intellectuals in 1981 in what became 
known as ‘The Heidelberg Manifesto’, in which a group of professors and doctors 
suggested a ‘known ethnic catastrophe of a multicultural society’ (Mandel, 2008:59), 
while leaving the ‘known catastrophe’ undefined. The manifesto however clearly 
expressed a fear of for the education of German children in classes dominated by 
‘illiterate foreigners’, referring specifically to the Turkish minority children in the 
German midst (2008:59).  
Racist understandings of Germanness and fear of Überfremdung
26
 are at the heart of the 
group’s suggestions. The manifesto expressly suggests that Gastarbeiter be returned to 
their respective homelands, thus cleansing the Heimat of ‘undesirables’ (2008:60). The 
rhetoric used is strongly reminiscent of National Socialist rhetoric and ideologies, 
although the group dissociated itself from racism, ideological nationalism and 
extremism. Nonetheless the Neo-Nazi slogan of the 1990s ‘Deutschland den Deutschen, 
Ausländer raus’ [Germany for the Germans, foreigners out] seems to summarize their 
position. Incidents such as in the 1990s in Mölln, when arson attacks killed eight 
Turkish Germans
27
, are connected to an understanding of Germany as a nation that has 
grown organically and ethnically, and that it is under attack (cf Chin, 2007:150).  
What the Heidelberg Manifesto addresses particularly are children and the negative 
effects German children might suffer. Ethnic foreigners are conceptualized as a direct 
threat to the German family, and thereby the future of the German people. This needs to 
be placed within the context of the German government’s concern about the negative 
birthrate
28
 among ethnic Germans in Germany, opposed to the high, positive birthrate 
amongst the Turkish minority, leading to Germany’s strongly pronatalist policies 
                                                 
26
 The fear that ‘unbearable numbers of foreigners will overtake German society (Mandel, 2008:60)’ 
27
 I use ‘Turkish Germans’ rather than ‘Turks’ in this context to indicate that they were what Bellers 
(2003) calls ‘de-facto Germans’.  
28
 Negative birthrate means that statistically fewer children are born than needed to sustain the size of the 
population.  
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(Mandel, 2008:60). Such pro-natalist policies are exemplified in a 2002 political slogan 
against a possible Green Card scheme to allow Indian migrant workers into Germany. 
Kinder statt Inder [Children instead of Indians] was the slogan that the Christian 
Democratic Party used to protest against the importation of foreign labour migrants, 
demanding that the German people have more children, rather than allowing Indian 
workers to migrate to Germany. Considering the fact that the labour market had a 
demand in the present, and not in the future when those children were adults, the slogan 
was fraught with possibilities for ridicule.  
But what such demands indicate is the connection between a fear of foreigners, pro-
natalist policies and the conceptualization of the role of women. In 2005 a small moral 
panic swept through articles in German newspapers
29
, after statistics revealed that 
apparently 40% of female university graduates have no children. At the time, the 
number caused a small storm in the media and words such as ‘birthing strike’ were 
used, and the media sought reasons and answers (Konietzka & Kreyenfeld, 2007). 
Currently the debate still flares up now and again in the media, highlighting an on-going 
preoccupation with the fear that German people are becoming extinct and the sex lives 
of female university graduates. Taking all these things together, Baribieri’s (1998) first 
model characterizes the anxieties of some parts of German society in the face of 
perceived threats by the presence of alien subjects (Mandel, 2008:59).  
The second model privileges culture. It raises the idea of a German culture above 
considerations of ethnic belonging, but demanding the willingness of the foreigners to 
take on a German cultural identity. Stolcke (1995) criticizes this approach as a shift 
away from discredited racial ideas towards “an ideology of cultural exclusion [in which] 
cultural sameness is the prerequisite for access to citizenship rights” (1995:8). She 
points out that “immigrants carry their foreignness in their faces” (1995:8). Using 
phenotype as a marker of cultural difference shifts the responsibility for integration 
towards the ‘othered’ immigrant whose different culture is presupposed. The ‘other’ 
must assimilate to become ‘us’.  
Events in the 1990s highlighted the pitfalls of such an approach. In the context of 
attacks on Turkish migrants and other foreigners, xenophobic violence became an issue 
for the German government. A report published in 1993 entitled Hostility toward 
Foreigners in Germany: Facts, Analyses, Arguments attempts addressing the issues. 
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However the key word in the title is Ausländer, meaning much more than ‘foreigner’ or 
‘stranger’, but literally ‘outlander’, someone who does not belong. This includes not 
only recent refugees, but also second or third generation descendants of migrant 
workers (Mandel, 2008:62). The entire report is more concerned with addressing the 
possible negative image Germany might gain abroad. It states unequivocally “there is 
no reason whatever to compare the post-unification situation in Germany with that 
existing at the time of the Weimar Republic” (Bundesrepublik, 1993: 05). The 
underlying concern is that Germany might be compared to Nazi Germany again, leading 
to a loss in foreign investment (Mandel, 2008:62). Thirty pages are devoted to 
‘integrative measures’, though integration is never defined properly, remaining vague in 
references to culture.  
As a matter of fact, the report avoids defining ‘integration’ altogether. Instead, it relies 
on implications, which become rather clear in a quote from Chancellor Kohl: “We need 
our foreign guests…without guestworkers the present level of economic prosperity in 
Germany would be unimaginable” (1993:85).  Furthermore it asserts a generally 
friendly public attitude towards foreigners, claiming in a survey that 94% of Germans 
condemn violence against asylum seekers, and 60% of Germans felt that the large 
number of foreigners in the country was no problem (1993:24). But, that means that 
40% of the German population do think that there is a problem with foreigners, and 
since migrant workers are not asylum seekers, it says nothing about the acceptability of 
violence towards them. What is more is that it establishes a clear social hierarchy, not 
allowing the foreigner the elevated status of immigrant, but continuously affirming the 
status of an alien.  
To clarify the position and the underlying distance from overt references to ethnicity 
and race, looking towards another group of foreigners that came into public view in 
Germany is helpful if . During the 1990s large numbers of migrants from the former 
Soviet Union and East Bloc came to Germany to settle, the so-called Rußlanddeutsche 
[Russian Germans]. They were known as Aussiedler [re-settlers]. The antecedents of 
this population arrived in Russia in the mid-eighteenth century, recruited by Catherine 
the Great (Mandel, 2008:67). Chancellor Kohl insisted a priority of his government 
should be to induce this population to settle, while deliberately avoiding the term 
‘immigration’, since by definition Germany was not a country of immigration 
(2008:68). Then the newcomers were subsidized at an enormous cost.  
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The ‘Aussiedler are not referred to as ‘Ausländer, but are German within their country 
of origin, German as far as the German government is concerned, and yet foreign to 
many Germans. Nevertheless, they are returning ‘home’, repatriating and therefore in 
theory are not Ausländer, but possess the crucial criterion of being ethnic Germans. 
Hence, they belong in the fatherland, are marked as different by being declared Russian 
Germans, but are essentially German. They possess Deutschstämmigkeit, German 
kinship or heritage, which crucially differentiates them from the true Ausländer and 
makes them ‘belong’ to the fatherland. Thus, calling them Russian-Germans makes 
them a variety of German, entirely legitimate and thus able to claim a right to return, a 
right to belong (2008:69). In effect, this essentializes German identity. Due to the 
underlying ideology of essentialized Germanness, the Aussiedler are seen by some as a 
medium-term solution: “a welcome watershed of the ‘right’ sort of population increase” 
(2008:69). They counteract the dwindling birthrate amongst ethnic Germans at the same 
time as counteracting the increased birthrate amongst the Turkish minority. Indeed, they 
not only have a right of return, but alleviate fears of being taken over by Ausländer, by 
increasing the German population
30
.  
Chancellor Kohl specified three different areas in which integration assistance for the 
Aussiedler was necessary, namely German language-course, integration assistance and 
welfare support, and reimbursement for those who suffered in Soviet work-camps or 
prison (Mandel, 2008:70). He particularly stressed that the second generation needed to 
feel at home in Germany to put down deep roots within Germany. This clearer 
definition of integration and definition of status for Russian Germans is at odds with the 
idea of integrating Ausländer, establishing a hierarchy. The retention of German culture, 
which the law demands to grant citizenship to Russian Germans (Alba, 2003), 
privileges a group of foreigners who fit within the ethnic conception of Germanness, 
while veiling the very same conception by framing it in cultural terms. At the same 
time, the discourse used by politicians and government reports admits that ethnic 
German migrants are valued higher than foreigners, even if those are the second and 
third generation of labour migrants. After all, the Russian Germans possess the potential 
to shed their ‘otherness’ and loose the prefix ‘Russian’, simply becoming German 
(2008:70).  
                                                 
30
 The issues surrounding the Russian-German community have since proven far more complex, but it 
would exceed the scope of this thesis to discuss the experiences of Russian-Germans and integration.  
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The third position that Barbieri (1998) identifies is no less complicated, attempting 
multiculturalism on the basis of the state. Basically this seeks to remove the ethno-
cultural inflection of German self-understanding, preserving the cultural identity of 
migrants, while giving them citizenship. Statemembership in this model is removed 
from ethnically defined membership within the German nation. This is what Brubaker 
(1992) calls ‘benign differentialism’ (1992:177), which goes against assimilation, 
attempting to guarantee the free practice of religion, language and culture. The idea 
behind it is that through naturalization comes integration and the ability to live together 
in a community.  
In this third position, the idea of integration rests on divorcing culture from citizenship. 
That makes the state the unit of participation and integration culture is relegated to the 
private and individual. Drawing from the Berlin campaign (Mandel, 2008), the stress for 
foreigners is to adhere to rules and regulations, while the majority society is introduced 
to individual, identifiable foreigners with darker skin. While the former is reminiscent 
of the idea of how guestworkers are bound to observe the host’s rules, the latter covers a 
variety of issues. Placards and ads usually show an individual foreigner with dark skin 
interacting with a group of Germans. In this way, the fear of Überfremdung [strangers 
becoming the majority] is counteracted visually. Moreover it affirms an ethnic 
component insofar as the Ausländer is visible and identifiable as the other.  
At the same time, the stress on high achievements, presumably educational and 
professional achievements of foreigners, as well as the pamphlets aimed towards ‘good 
citizenship’ are indicative of the sort of foreigner that is wanted. A ‘good foreigner’ is 
only someone who achieves highly and adheres to the rules. This position is close to the 
French model of the state-nation, based on civic rights and duties, and relegating 
cultural differences to the private realm, without addressing the underlying issues of 
ethnicity, while at the same time establishing clearly the sort of desired ‘good 
foreigner’.  
The Frankfurt a. M. authorities on their webpage reflect this model. The city calls itself 
a “global village” where over a hundred nationalities live “peacefully side-by-side”31 . 
However, living peacefully side-by-side indicates that these different nationalities do 
not live in the midst of native Frankfurters, but are expected to live peacefully next to 
them. This beckons the question what precisely the authorities mean by “peacefully” 
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and what happens if someone decides not to live peacefully. In this respect, two years 
before the change in citizenship laws, a criminal case drew attention to the issues 
surrounding integration and Germanness. While it didn’t happen in Frankfurt, but in 
Bavaria, it highlights the pitfalls and complexities of German citizenship laws, 
integration policies and the consequences of the past fiction of the temporary 
’guestworker’. 
The Fall Mehmet [Case Mehmet] as it became known made the press in 1998. “By 
1998, the Turkish juvenile (almost 14 years old) had committed more than 60 crimes 
like blackmail, theft, assault with bodily harm etc” (Bellers, 2003:1). The Bavarian state 
government decided to deport him. This decision caused a public argument between 
politicians and citizens in the media. Bellers (2003) claims that the argument followed 
“the known pattern: the Left lamented a human-rights scandal, and the conservatives 
saw order in Germany under threat” (2003:1). The problem was that the boy wasn’t yet 
14 years of age, meaning he wasn’t criminally responsible in the eyes of the law. 
Several attempts to put him into care didn’t work, and the parents had lost all influence 
on their son. The parents had lived in Germany for more than thirty years by that time, 
also received noticed that they were to be deported because of their son (2003:2). It 
should be noted that the argument for deporting the parents was legally dubious 
(2003:2).  
At the time, the next general election was close, so the case became a political 
showcase. The Bavarian state government presented a law in July 1998, which would 
allow Germany to deport juvenile delinquents and their parents. The law never came 
into action after other states voted against it (2003:2). By October 1998 courts decided 
that the boy, known as ‘Mehmet’, should be deported because he was a “fundamental 
danger to public order” (2003:3). The parents were not to be deported. In the meantime 
at the pleas of the parents, the Turkish consulate declared Mehmet’s Turkish passport 
invalid, causing the Bavarian state government to turn to the German foreign ministry 
for papers (2003:3). The foreign ministry refused, and answered that the Bavarian state 
government would have to go through the courts before the foreign ministry would 
intervene (2003:3).  
In the end, Bavaria deported Mehmet, who on arrival in Turkey clearly stated that he 
wanted to return to Germany. In 2001 the courts finally decided that he could return to 
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Germany, since he was the dependant of a Turk formally employed within the EU, and 
EU law overruling state law guaranteed him the right to remain, provided he did not 
commit major crimes (2003:4). According to German law in 1998 the case was legally 
sound, but it was nonetheless a scandal that sparked a heated debate in the public and 
media, and called into question Germany’s laws on naturalization and German self-
understanding. The Munich city council initially opposed Mehmet’s deportation on the 
grounds that “it would do nothing much, since he knew Turkey only from holidays and 
he was factually, if not legally, German (2003:2)”. But in the meantime one of the civil 
servants had begun the process of deportation for Mehmet and his parents, and the 
general public approved of his strict measures (2003:2). While Mehmet eventually 
returned and the laws regulating naturalization changed, what is important is that the 
general public approved not only of his, but also of his parents’ deportation. Certainly 
not everyone did, but since then “Mehmet has become the synonym for a rebellious, 
violent and unintegrable youth, the code for the state’s impotence in handling foreign 
serial criminals
32” writes the German newspaper Die Welt33 in 2005. “Mehmet” is 
synonymous with ‘bad foreigner’, someone who cannot be ‘handled’ and cannot be 
integrated. He is not one of the peaceful people the Frankfurt authorities imagine living 
next to other Frankfurters in a global village. And the public largely approved of 
deporting him to Turkey, a country he barely knew.  
‘Turk’ has come to be synonymous with Ausländer, foreigner, and outsider (Mandel, 
2008:91). In present times the Turkish minority numbers roughly 2.5 million (Mandel, 
2008). After the end of recruitment of guest-workers in 1973, only the wives and 
families left behind in Turkey by the guest-workers were allowed to migrate to 
Germany for the purpose of reunifying families. Within the public consciousness, the 
more a group is perceived to transgress norms, symbols and values of German society, 
the lower it is placed on the hierarchical ladder, and Turks occupy the lowest rung.  
In her work on Turks in Germany, Ruth Mandel (2008) uses Kreuzberg in Berlin as a 
prime example for this transgression to illustrate the hierarchy within which migrants 
move. It is known as a Turkish enclave, and thus – being a community and not based on 
individuals interacting with a German minority- already goes against the ‘co-existence 
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 http://www.welt.de/print-
welt/article673954/Nicht_bewaehrt_Mehmet_setzt_seine_Gerichtsserie_fort.html 
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position’ (Barbieri, 1998). Kreuzberg is “a very powerful symbolic domain despite and 
because of actual social marginalization of Turks (Stallybrass and White, 1986:24)”.  
It is both demonized and idealised, within the German imaginary it is the enactment of a 
dangerous world, which exists outside all German rules and regulations, where the 
unthinkable might occur (Mandel, 2008:90). Kreuzberg, in the public’s imagination, is 
Anatolia outside of Turkey, where ‘Turks might slaughter sheep in their bathtubs, 
without a butcher’s licence, girls might be kidnapped, forced into arranged marriages 
against their will; daughters and sisters could be beaten, even killed for violation of the 
sexual mores of their brothers and fathers: Islamic fundamentalist rage could shock this 
ostensibly secular society; sectarian violence could erupt, transposed from eastern 
Anatolian civil wars (2008:90).’ Here, bread and pork-free sausage can be purchased in 
Turkish shops, and one can live without speaking German. Thus Kreuzberg stands for 
all that is foreign and dangerous, and all that cannot be integrated.  
Sen (1992) argues that since the beginning of work migration, divorced from real 
contact, native Germans have internalized a relatively negative image of the Turkish 
minority; because they are the largest group of migrants in Germany and have a 
different religious and cultural origin, which means a kind of otherness, which many 
natives meet with hostility. European guest-workers were seen as more integrable 
within German society, considered to be sharing the basic Christian heritage and values. 
Within the Christian space, according to Mandel (2008), there is an internal 
classification of high and low by means of which Italians, then Greeks and Christian 
(former) Yugoslavs are ranked. Italians dominate the top of the pecking order, sharing 
the Catholicism of part of the German population, while at the same time their heritage 
is solidly European, including the opera, Renaissance, the pope etc (2008:91). Greeks, 
though Christian, are exotically inflected as Eastern Orthodox and their culture is 
considered less accessible to Germans, but distant and different in terms of social, 
cultural and physical proxemics (2008:91) . Thus, the less accessible a cultural group is 
deemed, the lower it is situated in the hierarchy of migrants.  
However, within Germany, foreigners reproduce and thus reinforce the idea of a 
hierarchy of foreigners, and internalize it. Bourdieu (1984) describes this process:  
“Dominated agents, who assess the value of their position and their 
characteristics by applying a system of schemes of perception and appreciation 
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which is the embodiment of the objective laws whereby their value is objectively 
constituted, tend to attribute themselves what the distribution attributes to them, 
refusing what they are refused (1984:471).”  
In other words, migrants reinforce the German-assigned attributes of anti-social, anti-
integrative and criminal, and in particular the Turkish minority that is considered the 
least ‘integrable’. ‘Good foreigners’ are those who assimilate and live up to German 
expectations. They are the highly achieving individuals of the Berlin campaign, whereas 
the Turkish minority is perceived as a group that is alien, inaccessible and under-
achieves.  
But, places in the more academic secondary school, the Gymnasium, commonly have 
been directly or indirectly refused to Turkish children. Many Turkish parents knew little 
about the German system and were in no position to help their children. That meant, 
that in effect, they conspired with the educational authorities to deny their children the 
necessary tools to assure their future, social, educational, and vocational, and thereby 
their children’s success in Germany (Mandel, 2008:92). Again, this reinforces the 
perception of Turks as the perpetual outsiders to mainstream middle-class society, 
making Turks and Turkishness inherently bad and resistant to German attempts at 
helping integration. Based on the idea of the desired and ‘good foreigner’, who is a 
highly achieving individual, whose culture is accessible and not too alien, the Turkish 
minority is constructed as the ‘bad foreigners’. And the second generation, and by now 
the third generation, are still considered Anatolian peasants, highlighting the importance 
of class and achievement again, by implicating that they are ill-educated.  
According to Polat (1997), much has been written about conflicting cultures and value 
systems that migrant children need to negotiate, leading to inevitable identity crises, 
especially amongst the children. Having an identity crisis is considered an inevitable 
fact amongst migrant children, which is reinforced or begun in the parental home where 
‘retrograde’ life concepts and educational methods prevail. Such ideas were reflected in 
the German media, but gained immediacy when civil unrest broke out in French suburbs 
in the autumn of 2005. Comparisons were made between the situation of migrants and 
in France and migrants in Germany, and particular attention focussed on the issue of 
migrant children and integration.  
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For many years German integration policies or lack thereof, have been criticized, while 
the French policies were praised for a long time. Back in 1998, for the anniversary of 
“30 Years Migration to Germany”, the French model of addressing the issue of 
migration was still praised. “We [the Germans] are precisely therefore too little 
hospitable and capable of integration because we deny our identity as a nation with a 
culture. From not denying, however, realistic requirements (in France and England 
accepted without asking) arise of the guest-worker and the asylum seekers that are to be 
integrated (Heinrichs in Koschyk, 1998:31)”. By this, Heinrichs (1998) means that 
Germany needs to admit to its own culture and clarify its own identity, instead of 
denying it. He takes France and the United Kingdom as an example, which he 
considered assured in their own identity and culture, hence having a clear guideline for 
what migrants need to be integrated into. This approach is not nearly as straightforward 
and unproblematic as Heinrichs (1998) imagines. Stolcke (1995) argues that the 
discourse on culture in integration veils the true underlying issues, and shifts the 
responsibility for integration to the migrants (cf, Selim, 1997:127).  
Nonetheless, some authors (like Heinrichs, 1998) and the media considered French 
integration policy superior. So when the banlieues [suburbs] caught fire in a climate that 
was already sensitized to the question of migration, the media increased its attention. 
The unrests began in a suburb of Paris mainly inhabited by migrants and spread across 
France, till the State declared a state of emergency to put an end to cars burning every 
night and fights between youths and the police. “Germany doesn’t have French 
conditions in this country yet”, the newspaper die Zeit (46/2005) subtitles an article 
about the possibility of civil unrest in German cities with large migrant minorities. The 
article tries to warn about ghettos and draws comparisons between Berlin-Neukölln and 
Aulnay-sous-Bois in Paris, saying that Berlin-Neukölln isn’t “as far advanced yet”, but 
one may fear that it might get to that stage.  
However, while attention to integration was increased, while a new vocabulary arose, 
the helplessness of politicians to provide viable answers is highlighted in an emphasis 
on rhetoric and the peculiar absence of definitions. Erdogan calls on Turks to integrate 
more, der Spiegel writes on the 6
th
 of November, 2005, reporting on the Turkish 
Premier’s visit to Germany. “In Germany, the Turks should integrate better into 
society,” he is quoted as saying. Yet Erdogan too, remains silent on what integration 
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means and how exactly the Turkish minority should integrate themselves. Again, it 
seems to make integration the Turks’ problem, not of German society and German 
government policies.  
Another article, written in the wake of the civil unrest in France asks whether in 
Germany offers for integration are enough (Die Zeit, 49/2005.). In a whole series, Die 
Zeit laments the rise of Paralellgesellschaften [parallel societies], which have already 
evolved, in which Germans and migrants live apart. But is that not what authorities like 
Frankfurt’s want: a peaceful ‘side-by-side’ of nationalities?  
Anatolia is only a tram-stop away, Die Zeit (48/2005) titles another article, indicating 
that in Berlin this scenario of segregated societies is already happening. In short, in 
2004/2005 the public discourse changed and acknowledged that serious problems might 
arise from the Federal Republic’s former migration policy, problems which had been 
largely ignored. While voices even before called for a change in the handling of 
migration issues, attention was focussed outwards on France, for example, for 
inspiration. What followed was an on-going discourse of helplessness in which words 
such as ‘integration’ and the spectre of Paralellgesellschaften were used to attempt 
solutions. The co-existence position, based on the French model, appeared to have 
failed, and the praised French example no longer offered solutions.  
In fact, the unrests in France, and the helplessness of German politicians highlighted the 
lack of a definition of integration. What had begun as the vague implication during the 
Chancellor Kohl- era, and had then been defined on an individual level of high-
achieving ‘good foreigners’ who took on German values and participated in civic 
society, was shown to be insufficient and revealed the underlying issues. This was by no 
means a new phenomenon however the discourse on ‘culture’ and ‘co-existence’, which 
attempted to move away from ethno-cultural perceptions of ‘Germanness’ by veiling the 
same, can be further illuminated by looking at the media, and the way foreigners are 
described.  
Comparing different newspapers in Frankfurt, Diederich (1997) found that crimes 
committed by foreigners were reported much more dramatically, thus increasing the 
perception of Ausländerkriminalität [rate of crimes committed by foreigners] as a 
societal problem (1997:138). Nationality and ethnicity, according to Diederich, feature 
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strongly in crimes committed by foreigners or such that are perceived as ‘foreign’, 
whereas in the few instances, where  German nationality is named specifically, it is to 
underline the outlandish nature of the crime, e.g.: “German Dracula bit old age 
pensioner- dead (F.A.Z, 06.04.1995)” (1997:137).  
The difficulty and ambivalence of reporting on crime using stereotypical labels of 
criminals as foreigners, for Diederich, presents itself in a headline of the newspaper 
FNP: “Having come to Germany at the age of fourteen already, he speaks excellent 
German and presents himself in a self-confident manner (15.04.1995)”. According to 
Diederich the reinforcement of stereotypes in the media creates a false awareness of the 
crime rates amongst foreigners and only increases hostility towards foreigners, when 
suspects or perpetrators belong to the second or even third generation of migrants, in 
which case labelling them as ‘Frankfurter’ would be more fitting (1997:138). Whether 
or not such a new label would help changing the perception of criminal foreigners, 
Diederich (1997) rightly points out the importance of language skills, and the 
associations made with them.  
Lack of fluency in German is a focal point for the media and public discourse about 
migrant children, especially the Turkish minority. The images are mainly negative 
images of migrants and migrant children, who are perceived as badly educated, 
criminal, lazy, and incapable of speaking sufficient German. “Why education? They live 
in Germany as would in their rural world”, Die Zeit (48/2005) writes. It describes 
“traditional Muslim- Turkish culture” as unchanged, concluding that ‘life continues as it 
has over the centuries”. According to the author, Turkish migrants in Germany “live 
according to the rules of an Anatolian village”. Here, tradition, backwardness and the 
oppression of women go hand in hand with a lack of ‘Bildungswillen’ [the will to 
become educated]. Where the education of women is immaterial since the parents 
believe that the girl will marry aged 16, integration fails and the system of traditional 
patriarchy continues, disallowing the Turkish minority to enter into ‘modernity’. 
Perhaps not oddly, but uncomfortably, the discussion about education and the perceived 
lack of will on the part of the Turkish migrants, seems to hark back to older ideas about 
the intelligence of different races, as outlined by Fischer (1913/1961) about the 
“Rohoboter Bastards”. Although in this case, lack of education, indicating a lack of 
intelligence, is constructed as a personal shortcoming and character-flaw. It is 
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backwards, refusing to participate in the blessings of modernity, thus showing a decided 
lack of intelligence.  
In this article, as in others, the fact that women came after men, came to Germany as 
wives and mothers primarily rather than workers, led to Turkish being the language in 
homes and the affirmation of Muslim values. This, coupled with religious and 
traditional ideals amongst Turkish migrants, creates difficulties for the wives of migrant 
workers who came to Germany following their husbands, and consequently for the 
children. According to Atabay (1998), writing about the second generation of Turkish 
migrants in Germany, when couples migrate, the phenomenon of “pioneer migration” 
(1998:62) has a direct impact on the couple, meaning that whoever migrated first has an 
advantage with regards to learning the new language. Atabay (1998) quotes one woman 
as asking why she should learn German, when they [she and her family] had Turkish 
friends (1998:63). Variously, the media focuses on the inability of migrant wives to 
speak German and the perceived consequences of limiting successful integration for 
entire families, as well as lack of educational success for the children. The above article 
in particular uses the imagery of the ‘Anatolian peasants’, saying that the “farm workers 
without land and work, who took their customs first to Istanbul and then to Germany 
[…] held fast to what was left to them- after they found they were the losers of 
economical development whether in Istanbul or Iserlohe- their traditions, and 
increasingly their faith with its stern rules for life and an Islamic belief in submitting to 
their fate”(Die Zeit, 48/2005). The Turkish minority hence is defined as backwards, 
criminal and refuses to adapt to modernity, i.e.: Germany. Recently, particularly the 
phenomenon of ‘honour killings’ has captured space in newspapers, and fired the 
public’s imagination, portraying young Muslim or Turkish women as the oppressed 
victims mainly of their backwards brothers, who refuse to adapt to modern, German 
ideas about gender equality. The position of women has become a key issues in making 
Turkish difference.  
In November 2000, Member of Parliament Friedrich Merz defined German Leitkultur
34
 
in three basic elements: German language, constitution, and the position of women 
(Schuhmann in Kavoori and Fraley, 2006:96). Equally pointing towards the treatment of 
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women, politician Günther Beckstein said: “For me, leading culture is that there won’t 
be a minaret in a Bavarian village and that Turkish women in Germany have at least as 
much say as their husbands. (2006:97)”.  Beckstein is openly talking about oppressed 
Turkish women who serve as a gendered and ethnicized boundary marker that are not 
and never will- due to their static mentality/culture- be part of the German national 
collective. Turkish men are perpetually conceptualized as uncivilized, constantly 
partaking in sexist behaviour, and placed in opposition to real German men, whose 
modernity and enlightened thinking would never allow them to treat women that way. If 
the “treatment of women […] became the primary litmus test to determine whether 
foreigners- and especially Turks- possessed the capacity to function effectively within a 
Western liberal democratic society (Chin, 2007:143)”, then the Turkish minority- in the 
eyes of the majority society- has failed.  
Even liberal newspapers reinforce the idea that the Turkish minority doesn’t want to 
integrate, refuses to arrive in German modernity and prefers to continue living in 
Anatolian villages. These groups of Anatolian villagers are the epitome of the ‘bad 
foreigner’ who is ill-educated, doesn’t respect laws on equality, refuses to adopt 
German values and is criminal, while treating women badly. Turks and Turkishness are 
perceived as ‘too different’ to integrate, while at the same time the ‘integration debate’ 
ignores the underlying ethno-cultural implications of what it means to be German. 
Integration in Germany means more than adhering to the rules and achieving, but 
actually demands assimilation and inherent Germanness that the Aussiedler
35
 [resettlers] 
already have. Those who are not ethnically German, but who adapt and achieve can be 
awarded the status of ‘good foreigners’. Diametrically opposite to this is the ‘bad 
foreigner’ who is not an individual, but recognizable as part of a community, who has 
not achieved highly in education and profession, and who does not adhere to the rules. 
For them, the stress in the debate remains on the word Ausländer, informed by ethno-
cultural notions of what it means to be German, and who cannot be ‘good’ by the above 
definition. This establishes a hierarchy of migrants, at the bottom of which are the ‘bad’ 
foreigners who are ‘too different’ and ‘unintegrable’, transgressing German norms 
(Mandel, 2008:87), which render them more alien than the other Ausländer. In 
Germany, these ‘bad’ foreigners are the Turkish minority, who “when scarves cover 
their heads, when they read Turkish newspapers on busses, send children to Qu’ran 
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school, smell of garlic or refuse to eat pork […], they become Ausländer’” (2008:87). 
However: the operative word remains Ausländer, someone who doesn’t really belong, 
whether good or bad.  
I will look again closely at these issues in chapter 6 “The Good Foreigners”, having 
tried to outline the discourses surrounding migrants, gender and integration in Germany 
here. These discourses regulate access to ‘German identity’, creating the framework that 
migrants and second generations negotiate in the process of identity formation.  
3.5.Gastarbeiterkinder- Literature and Media Representations of Second- 
Generation children in Germany  
 
Literature and representations in the media about the second generation of German- 
Koreans tend to portray a success story of integration. I will explore this seeming 
success story in greater detail in chapter 6 “The Good Foreigners”. In this section, I am 
looking at the way second generations in Germany are represented and discussed. 
Attempting to give an exhaustive overview would far exceed the scope of this thesis, so 
I am focussing on general approaches, with special attention to the kyopos. Literature 
about the kyopos is sparse. Mostly they are mentioned by the bye in books or articles 
pertaining to the first generation (cf Lee, 1991; Han, 1991; Yoo, 1991; Yoo, 1996; 
Beckers-Kim, 2005 etc). Or they are mentioned briefly in research on second generation 
migrant children in Germany (cf Trommsdorf, 2001; Röhr-Sendelmeier & Yun, 2006 
etc). Compared to a wealth of work on the second generation of German- Turks, 
literature about or by the second generation of German- Koreans is almost non-existent. 
Hence, I explore the broader discourse in which the few available sources are situated.  
I argue that literature and media representations in the past problematised second-
generations in Germany, building onto an ethno-cultural understanding of Germanness 
that dichotomized ‘Germanness’ with ‘Foreignness’; this approach situated second 
generations between cultures leading to a discourse of culture conflict and identity 
crisis.  
In spite of the repeated claim then that Germany was not an immigration country, it had 
become one, but was retaining the concept of ‘guest’-labour, rendering migrants and 
their children permanent guests. Such reasoning had the potential to create difficulties, 
as W. Bodenbender, senior civil servant in the Federal Ministry of Labour pointed out 
in 1976, three years after the recruitment stop of foreign labour: 
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“A special problem arises with respect to the second generation of foreigners, a 
number of whom will remain permanently in the Federal Republic. This coming 
generation, because they have grown up in Germany, will react differently than 
their parents to the limited educational and occupational opportunities and social 
declassifications […]. The second generation of foreigners will compare their 
own social and economic opportunities with that of the German population and 
interpret the unsuccessful social and occupational integration for what it is: 
unsupportable discrimination.” (Quoted in Wilpert, 1977) 
Bodenbender pointed out the future difficulties that the second generation faced: In 
conjunction with the jus sanguinis that made naturalization for foreigners difficult. 
Temporariness and thereby dislocation became hereditary. In other words: migrant 
children who grew up in Germany remained ‘guests’, who in theory had another Heimat 
to ‘return’ to.  
In 1977, Wilpert (1977) calls the fact that migrants stayed and raised families a 
“dimension [that] was unanticipated (1997:475). And “schools were ill-prepared for 
both the influx of foreign children and the resulting social and pedagogical challenge 
(1977:475).” In the 1970s notions of culture conflict and identity crisis were prevalent 
in studies on migrant youths, operating under the assumption that culture and values 
“are transplanted here wholesale, and are either taken up or refused by young people 
growing up here (Parker, 1995:11)”. Thus, there was an assumption in academia that 
migrant children inevitably would suffer an identity crisis and identity problems. Such 
notions used static notions of what constitutes culture and problematized individuals, 
who deviated from norms or didn’t conform to expected patterns. This approach 
situated individuals ‘between two cultures’, and constituted identity as a static and 
holistic concept that “you either have or totally lack” (Paker, 1995:14).  
Wilpert (1977) reflects this static view and the perceived temporariness of guest-
workers in talking about “mother tongue instructions” that “maintains the cultural 
identity of the foreign worker child; a factor considered important for the sense of self-
confidence and cultural heritage of the child […] as well as a practical necessity for the 
real alternative that at any time the child may be forced to reenter [sic] either the 
educational system or labour market in his own country” (1977:480). The 
Ausländerpädagogik [foreigner pedagogy] established during that time focussed on the 
educational achievements and problems, vocational training and transition into the 
labour-force (Worbs, 2003). At the time, the main concern focussed on the 
achievements or lack thereof for Turkish migrant children. Worbs (2003) identifies a 
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general problem with German discourse on migrant children: “there is an abundance of 
statistical material and literature about young foreigners, and there is an intense 
discussion, about for example, their comparatively high school drop-out rates. But this 
is often done without considering the generational status of the examined and the 
increasing number of naturalizations, especially among the second generation” 
(2003:1015).  
Naturalization numbers have increased strongly in recent years, but categories in official 
statistics still compare ‘foreigners’ with ‘Germans’, which means that an increasing 
number of migrants and migrant children vanish from the public eye, causing a 
distortion. In an analogy, academic and public debates still compare ‘foreigners’ and 
Germans, as several authors have pointed out (Nauck & Diefenbach, 1997; Haug, 2002 
etc). Worbs (2003) argues that this is important since studies have shown that migrant 
descendants fully educated in Germany and/or who have acquired German citizenship, 
achieve higher levels of structural integration.  
The Turkish minority is often the focus of attention in academic literature, and in the 
public consciousness. The second and third generation is problematised, leading to a 
widespread perception of socio-cultural ‘integration deficits’ of Turkish second-
generation migrants (Worbs, 2003:1016). Much has been written about conflicting 
cultures and value systems that migrant children need to negotiate, focussing on 
seemingly inevitable identity crises. As the first generation of guestworkers raised 
families, the question of identity for the children became of interest. Polat (1997) 
summarizes that ‘identity-crisis’, ‘identity-diffusion’ and ‘idenitity-confusion’ were the 
central topic in research dealing with the identity of migrant children (1997:35). In 
many studies the Turkish parent generation is described as ‘backward, traditional, 
patriarchal and authoritarian’ (Özkara, 1990; Lajios, 1991; Nieke, 1991; Heitmeyer, 
1997). Having an identity crisis is considered an inevitable fact amongst migrant 
children, which is reinforced or begun in the parental home where ‘retrograde’ life 
concepts and educational methods prevail. 
Often these concerns focus on their command of the German language, and their 
consequent underachievement in education. “Education and language, the politicians 
agree, are the keys to successful integration” (Hyung, 2008:139). In the German 
discourse on integration, the underachievement of young people of Turkish origin adds 
to a discourse on ‘unwillingness to integrate’. Many authors have attempted to address 
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this situation to provide a more nuanced image, especially of the Turkish minority (cf 
Polat, 1997; Atabay, 1998, etc). But the rhetoric in the media and public opinion doesn’t 
agree with such a nuanced image. The media, instead, shows a preoccupation with the 
educational underachievement and the crime statistics of migrant children. For example, 
the newspaper Der Stern had a headline in 2008 stating that “Every fifth foreigner drops 
out of school.
36” Interestingly, the article appears in the category ‘migrant children’, so 
it is unclear whether they are only referring to legal foreigners, naturalized migrants or 
migrant children who may or may not be naturalized. This is precisely the sort of 
undifferentiated approach Worbs (2003) criticizes that still dominates the media and 
informs public opinions. Having said that, the media attempts critical approaches, 
writing about institutionalized discrimination against migrant children in German 
schools, like Der Spiegel in 2006, pointing out that teachers don’t credit migrant 
children with the abilities to succeed
37
.  
German crime statistics indicate at first glance that migrant children commit more crime 
than those without a migration background. But, as the researchers point out, if one 
looks at family and social class, then the numbers of migrant children that commit 
crimes, and the number of children from a corresponding social class with equal 
education, commit the same number of crimes (Kriminologisches Forschungsinstitut 
Niedersachsen, 2009). “A constantly reproduced outcome of studies about youth- 
violence is the fact that youths of migrant descent (except children from Asian 
countries) commit more violent crimes
38,” writes the newspaper Die Zeit about the 
crime statistics. The article focuses on young men of Turkish descent, saying how they 
want to “show strength through violence”, but it is rare enough to find any mention of 
Asian migrant children in the news. Such rare portrayals show migrant children of 
Asian descent in a good light, or at least, as in this case, they are mentioned in passing 
as ‘unproblematic’.  
To a large degree, this reflects the existing body of literature in Germany about second-
generation German-Koreans. Early studies focussed on pedagogy, and concluded that 
with a few exceptions almost all children of Korean migrants in Germany attended the 
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 http://www.stern.de/panorama/migrantenkinder-jeder-fuenfte-auslaender-bricht-schule-ab-610347.html 
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 http://www.spiegel.de/schulspiegel/wissen/0,1518,444160,00.html 
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 http://www.zeit.de/online/2009/13/jugendgewalt-migranten 
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Gymnasium
39
 (Kim, 1986:197). Clearly, Korean migrants, unlike their Turkish 
counterparts, did not and do not lack Bildungswille. In her study on Korean children in 
Germany, Kim (1986) identified several problematic areas: Parents and children 
disagreed about identity, with the children suffering from the fact that they were not 
fluent in Korean and their self-understanding as Koreans differed from their parents’. 
Another point was that the parents had different expectations for their children than the 
children, favouring a career that would confer status and pay well, preferably a career in 
law, medicine or business. Finally she found that the parents treated their daughters 
differently than their sons, and acted more conservative towards them. Kim (1986) 
concluded that the problems of communication between the parent and second 
generation weren’t based on language differences, but on different ideas and plans for 
the future. Kim (1986) sees an immediate connection between language and identity, 
and concludes that the second generation children suffer because of their lack of fluency 
in Korean (1986:205).  
Within the paradigms set by German discourses on integration, Kim’s (1986) study of 
second-generation German-Koreans showed them as successful in German language 
fluency and educational achievements, but she pointed towards the influence of the 
German environment on the children’s Identitätsprägung [Identity 
imprinting/development]. She situates the second generation between two cultures, and 
their ‘suffering’ is the direct outcome of the culture conflict in which they live. While 
Kim’s (1986) study highlights several issues that are important for mine as well, her 
approach is limiting. It adds to the existent discourse about culture conflicts and identity 
crises. What is more is that the children she writes about are grown men and women by 
now.  
Similarly, Hwang (1999) situates German-Korean migrant children between two 
cultures. Taking up the notion of ‘culture conflict’ and ‘identity crisis’, she assesses the 
passive and negative image of Ausländer, and argues that growing up and living in two 
cultures is a chance and an opportunity for positive agency that gives them an 
educational advantage. Beckers-Kim (2005) goes so far as to claim that 95% of the 
second generation of German-Koreans has achieved its Abitur- the examination that 
allows registration at universities. Literature about German-Koreans and the second 
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 Germany has a three-tiered school system, geared towards providing different education for different 
jobs. Hauptschule is geared towards manual labour, Realschule towards white-collar work, and 
Gymnasium towards higher education in university.  
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generation discusses the high level of female migrant education (Lee, 1991), and the 
continuity of harmonic parent-child relationships that produce mutual obligations and 
loyalties (Oerter/Oerter, 1995; Trommsdorf, 2001). The children of Korean migrants are 
presented as fluent in German, educated and integrated into German society. Reasons 
for this success are the stress on educational success and the educational ambition that 
the parent generation transmitted (Park, 1996).  
What all these works on the second generation of German-Koreans have in common is 
that they are situated within the discourse on culture conflict and identity crisis, and 
from this approach argue the ‘success’ of the second generation as migrant children. 
That is to say that they support that discourse rather than offering critical insights, and 
challenging it. Also, they mostly focus on what the parent generation has done to bring 
about such success. The involvement of the parent generation cannot be denied. The 
parent generation’s experiences have informed my research as well, but in order to gain 
an understanding of the second generation’s self-perception and understanding, looking 
at the parent generation’s influences and the established discourse is too limiting.  
In recent years, the second generation has begun representing itself. Literature is still 
sparse, but a few very active groups of second-generation German-Koreans are working 
on that
40
. One representation is a 30-minute film by Cerin Hong that portrays second-
generation German-Korean women in Berlin, narrating a “transit (Showcase Catalogue, 
2005:29)”, meaning the “crossing over into the German society through and in the 
company of the traditions and values of Korean families” (2005:29). This film portrays 
the young women as neither accepted by German society as Germans, nor accepted in 
Korean society as Koreans, and shows them attempting to negotiate between ‘German’ 
and ‘Korean’.  
In 2008 Hyung (2008) published a book about the second generation, called “Lautlos- 
Ja, Sprachlos- Nein: Grenzgänger zwischen Korea und Deutschland [Soundless/silent- 
yes, Speechless- no: Someone who crosses boundaries/frontiers between Korea and 
Germany]”. His account is mostly biographical, addressing various issues about 
growing up in Germany with Korean parents, while drawing on the voices of other 
members of the second generation too, to present a broader picture. His account 
assesses their present situation, especially in relation to integration and attitudes from 
the majority society towards the second generation, critically. He situates the second 
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 ‘Korientation’, for example, is one of these active groups.  
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generation in the dichotomy ‘Germany-Korea’ and the resulting culture conflict so that 
they “are not really at home in both cultures” (2008:139).  
Roberts (2008) provides an - as of yet unpublished- linguistic study on the identity of 
the second generation, focussing on the use of terminology for self-description, 
advocating hybrid identities. She is addressing the question of self-perception, by 
analyzing the use of terminology on online forums, to provide an understanding of the 
issues surrounding the second generation. While she is challenging monolithic 
constructions of identity, her focus is on the acceptance of second generation German-
Koreans into German society and considers being German as the “dominant identity” 
(2008:8) in a hybrid identity.  
What this brief overview of existing literature and self-representations indicates is that 
discourses about the second generation of German-Koreans are firmly located in 
discourses on integration in Germany that dichotomizes ‘Germany’ and ‘Foreigners’, 
creating an ongoing discourse about clashing cultures and identity crises that is tinged 
with an underlying racial ideology. In this undifferentiated discourse, migrant children 
are expected to suffer an identity crisis, do badly in school and turn into criminals. The 
second generation of German-Koreans is an anomaly in this framework, seemingly 
‘created’ as a success story by ambitious parents (cf, Hwang, 1999). I am using Hyung 
(2008) and Roberts (2008) mainly as sources, in an attempt to move beyond the 
established paradigms that focus on the parent generation’s aspirations for the second 
generation. What earlier literature has done is to create a ‘success story’ of migrant 
children that did not do badly in school and do not commit crime, trying to find 
explanations for that. Hyung (2008) and Roberts (2008) offer an approach that attempts 
a more differentiated view that does not play into an established trope of ‘good’ and 
‘bad foreigners’, and identity crises resulting from essentialized identities.  
I intend to further this approach, by moving away from essentialized understandings of 
identity, looking at the negotiation of identity, rather than reasons for success or failure. 
Thus, I consider my research as part of a larger body of work on the identities of second 
generations in Germany, and not restricted to German-Koreans. I am aim to challenge a 
whole discourse on second generation migrant children in Germany that pitches a 
seemingly successful group against seemingly unsuccessful ones, and break out of 
dichotomized thinking that circumscribes the discourse on second generations in 
Germany.  
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3.6.Conclusion 
 
“We called for workers, but humans came,” the oft-quoted Max Fritsch statement (cf, 
Chin, 2007; Mandel, 2008 etc) has long become a truism. The German state refused to 
acknowledge that it had become an immigration country a long time ago, holding on to 
policies and ideas about ‘return-migrants’ until it could no longer deny the truth. The 
debates about the policies and practices towards these settled migrants have persisted 
for many years. But discourses about integration failed to address the underlying issue 
of ethno-cultural German national self-understanding, and instead shifted the debate 
into the seemingly less problematic realm of the cultural.  
Considering Germany’s dark past, and the atrocities that followed a misguided 
understanding of “race”, it is perhaps not surprising that the debate shifted into the 
cultural realm, but shifting the issue fails to recognize and address the true problems. In 
this cultural debate, the German state shied away from actually defining ‘integration’, 
leaving it open to interpretation what integration means.  
Apparently, vaguely, it means education and proficiency in German. In 1977 Wilpert 
already wrote that “proficiency in German is an absolute necessity for these children 
(1977:481)”. ‘These children’ are adults now, the third generation is growing up, and 
integration still remains problematic. The German model of integration seems to be the 
one that Frankfurt am Main espouses: a peaceful side-by-side, rather than living 
together in a community. Basically that means that the ethno-cultural understanding of 
‘Germanness’ need not be challenged, and the discourse on integration can continue on 
a cultural level, while the media vilifies ‘foreigners’ and ‘migrant children’ who are 
uneducated, violent and criminal.  
Wilpert (1977) predicted that missed opportunities “can only lead to social unrest, 
deviancy and disillusionment among the majority of disadvantaged migrant youth in the 
future (1977:483).” Looking at the crime statistics of the Kriminologisches 
Forschungsinstitut Niedersachsen (KFN), her predictions seem to have come true. 
Although the KFN points out the parity between youths of the same familial and social 
circumstances, it would appear that violent and criminal migrant youths –considering 
the size of Germany’s migrant population- are disproportionally represented. And the 
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image the media represents is anything but flattering, feeding into existing stereotypes 
of ‘other’ men that present a danger. Education and language fluency do not guard 
against “discrimination, institutionalised racism and they do not blur ‘the sharp edges of 
ethnicities’” (Hyung, 2008:139).  
But the kyopos are an unproblematic second generation for the German state and 
majority society. They don’t figure in crime statistics, speak fluent German and are 
educated. The majority society considers kyopo women ‘reserved and humble’ and 
kyopo men aren’t perceived as a threat the same way that Turkish youths are. They have 
fulfilled the requirements for integration. They are the model for what Deutsche mit 
Migrationshintergrund look like, literally.  
While this relatively new term is meant to be inclusive, it is typical for the helpless 
discourse that refuses to take into account its structural racism. Seemingly trying to 
include those citizens who were possibly not born German, or whose parents migrated 
to Germany, it still denies full inclusion by pointing out that a particular German is not 
part of the national myth of shared blood and history, and therefore is othered. Such and 
other well-intended attempts, like the misguided studies about “Negermischlinge” in the 
1950s, create the conditions for the prophesy of an eventual ‘identity crisis’. In practice, 
in everyday life, the term becomes even more problematic, since the majority society 
applies it to those who, as Stolcke (1995) put it, “carry their foreignness in their faces” 
(1995:8). In the current discourse on integration in Germany “phenotype tends now to 
be employed as a marker of immigrant origin rather than ‘race’, being construed as the 
justification for anti-immigrant resentment” (1995:8).  
The ‘sharp edges of ethnicity’ are precisely what the German discourse on integration 
needs to address. Words like ‘integration’ and ‘multiculturalism’, are meaningless in a 
discourse that refuses to recognize discrimination and institutionalized racism, while 
blithely using words like Mischlingskind and Neger, speaking to those who are 
supposed to –somehow- integrate, signalling that they’re not members, and by virtue of 
phenotype never can be. In Germany, being an Ausländer is hereditary. And it is this 
discourse that creates “identity crises” and identity conflicts. Being ‘German’ with a 
different phenotype is not a readily available form of identification for second 
generations. 
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In chapter 4 “Yellow Angels”, I am discussing the particularities of Korean migration to 
Germany to provide the context for the present situation of the second generation of 
German-Koreans. Looking at the experiences of the first generation will contextualize 
the upbringing and experiences of the second generation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. ‘Yellow Angels’: South Korean women migrants in Germany  
 
“We came because German hospitals needed staff, and we helped Germany. We 
are not economic goods. We will return, if and when we want.”  
The above quote comes from a flyer handed out by Korean nurses in Berlin, in 1977 
(Berner & Choi, 2006). That year the German state decided that the usual 3-year 
contracts for Korean nurses shouldn’t be renewed, forcing Korean nurses to leave 
Germany. By that time, many Korean nurses had lived and worked in Germany for 
many years and wanted to stay. In hospitals, they were known as ‘gentle angels’ or 
‘yellow angels’, but in 1977, they decided to fight back. They demanded from the 
government that they should receive a unbefristete Aufenthaltserlaubnis [leave to 
remain indefinitely] after five years, and after eight a unbefristete 
Aufenthaltsberechtigung [right to remain indefinitely]. They collected signatures and 
protested, garnering support from the majority society for their plight. The local 
government of Berlin acquiesced to their requests in 1977. The last local government to 
acquiesce was in Baden-Württemberg, one year later. The Korean nurses had won the 
right to remain in Germany for themselves, their husbands and their children.  
Today, the majority society is largely unaware of these events, and mass media when 
speaking of migrant women, follows the established trope of oppression of migrant 
women by migrant men. The first generation of Koreans in Germany does not fit into 
this narrative. Their stories are different, not least of all because they fought for and 
won for the right to stay, for themselves and by extension their children, and spouses. 
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These and the narratives about them among the second generation, form the basis of a 
narrative myth that is ‘the classic story’ among the second generation. While the 
migration stories about fathers can vary, it is rare that the mothers weren’t nurses41. 
‘The classic story’ is part of the established narrative of shared experiences among the 
second generation, in which maternal pioneering courage and sacrifice, are part of the 
self-production of identity and community.  
In this chapter, I will explore Korean migration to Germany, focussing on the women 
who came as nurses, using two life stories as examples. I will use these and other voices 
throughout the chapter to analyze. In contrast to the case of other migrant groups, 
Korean migration to Germany did not consist of mainly male migrant workers. I am 
focussing on the women in particular since more women came to Germany than men. 
Roughly 10.000 Korean women came to Germany, and 8000 men (Yoo, 1991:25). 
Statistically, and in practice the assumption that every Korean nurse married a Korean 
miner is wrong- many Korean nurses married German men or other Korean nationals 
who had come to Germany as students, after the first wave of Korean migration to 
Germany. That is not to say that the experiences of the Korean miners in Germany are 
negligible, since as a matter of fact their stories of migration have become part of a 
second-generation narrative that recognizes the parental pairing ‘nurse and miner’ as 
‘the classic’. Nonetheless, I am focussing on the women’s lives and experiences as story 
that has had a greater direct impact on the second generation, as I will explain in chapter 
5.  
I will look at the particular circumstances of South Korea before and at the time of their 
migration, drawing out several key issues that contextualize the women’s experiences 
that constitute the narrative myth of origin among the second generation. Beginning 
with history, I explain the circumstances leading to migration, before looking at the 
constitution of religion within a Korean context, and the construction of gender and 
families. I then discuss the Korean women’s experiences in Germany and the present-
day situation. I posit that the experience of gendered migration, which differs from the 
experiences of other migrant groups to Germany, puts the Korean migrants to Germany 
in a unique situation with consequences for the second generation. Korean nurses in 
Germany learned German much more quickly than the Korean miners, and had greater 
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 None of my informants had a mother who had not been a nurse, but a few had fathers who had not 
migrated to Germany as miners.  
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contact with the majority society (Yoo, 1991:27-30). I argue that the particularities of 
Korean migration to Germany made the Korean community in Germany a “poster-
child” for integration in a discourse that centres on the perceived backwardness and 
silence of migrant women. This particular position and the self-representation, and self-
production of the first generation, form the basis of kyopo self-narration, and are part of 
the “memory, fantasy, narrative and myth” (Hall, 1989:71), which are used in the 
negotiation of identity.   
 
 
4.1.Two stories of migration: Mrs Kim and Mrs Pak  
 
Mrs Kim and Mrs Pak
42
 came to Germany together as nurses’ aides. They had both 
heard stories and seen newspaper adverts seeking staff for German hospitals. Both were 
young, and unmarried, both decided to migrate. And both still live in Germany. Mrs 
Kim came to Germany on November, 30
th
 1970 as a nurse’s aide. I met her via her 
daughter Johanna, and had the opportunity of interviewing her on several occasions in 
formal and semi-formal interviews. Mrs Kim always chose the venue for these meetings 
and always chose a different Viennese-style café, which are popular in Germany. Like 
many women of her age, she enjoyed sitting in these cafés, meeting with friends and 
chatting. Usually such a café is connected to a Konditorei, where cakes, chocolates and 
sometimes bread are sold, though the café is a separate room or rooms, usually large 
and airy with pastel-coloured walls, carpeted floors, landscape paintings on the walls 
and tables covered with table-cloths that reach at least halfway down the table. In the 
background, usually, discreet piano music plays from loudspeakers, intended to create a 
refined and cultured atmosphere, and the level of conversation remains a low, polite 
murmur.  
Mrs Kim liked such Viennese cafés, not only for good coffee and cream cakes, or the 
elegant setting, but also because they stand for respectability and tradition. During the 
opening hours, which usually end around 6pm, such cafés are mostly frequented by 
elderly ladies, who meet and chat. The price of a cup of coffee (up to 4 Euros) ensures 
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 Neither Mrs Kim, nor Mrs Pak ever offered their first names. I explain this below.   
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that the clientele remains select and great emphasis is laid on appearances, both in terms 
of the space and the clientele. Hence, a stained table-cloth in Mrs Kim’s reasoning was 
a reason not to frequent a café again, or complain immediately, demanding another one. 
The clientele is, after all, not only paying for beverages and food, but for the setting as 
well, and appearances matter. Mrs Kim would usually attend such meetings dressed in 
smart casual dress: trousers, a blouse and a blazer, always wearing jewellery and 
lipstick, fitting into the setting and the dress-code of the other patrons neatly. She was a 
thin, elderly woman in her late fifties, with bobbed black hair that was streaked with 
grey.  
Inevitably, she began the meeting, after greeting me, by carefully choosing from the 
menu, usually taking a good amount of time during which she ignored me completely. 
Being a generation younger than her, I wasn’t supposed to interrupt this process, but 
wait patiently, giving her precedence when ordering and waiting till she addressed me. 
Mrs Kim inevitably only chose coffee, but would always encourage me to order cake as 
well, insisting on feeding me. “You’re too thin, you have to eat enough. I know young 
people, my daughter never wants to eat properly either, but you can’t work on an empty 
stomach, and you’re too thin. Have you lost weight since I last saw you?”  
Mrs Kim considered it her prerogative to feed me heavy cream-covered cake, using the 
advantage of age and the respect owed to her as being my elder, to establish the proper 
circumstances under which she wanted the interviews conducted. She created a set of 
semi-filial obligations in which she likened me to her daughter, showing care and 
reminding me that I owed her respect as a maternal elder. This set of relations was 
further exemplified in that she insisted on the proprieties of my addressing her as ‘Sie’ 
and ‘Frau Kim’, using the polite forms of address, while she would address me as ‘Du’ 
and by my first name, as one normally does with children. Since it is improper for the 
younger to offer informal address, this pattern of talking remained throughout the 
course of my fieldwork, as Mrs Kim never offered informality. Like most of my 
informants of the parent generation, Mrs Kim addressed even her closest friends with 
‘Sie’ and ‘Frau’, followed by the name.  
The outward formality of the meetings as proscribed by place and manner of speech are 
both traditionally German and traditionally Korean. Formality in outward presentation 
of a place and one’s own person is important in both contexts, as is the formal address 
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in speech, which exists both in Korean as it does in German. The importance of formal 
address towards elders in both contexts can be illustrated with two separate personal 
experiences. As a child I once accidentally addressed an older, retired German 
acquaintance with ‘Du’, which led to him to complain to my parents about my 
impoliteness. A similar incident happened with a visiting aunt from Korea, whom I 
wished a ‘good night’ in Korean one evening, having barely managed to remember what 
my mother had told me once, and the next day had my mother quickly teaching me the 
polite form since my aunt had been- in her words- mortally offended that a young 
person would dare speak to her so informally.  
Sitting in the café with me, Mrs Kim was dressed in the generic uniform of Korean 
women of her age, consisting of a dress jacket in muted colours of brown and green, 
slacks and sensible flat-soled shoes with a spacious brown bag slung over one shoulder.  
She was giggling as she told me about one of her friends back in her younger days in 
Korea who dreamt of moving to the United States and becoming a lady in her own 
manor who wears ball-gowns all day. The image of the lady of the house who walks 
around in an evening gown is reminiscent of the Hollywood movies that Mrs Kim and 
her friends consumed when they were young women in Korea in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, portraying a different life to the one they had experienced in the 
deprivations of war, which often came with hunger, hardship and resettlement, and the 
demands their families were making on these young women, who wanted to be modern.  
One of the pictures she handed to me, showed her friends on a beach, all of them 
dressed in stiff, old-fashioned bathing suits fashionable in the 1950s, doing a can-can 
line with their right leg lifted just above the ground. It was, I was told, a very risqué 
picture for the time. Mrs Kim and her friends with their short hair and perms, and their 
swimming suits going on hiking trips and to the seaside, were indeed rather 
controversial for the time. They were modern young women who were exposed to 
Western culture through films in the cinema. She considered herself a very modern 
young woman, and black and white pictures indeed did show a rather perky young 
woman attired in fashionable 1950s clothes, which she told me, she had tailored 
especially for herself.   
Mrs Kim said about Korea: “It was a dirt-poor country [ ein bitterarmes Land] and I 
wanted to leave.” She would have preferred the United States, but Germany was “good 
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too”, and she knew about Germany from books, such as ‘Heidi’43, so she was convinced 
it was a pretty place where she was going. “What a shock-it wasn’t like the book at all. 
But people did have pretty lace curtains in the windows! It’s funny thinking back on it 
now, isn’t it? Maybe some people weren’t nice to me, but I had only done one German 
language course, so I suppose that I didn’t understand them then. I used to carry a 
dictionary in my pocket all the time, and I think most people were nice.”  
One of the first things, Mrs Kim told me at our first meeting, when I asked her to tell me 
of her personal experience of coming to Germany was that she came from a noble 
family, a yangban
44
 family and that it had always been her aim to attend university, but 
lack of money had prevented her. “I was very studious and wanted to study at 
university, but my family was very traditional, and of course they supported my brother 
rather than me. After half a year in Germany, I was dissatisfied and wanted to go to 
university, so I asked around what I needed, but it turned out not to be easy. You need 
an Abitur
45
, and you need to speak German perfectly, but of course it was problematic 
because of money too.”  
Eventually Mrs Kim got married to a Korean miner and had a daughter, Johanna, her 
only child, but continued her education.“After working for twenty years in hospitals, I 
got a pretty good eye for the hierarchy. Unfortunately, I couldn’t study medicine, but I 
was made ward-sister, which is very good. I keep in contact with many of my 
schoolfriends from Korea, honest contact and friendship, one of them is a managing 
director in an old people’s home, another is a manager, one is a banker, one is a doctor, 
we’re still very good friends. I don’t regret not quite getting a university degree, after all 
that way I had time for my family, but I made sure that my daughter became 
multilingual. She speaks fluent French
46
. For the first ten years, when she was small I 
only spoke German with her so she’d learn properly in school, but then I made sure she 
learned other languages, and she made a good Abitur and now studies at university.”  
                                                 
43
 ‘Heidi’ by Johanna Spyri tells the tale of a poor Swiss girl that goes to Frankfurt am Main in Germany 
to act as a companion to a rich little girl.  
44
 One of the four social classes during the Korean Choson period, before the Japanese annexation in 
1910. The Yangban were members of a – by 1910- hereditary class occupying important positions in state 
service based on the civil service examinations (Yoo, 2008:18). The education necessary to sit civil 
service examinations in the old Korean kingdom created the yangban class, whose status later became 
hereditary and also connected to land-ownership.  
45
 German school graduate’s  certificate that allows entry into university.  
46
 Johanna speaks only a few words Korean.  
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Mrs Kim was very proud of her daughter and her academic achievements. “It wasn’t 
easy for us, financially. Both Mr Kim and I had to work full-time, but I wanted her to 
have the best [possible education, including a private school]. My daughter studies 
foreign languages and economics and something with IT.”  
Mrs Pak turned out to be quite different from Mrs Kim though, although their clothes 
were similar, but Mrs Pak was taller, not as slender and kept her hair short and in a 
perm. Mrs Pak was a farmer’s daughter, who unlike the majority of nurses had not 
finished High School. She said she heard about newspaper adverts offering work in 
Germany to Korean nurses. “I didn’t really want to go, but I had brothers and sisters, 
and we were poor, so poor. So my father sold crops [meaning more than he would 
usually have sold] so I could go into town [Seoul] and apply. He was a good man, such 
a good man.”  
Unlike Mrs. Kim, Mrs Pak didn’t have any romantic ideals about Germany. She 
stressed to me repeatedly that she didn’t really want to leave, but felt she had to, to 
make money and help her family, especially her brother, whom the family wanted to 
send to university. “I cried so much. Every day. And the German nurses weren’t nice to 
me. ‘Dirty Koreans’ they would say behind my back, and if in our halls of 
accommodation something was dirty, they would always accuse us. They were mean 
people. So I used to sing when I was cleaning on the wards, just sing and sing till I no 
longer felt so angry and frustrated. Dirty Koreans, hah. There were nice people too, but 
I always remember that.”  
At the beginning of her career, in the early 1970s Mrs Pak earned DM 700 a month, and 
sent all of it, apart from DM 30 home. “We could eat in the canteen, and our 
accommodation was paid for, so I did not need much. But it was still hard, so hard. I 
was so homesick, but other Korean nurses lived in the halls of accommodation and we 
used to get together to cook together. We had fun and we laughed a lot, but some of the 
women weren’t good women. One nurse had a husband and children in Korea, but she 
would also go out with German men. Women like her gave us a bad name. They would 
go with the German men, but I didn’t.”  
Visits to Korea were few and far in between, being expensive and the pressure to bring 
money and gifts to extended families making them even more expensive. But they made 
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German friends and were invited for coffee and cake, and Christmas. Mrs Pak and her 
friends were informally adopted by an elderly German couple that had no children, 
which later became the substitute or German grandparents for Mrs Pak’s daughter. This 
wasn’t an isolated incident. Many first generation women entered into such friendships 
with elderly Germans that they met on the wards of their hospitals.  
Eventually, Mrs Pak got married. “I married a Korean in Germany [with whom she has 
a daughter]. Sometimes my husband and I didn’t see one another for a long time, 
because we were working different shifts. We used to leave notes on the kitchen table, 
things like- please buy more rice, and such stuff.”  
Mrs Pak said she never qualified as a nurse because she didn’t have the time. She 
stressed that she wanted to study, but since her father was a farmer without much 
money, all money went towards her brother’s education, since he was the one who was 
supposed to care for his parents when they were old. She contrasted her own behaviour 
in caring for her aging parents by sending money, with her brother’s who did not do his 
filial duty in Korea by caring for them properly. She asserted the value of having a 
daughter by saying of herself that to her own family, she is a daughter ‘but like a son’.  
Both Mrs Kim and Mrs Pak told me that these days, they regard Germany as ‘home’ in 
a sense, although both were reluctant to state this, stressing that it is ‘home’ because of 
family ties. Mrs Kim said: “Korea remains home, but I’m at home in Germany too, it’s 
where my daughter is.” Both of these stories highlight several issues that need to be 
contextualised to be understood. The economic situation in Korea after the Korea War, 
in the years before both women left requires closer examination. Mrs Kim’s experience 
of Korean poverty contrasts with Mrs Pak’s experience. While Mrs Kim lived in urban 
Seoul, Mrs Pak came from the countryside just outside Seoul. They both agreed that 
Korea was very poor at the time, but Mrs Kim experienced that poverty differently. For 
Mrs Pak migration was a necessity, while for Mrs Kim, it offered an opportunity.  
Gender is another issue that requires close examination. Mrs Kim presented herself as a 
‘modern woman’ who  went against traditional Korean gender roles, and migrated to 
fulfil personal aspirations, while at the same time stressing her understanding of 
traditional Korean hierarchies that she transferred onto her present circumstances. Mrs 
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Pak was not a ‘modern woman’, but a good and obedient Korean daughter that migrated 
to help her family financially, and thus became ‘like a son’.  
Their experiences of Germany differ as well. Mrs Pak was critical of her reception, and 
had experienced  discrimination, which Mrs Kim dismissed. Underlying these narratives 
was the question of belonging that they both resolved by pointing out that their own 
families tie them to Germany these days, but that they still retain strong links to Korea 
where other family members, like siblings, nieces and nephews, and friends, still are. To 
fully contextualise these themes and issues, it is important to discuss the history of 
migration, the construction of gender and belonging.  
 
4.2.‘The miracle of the Rhine ought to be repeated on the Han River’: History and 
Korea during the 1950s/60s  
 
In this section I am going to discuss the economical situation of Korea at the time when 
Mrs Pak and Mrs Kim grew up and left. I am going to explore the historical events that 
created the circumstances under which they migrated to Germany.  
Talking with Mrs Pak and Mrs Kim in interviews, they always struck me as ‘typical’ 
elderly first generation women, who wore their discreetly expensive clothes as a sign of 
personal success, and enjoyed the status of Korean matrons from the Choson
47
 period- 
being mothers to successful children. But while they enjoyed that image, and made me 
eat cake- their prerogative as my elders- it is interesting to note that the sort of café they 
habitually chose to meet were the Viennese-style cafés that are reminiscent of 1950s 
German movies
48
 about the Austrian Empire, evoking images of ‘the good old days’ 
and unchangeable traditions. Mrs Pak and Mrs Kim were both teenagers in the 1950s 
and the ‘good old days’ these cafés evoke roughly correspond with the late Choson 
period. One could say that they utilized the visual reminders to evoke the feeling of a 
time and period in Korea that corresponded to the one portrayed in such cafés, and 
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 The Choson period lasted from 1392- 1910, and was named for the ruling dynasty. 
48
 There is a whole genre of such movies, roughly falling into the category of ‘Heimatfilm’. These films 
gained popularity in Germany after the WW2, portraying a timeless, rural idyll of harmony and tradition, 
or the Austrian Empire in a stylized, harmonic fashion. ‘Sissi’- the film about the fictionalized life of the 
Empress Elisabeth of Austria, is an example of that particular sub-genre. Manners, traditions and morals 
come under attack and are restored again. The Korean equivalent to such movies would be historical 
dramas playing in the Choson period.  
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contrasted and contextualized their own narratives about personal success, grief and 
emancipation.  
Historically, Korea was known as the ‘hermit kingdom’ (Kitano, 1995). According to 
Kitano (1995) Koreans were known for their reluctance to travel abroad and the link 
between soil and ancestral homes as part of constituting identity. Angus Hamilton 
(1904), a British journalist, gives a snapshot of late Choson
49
 Korea in his book ‘Korea’. 
He describes the Koreans as ‘a hermit-like people’, who at the time of writing had only 
recently opened their harbours to foreign ships and gained complete independence from 
China, having been a dependency beforehand (1904:8- 29). Since the Choson era is 
often evoked to explain ‘traditional’ Korean patterns of behaviour and social 
organization, it is worthwhile to briefly look at. At the time Hamilton was writing, 
Korea was a monarchy, and completely independent from China for the first time, but 
he notes that since then Japanese influence on Korea has grown (1904:10-11) and that 
Korea could yet be “incorporated, annexed, divided” (1904:14) by foreign powers.  
Following the Russo-Japanese war (1904- 1905), Japan occupied Korea, and colonized 
it till 1945. The Japanese occupation and subsequent colonization ended the first 
tentative wave of migration from Korea to Hawaii. Until the time of Japanese 
occupation, roughly 7500 Koreans left Korea to work in Hawaii (Patterson, 2000). The 
period of Japanese colonialism had a profound effect on Korean national memory and 
self-understanding, which must be noted to contextualise the later discussion on gender. 
Historical discussions about Japanese colonization use a discourse of victimization. The 
discourse on the treatment of ‘comfort women50’ uses personal tragedies as a narrative 
about national suffering and victimisation with women’s bodies directly being seen as 
representative of the nation (Kim, 1998). The underlying discourse is one of Korean 
men being emasculated by Japanese colonisers, reminiscent of the discourse employed 
in post-war Germany and the national memory of wartime rapes of German women by 
Russian soldiers. Memories of the Japanese occupation and colonization played a large 
role in Korean self-understanding.  
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 The Choson period lasted from 1392- 1910, and was named for the ruling dynasty.  
50
 ‘Comfort women’ was the name given to military prostitutes, during WW2. The Japanese did not only 
draft Korean women, but women from other colonies as well, but Korean narratives focus on the 
particular Korean suffering, and in recent years former Korean comfort women have attempted suing the 
Japanese government. (cf Jager 2003)  
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After the Korea war, in the 1950s, South Korea's economic situation was typical of any 
resource-poor, low income, agricultural country with a per capita GNP of roughly $82 
(Lim, 2000:15) with one fifth of the working population unemployed. The government 
began paying attention to rebuilding its 'human capital base' (2000:15) in spite of a low 
per capita income. Educational facilities were greatly expanded and school enrolment 
increased by 265% while the number of college students increased from about 8000 to 
100 000 (2000:15). It is interesting to note that while there were fewer female college 
students, Ewha Woman’s University in Seoul, was the first governmentally recognized 
university in Korea, having been founded in 1886 by a Methodist missionary.   
Korea, during the 50s and 60s was largely dependent on the United States, who 
considered it of greater interest to economically and financially stabilize agriculture and 
dampening inflation than to industrialize the economy. In 1964 president Park Chung-
Hee visited Germany for the first time and ‘the voyage left deep traces in Korean 
development: the German miracle of the Rhine (economic boom) ought to be repeated 
on the Han-river (Beckers- Kim, 2005:262)’. In his book, 'The Country, the Revolution 
and I' (first edition 1962), Park Chung-Hee, wrote a chapter about Germany, in which 
he concluded that while the Marshall-Plan was helpful in rebuilding Germany, the 
economic miracle on the Rhine was far from a miracle. ‘I appeal to our countrymen not 
to regard the rehabilitation of Germany as a miracle, but a crystallization of the blood 
and sweat of 57 million German people’, he writes, finishing off with the slogan for the 
economic development for his people to be: ‘Diligence, humility and frugality (Han, 
1991:127).’  
Both the Republic of Korea and the Federal Republic of Germany had a vested interest 
in commencing diplomatic relations with one another. The FRG considered South 
Korea with its weak economy as a market for exports and a sphere for capital 
investments, and furthermore considering the political situation of the 1950s, had an 
interest in affirming South Korea's link to the capital market system. In the 1960s young 
Korean men and women began coming to Germany. Males were requested to work in 
the FRG’s mining industry. Roughly 8000 miners came to Germany (Yoo, 1991:30). 
While Germany requested qualified miners, the fact that the recruitment remained in 
Korean hands- unlike other countries, like Turkey, where Germany opened its own 
recruitment offices- meant that corruption caused considerable problems: Due to bribes, 
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the officials mostly selected students, graduates and former white-collar workers 
(1991:30). The main reason many of these people wanted to leave was the economy and 
their lack of opportunities. Many of them were unemployed since the educational 
policies in Korea meant a lot of university students and few jobs for them.  
Officially the recruitment of Korean nurses began in 1970 with a bilateral agreement 
between the Republic of South Korea and the Federal Republic of Germany, however 
unofficially the recruitment began in 1959 through the Benedictine Order, which sent 
missionaries to South Korea (Han, 1991:353). Thus, initially mainly Catholic converts 
came to Germany, yet soon enough German demand for more nurses caused the 
respective governments to regulate the recruitment through the Deutsche 
Krankenhausgesellschaft [German Hospital Society] and the 'Korea Overseas 
Development Corporation'. Recruitment, as with the miners, remained in Korean hands 
rather than in German hands, searching for both qualified nurses and nurses’ aides. The 
latter position was open to women who had only graduated from middle school, which 
meant that much larger numbers of young women applied for this position, which didn’t 
require a lengthy training. It also meant that more women applied than positions were 
available (Yoo, 1991:26).  
 
4.3. How Kyung-Ja became ‘Sister Clara’- Religion in Korea and its role among 
migrants 
 
Having discussed the historical background of migration, and the economic 
circumstances, in this section I focus on religion. As noted above, the initial wave of 
Korean nurses were mainly Catholic converts, yet it will become clear later that 
Confucian thought played a decided role in the lives of the first generation, and by 
extension the second generation. In the previous chapter, I attempted to explain the 
hierarchy of foreigners in Germany, pointing out the difficulties of the Turkish 
migrants, due to religion. Talal Asad (1993) makes a compelling argument for 
Christianity as the founding principle of Western secularism, using the case of Salman 
Rushdie to show how deeply entrenched Christianity is. Christianity with its claim to 
the ultimate and only truth, and promise of salvation cannot encompass the possibility 
of other truths. Germany being a Western secular state, according to Mandel (2008), is 
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still a Christian space which problematizes non-Christian heritage, leading to negative 
implications for integration. Here, I attempt to explain religion in Korea, among the 
migrants and the continued role of Confucianism.  
Kyung-Ja
51
 was my mother’s name, a name her superior at the hospital found 
impossible to pronounce. But being a Catholic, my mother had a confirmation name, 
and thus became known as ‘Sister Clara’. In spite of being a Catholic, my mother never 
stopped being a Buddhist, and occasionally would use a few Shamanistic rituals, when 
she felt that something had unsettled the ‘nature spirits’. Like most members of the first 
generation, my mother had at some point converted to Christianity, and Christian 
churches continue to serve as meeting places for the first generation, who hold on to 
Confucian, Buddhist and in some cases Shamanistic principles and ideas.   
Writing a little later than the arrival of the first missionaries, Hamilton (1904) explains 
some commonly held beliefs and superstitions, which I will briefly describe to illustrate 
the pluralistic beliefs prevalent in Korea. Hamilton (1904) describes how streams and 
mountains are imbued with personality, and even become persons or dragons, and how 
the mountains are home to ‘mountain spirits52’, on whose altars the local people and 
passing travellers leave sacrifices to ensure their goodwill (1904:07-09). At the time of 
his travels, Korea experienced an influx of foreign, Christian missionaries, who 
immediately set about efforts to Christianize what they considered a ‘godless’ country 
(1904:226). The same mountains that are home to mountain spirits and dragons, were 
also home to many Buddhist monasteries, nunneries and temples. Shamanism, 
Buddhism and Confucianism, Hamilton writes (1904:226), were the main religions in 
Korea, although Buddhism and Confucianism were the religions of the upper classes.  
It is important, for later discussions, to briefly explore Confucianism, and note how 
deeply entrenched its ethics were, and are in Korean society. Hamilton claims that at its 
core, Korea was a Buddhist country, even though as he notes, it “has fully accepted the 
ethical character of Confucius’ teachings” (1904:234). Confucianism was the organizing 
principle of the state, brought in by the Choson rulers for its political, as well as social 
value, stressing the principle of filial piety as the basis of good government. Korean 
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 Kyung-Ja is a Japanese name, not a Korean one, because she was born at the end of the Japanese 
occupation period.  
52
 These ‘mountain spirits’ are neither divine, nor are they intrinsically good or bad. According to my 
mother, they are however exceedingly beautiful, and can be seen bathing in streams in the mountains.   
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Confucianism stresses the ‘three bonds and five relationships’, which are centred on the 
filial obligations of junior to senior members of the family, and the state. It also 
particularly underlines social rites, roles and values, and the virtues of loyalty, mutual 
responsibility and hard work. (Pratt, Ratt & Hoare, 1999:88)  As a moral philosophy 
Confucianism stabilized the Korean state for centuries, and remains at the core of many 
social practices and social structures, much like Christianity remains at the core of 
secularism. In Choson Korea, social structures and behaviour reflected Confucian 
principles, but the most popular rites and festivals were drawn from Buddhism and 
Shamanism (1999:88).   
What appears contradictory at first to those of a Western secular mindset, used to 
religions that claim to be in possession of the one and ultimate truth, becomes less 
contradictory when considering that neither Buddhism, nor Confucianism, or indeed 
Shamanism, make such a claim. That is to say that it is thoroughly possible, while 
following Buddhism or Confucianism, to accept another faith as well, for oneself.  
Buddhism and Confucianism are philosophies that provide principles for life and 
personal enlightenment, rather than providing rules for eternal salvation. The Confucian 
values the Korean state propagated, are not in contradiction with Christian values. 
Christianity challenged Confucianism though. It arrived in Korea, in the form of 
Catholicism during the Choson period. Catholicism was outlawed in 1758 as an evil 
practice, because it threatened the authority of the king, whose state was built on 
Confucian principles (Grayson, 1985). Protestantism arrived after Korea opened its 
harbours, and ended its isolation in the late 19
th
 century. Missionaries built schools and 
were a driving force behind women’s education. Christianity became an opportunity for 
women to gain an education. But while it had once threatened the foundation of the 
state, Christian values do not clash with Confucian and Buddhist virtues like filial piety, 
modesty, loyalty, dignity, hard work, mutual responsibility, etc. Significant vestiges of 
Confucianism remain within Korea, for example, many families still perform an annual 
kowtow to their parents to show respect, while companies stress the above mentioned 
virtues among their workforce (Pratt, Ratt & Hoare, 1999:88).  
Equally, such vestiges remain with the first generation, who by and large accepted 
Christianity. According to some first-generation accounts, missionary efforts in post-
war Korea focussed on children, and missionaries would offer sweets and other treats to 
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children for attending services, eventually leading to conversions. Once in Germany, the 
first generation used their churches for meeting places, as Korean migrants have done in 
Hawaii in the past (cf Patterson, 2000; Kitano, 1995). In Frankfurt, numerous 
evangelical Korean congregations existed, but only one Catholic one. Services were 
held in Korean, and the evangelical congregations often recruited and employed pastors 
directly from Korea. According to my second generation informants, evangelical 
congregations had a tendency to splinter or regroup, depending on various internal 
politics within the congregation. Unverified second-generation gossip has it that the 
Catholic congregation tried splitting, but the bishop in charge refused to allow more 
than one Korean mass. The point of this gossip is not to say that the first generation do 
not take their faith seriously, only to highlight the social nature of services, which are 
often followed with communal lunch for sociability. 
However, there is little or no contradiction in enacting her faith the way my mother did. 
Buddhism and Confucianism do not clash with an inherently Christian space in the 
same way Islam appears to. Confucian values and virtues easily transfer into 
Christianity, and Buddhism with no claim to an ultimate truth, is not in competition 
with Christianity. The German majority society does not perceive Buddhism or 
Confucianism as a threat, but at worst as quaint Eastern philosophies. In conjunction 
with the overt Christianity of the first generation, Confucian virtues, such as working 
hard, fit into the discourse on integration well, seemingly being another point in favour 
of making the Korean minority in Germany more ‘integrable’ than the Turkish one.  
 
4.4.‘I was like a son’: Class, Gender and Family Structure 
 
Having looked at the history of migration, it is clear that gender played an important 
role in Korean migration to Germany, and that women were in an advantaged position 
to fight for their rights in Germany. In this section I discuss the construction of gender 
in Korea, which is central to understanding the female second-generation’s self-
understanding. Discussions about gender are usually closely connected to discussions 
about family, but in this case, it is vital to also look at class, to deepen an understanding 
of how the first generation raised their families, and the impact it has on the second. 
Beginning with class, I will then look at gender and families. Then, I will examine the 
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changing perceptions of gender roles and the effect this has had on the first generation 
of Korean women in Germany.  
Mrs Kim repeatedly pointed out her ‘good eye for hierarchies’, which seems 
bewildering at first. But hierarchies and class play an important role in the way the first 
generation understood itself, and its aspirations for the second.  Choson Korea had a 
hierarchical class system that influenced and informed the role of women, depending on 
their class. Thus, 19
th
 century Western missionaries saw the lower class women having 
much more freedom in terms of dress and relations with men, which they interpreted as 
signs of personal freedom, and contrasted with the secluded lives of the women of the 
yangban class (2008:28). Yangban is the name of the educated male elite class of Korea 
prior to the Japanese invasion in 1910 (Yoo, 2008:18). While belonging to the yangban, 
i.e. administrative elite of the kingdom, meant nobility, at the same time, even though 
difficult to accomplish, it was possible to rise into the yangban class on the basis of 
scholarly merit in the early Choson period
53
. Education was pivotal to social mobility, 
and the yangban class was the most respectable class one could aspire to. Women could 
be born into the yangban elite, but they could not rise into it on the basis of their own 
merit. The yangban elite dominated the court and military life, although being mainly 
bureaucrats. Although after the Japanese took power in Korea, the yangban class lost its 
standing and importance, even today many people in Korea are proud to claim yangban 
ancestry. The yangban may no longer exist as a class of influence, but traditional stress 
on academic achievement to gain such status persists, and is pivotal to an understanding 
of filial relations between mothers and children of the first and second generation 
respectively. In modern-day Korea, mothers still emulate the values of yangban families 
(Jager, 1988).  
One could compare the yangban to the German idea of Bildungsbürgertum; that is to 
say, a class of intellectual and economic upper bourgeoisie, as compared to the petite 
bourgeoisie. Antiquated as the concept is, it still holds sway, implying not only superior 
education and intelligence, but also social and cultural refinement. The 
Bildungsbürgertum is the antithesis to the lack of Bildungswillen that the majority 
society often claims the Turkish minority displays. Mrs Kim’s insistence on her good 
eye for hierarchies indicates that she saw the similarity, and the possibility of upward 
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 By the late Choson period the class system had solidified and the possibilities for upward mobility were 
curtailed.  
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social mobility into a similarly highly regarded class as the yangban for her own 
daughter.  
Within the traditional hierarchy however, such upward mobility would have been 
impossible to achieve by way of a daughter, only by way of a son. The basic unit of 
society in Korea was not an individual but the family, and its social order was ‘filial 
piety’. According to Confucian tradition, Korean family values demand that children 
respect and honour their parents as well as all elderly people, and such values are 
strictly observed and deviations are frowned upon (Moon, 1999:112). Koreans did not 
have equal relationships between parents and children (Chung, 1986:234). The 
relationships of the family members were based on the duty of one-way obedience, on 
the part of children for parents and on the part of wife for husband. Likewise, husband 
controlled wife and parents controlled children. Women’s status was inferior to men but 
once becoming a mother, the power of a mother over her children became absolute. 
Women were expected to deny their own interests and rights as they obeyed the codes 
without conditions (Chung, 1986:233); however the code that gave elders the right to be 
respected gave recognition to mothers (1986:234). 
The master of the household, as Cho (2002) writes, was a distant and removed patriarch, 
whose role was restricted within the family context to being the head of the household. 
Recognising this, we can understand better the absence of fathers and husbands from 
female narratives about families. Within a framework that emphasizes the mother-child 
relationship above husband-wife relationships, husbands play a marginal role. In 
everyday life, Korean women wielded considerable power, but such power did not come 
from their status as wives, but from their status as mothers. A child’s success was a 
mother’s greatest achievement, transferring status on her. In this framework it is not a 
husband’s academic or professional success that transfers status onto a woman, but the 
child’s success. Hence, traditionally, married Korean women with children were 
generally known by the eldest child’s name as ‘[name of child]’s mother’ (cf Kendall, 
1985). If a son succeeded as a high official, his mother also was given an official title 
(Chong Y.-S., 1973; Cho, 2002).  
Men were subject to rules too and in the 19
th
 century there were designated women’s 
hours during which women could leave their domestic sphere for an outside realm of 
female sociability (Yoo, 2008:29). That meant that for an hour after sunset, men were 
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confined to the domestic sphere and subject to punishment, if found in the street during 
these women’s hours, which were designated solely for ‘Korean women to slip out and 
take the air, and gossip freely (2008:29). Choson society not only encouraged, but 
provided the means for women to form friendships and social networks in a sphere 
separate from men.  
Gender roles and expectations changed during the time of Japanese colonialism in 
Korea. Cho (2002) offers a framework for changing gender roles for women in the 
transition from colonial-modern to post-modern Korea. She looks at three generations 
of middleclass Korean women, calling them ‘grandmother’s generation’, ‘mother’s 
generation’ and ‘daughter’s generation’, which are terms she applies loosely. The 
grandmother’s generation, she describes as ‘born in 1920, come of age during the 
Japanese colonial era, and reared her family after the Liberation (1945). Women of this 
generation are described as “motherly women, the stronghold of the disrupted society” 
(2002:169). Their daughters would have been born around 1940, acquired her most 
vivid memories after the Liberation, and experienced the Korean War as a child. She 
would have reared her family during the period of Korea’s sudden economic growth 
(2002:169), while her daughter would have been born around 1965. According to Cho 
(2002), these three generations have come to age within different ideological narratives 
for women. 
The first generation of Korean women in Germany would have belonged to Cho’s 
‘mother’s generation’, which was “exposed to Western culture through movies and 
television dramas” (2002:173).  The women of their generation in Korea, according to 
Cho (2002:167), had insisted that they would not live their mothers’ lives, but they did. 
They made their own identities through their children and distanced their husbands by 
accepting the distinction between public and domestic domain. Women thus continued 
to perceive the family as matrifocal, composed exclusively of mothers and children . In 
their hard work and aggressive devotion to their families, and in their lack of intimacy 
with their husbands, they were the faithful daughters of their mother’s generation (Cho, 
2002: 178).  
While the first generation women wanted opportunities, they were still bound into the 
traditional family structures, and only economic reasons made it possible for them to 
gain permission. This reasoning is particularly pronounced in Mrs Pak’s narrative about 
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leaving. Economic necessity was the driving force behind it. Achieving financial 
security gave her status in Korea, made her ‘like a son’ meaning that she fulfilled the 
traditional role of the eldest son in caring for her ageing parents. It was a matter of 
considerable sacrifice and pride for her that she, once ‘only’ a girl, had achieved such a 
position.  
Certainly some of the Korean nurses that came to Germany were feminists, but most of 
my informants simply did not want to live their mothers’ lives. They had grown up 
during a time of vast political, economical and social changes and had experienced 
education as an opportunity they were previously denied. Mrs Kim expressed some 
resentment that her parents considered her education less important than her brother’s. 
‘Tradition’ meant that her educated was neglected. She contrasted this with insisting 
that she was a modern woman- unlike Mrs Pak, who framed herself in terms of being a 
good traditional Korean daughter- showing me pictures to illustrate her modernity, and 
telling me about the Western movies she used to see in the cinema with her friends.  
Modern as Mrs Kim was, it did not stop her from insisting on the traditional respect a 
mother and elder was due. By telling me that I was too thin, just like her daughter, she 
positioned herself as a figure of authority, while fussing maternally over me. And she 
repeatedly stressed to me how much she wanted to go to university, and how she even 
had looked into the practicalities. When her dreams of attending university came to 
nothing, Mrs Kim dedicated herself to supporting her daughter’s education, despite 
financial hardships, ensuring that Johanna would receive the best education possible. In 
that, Mrs Kim and Mrs Pak were very much like Cho’s (2000) mother’s generation, 
who worked hard and were aggressively devoted to their children. But in a departure 
from Korean tradition, my two informants were known as ‘Mrs Kim and Mrs Pak’, 
rather than by their children’s names. Cho- Ruuwwe (2006) says about meetings with 
her Korean peers
54
 in Germany: “For example, we have started calling one another by 
our first names, because it is more neutral, which is not customary in Korea at all. There 
you will be addressed as ‘Mother of XY’ or ‘Daughter of XY’, with the person of 
reference usually being a male.”(2006:27). 
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 Traditionally in Korea, even among peers the younger ones have to address the older ones in the polite 
forms, comparable to the German ‘Sie’. Addressing one another by first names is a departure from 
Korean norms. This does not mean that the second generation is free to address the first generation in the 
familiar form.  
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All of my informants insisted on being addressed by name, rather than identifying by 
their children’s names. This assertion is a departure from traditional Korean thinking, in 
which a woman receives her status by way of bearing sons. As Mrs Kim repeatedly 
pointed out to me that she became ward-sister, rising as high in hospital hierarchies as 
possible for her. The Korean nurses were proud of their individuality and of having 
achieved something for themselves, rather than being known as their sons’ mothers.  
 
4.5.Arriving in Germany – Reasons for migrating, Language and Experiences  
 
In this section, I examine the personal reasons for migration, initial experiences, and 
difficulties. Language plays a central role in all of these experiences, and serves to 
explain partly, later efforts on the part of the first generation to ensure that the second 
generation speaks fluent German. But these narratives also play a role in constructing 
‘the classic story’ that the second-generation uses to constitute itself.  
Reasons for coming to Germany varied. For some, economic considerations played the 
key role, for others it was an interest in Europe or the desire to live somewhere else for 
a while (Yoo, 1991:28). A sense of adventure certainly played a role. Some, like my 
mother, considered work migration the opportunity of a lifetime, to see the world. 
Another informant’s mother had vague plans for using Germany as a stepping stone to 
further migrate to the United States. Hyon-Sook Kim (2006) writes about her 
experience: “I had a friend then in the Seoul Medical Centre. She had heard from a 
friend of hers that Germany is looking for nurses and that one could apply now. For me 
that was surprising, because I didn’t know about it. I couldn’t really believe it. When I 
heard from different sides that you could really apply with the Korean Overseas 
Development Corporation, I thought: That’s what I want to do. […] It was a chance to 
lead a completely different life.” (2006:129)  
“What a chance!” writes Son-Im Kim-Morris (2006:43), “In summer 1963 I read an 
advert in a Korean daily newspaper. German hospitals want to hire trained Korean 
nurses. Korean nurses’ training will be  recognized, it reads. […] That is the opportunity 
to go abroad, and to Europe of all places! Until now, I did not even dare dream of that, 
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because in Korea it is almost impossible for normal citizens to go abroad. I do not 
hesitate to apply […] even though I know neither language, nor country.”  
Many of the women came from the Korean middle class, who also wished to further 
their education in Germany. Mrs Kim was adamant showing me how modern she was as 
a young woman. Her narrative about wanting to leave Korea and to gain an education is 
similar to that of many others. Yoo (1991) suggests that these reasons indicate 
traditional societal pressure on women in Korea, which the women wanted to escape, 
making migrating to Germany an act of emancipation. Hyon-Sook Kim (2006) reflects 
Mrs Kim’s experience of parents devaluing female education : “For our younger 
brothers’ sakes, my four sisters and I have to waive higher education and many 
privileges in everyday life. Privileging sons, as customary in Korea, is accepted by the 
daughters as if it were natural. I too cannot even fathom to demand equal 
treatment.”(2006:42).  
Mrs Kim, and the women cited above seem to have considered going to Germany partly 
as an adventure, and partly as an opportunity to improve their lives. They were modern 
young women who had gained an education and wanted to improve their lot, even if 
they knew little of Germany and had no language skills yet. Economic reasons cannot 
be discounted, though. As Mrs Pak and Mrs Kim pointed out, Korea was poor with 
limited opportunities, and as Mrs Pak said: “I didn’t really want to go, but I had brothers 
and sisters, and we were poor, so poor. So my father sold crops [meaning more than he 
would usually have sold] so I could go into town [Seoul] and apply. He was a good 
man, such a good man.” Being the eldest and having younger siblings, Mrs Pak 
considered it her duty to go, so she could send money home. She didn’t regard 
migrating as an adventure or an opportunity for herself, but a necessity, and an 
opportunity for her family for a better future.  
Initially, contracts ran for three years, which caused problems in some cases, making it 
difficult to change from one employer to another in the case of dissatisfaction. 
Especially in nursing homes for old people, where mainly unqualified young women 
worked- the nurses’ aides- and the physical demands were high, women experienced 
difficulties in settling into their work. Language difficulties were another problem. 
Unlike with other guestworkers in the past, the German state provided language courses 
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for the Korean nurses, but they were insufficient and many women privately attended 
language courses (Yoo, 1991:27).  
Mrs Kim and Mrs Pak, and doubtlessly all others, took a brave step in coming to 
Germany, in spite of knowing next to no German. Some felt liberated in Germany, but 
others describe the situation as aggravating and frightening: “I came to Germany in 
October 1970. Into a foreign country, without much knowledge of German. Suddenly, 
there I was like a child, like a deaf-mute, and made myself understood with basic words, 
gestures and a little English. To prevent myself from crashing and burning, I determined 
to diligently learn German. Otherwise, I would simply vanish in a foreign country 
without a trace!” (Berner & Choi, 2006:33)  
Like Mrs Kim, others too carried around dictionaries in their pockets, but that was 
fraught with the possibilities for miscommunication. “Lots of misunderstandings arose, 
trouble, but funny situations too” (2006:33).  
An informant’s mother recalled: “I am sure that sometimes people said bad words 
behind my back, but I didn’t understand, and I was friendly and polite, regardless. I was 
always friendly to everyone. Ward sister, I think, didn’t like me initially, but I was 
friendly and soon I had a reputation for being the nicest sister in the hospital.” 
Unlike the miners, whose contact with the majority population during work hours was 
limited, the nurses experienced far more verbal interaction, due to the nature of their 
work. But language acquisition was far from easy, often fraught with pitfalls, and 
revealing of cultural differences. The same informant’s mother said: “I was trying to 
buy a newspaper, and saw one called ‘Das Neue Blatt55’, so I had a mental image of a 
tree growing a fine new leaf. How poetic, I thought, and that the Germans were very 
poetic people to name their newspapers like that. It was such a hopeful image for the 
future. And then it turned out to be a glossy tabloid.” 
The small instance is revealing insofar as the associations my informant’s mother made 
in this context, are none a native German speaker would have made, highlighting that 
while one can learn a language, it is far more difficult to learn cultural competence. 
Languages are full of concepts that cannot be translated easily from one into another. 
                                                 
55
 Translation: The new sheet. ‘Blatt’ or ‘sheet’ is a common name for a newspaper, but ‘Blatt’ can also 
mean ‘leaf’.  
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The first generation women I spoke to, expressed their frustrations with occasional 
inabilities to express themselves fully in German, saying that German is a too precise 
and business-like language, whereas Korean is more playful and better suited to 
expressing emotions.  
“After our shifts, we used to sit together […] We cooked Korean food and ate together. 
In Korean, we made fun of others. In Korean we talked about our anger and irritation 
every day” (Berner & Choi, 2006:33). Among themselves, the first generation uses 
Korean to communicate, although they say that their Korean is old-fashioned now, 
compared to the one spoken in Korea, and they often use German words, and phrases 
when speaking. Aware of their own linguistic limitations, which in some cases hindered 
further education, the first generation ensured that their children would speak German, 
and speak Korean mainly among themselves.  
Cultural differences also meant that Korean women were at a disadvantage: in Korean 
society direct conflict resolution wasn’t customary (Yoo, 1991:27), which meant that 
oftentimes the Korean nurses did not insist on their rights, leading to being 
disadvantaged or their German colleagues taking advantage of them. Mrs Pak appears to 
be one of the few who had openly bad experiences with the majority society, being 
called ‘dirty Korean’, but that is certainly not to say that there were no problems. Jung-
Ja Peters (2006) reports with indignation how she was treated as a qualified nurse: 
“Matron was waiting for me. She was holding a bucket and a cloth, and when she saw 
me, she indicated into the direction of the toilets and pressed both into my hands. 
Without so much as a “good morning” did she vanish to eat breakfast. At that moment I 
had a hard time retaining my composure. […] I took off my nurse’s cap- the insignia of 
a qualified nurse- off my head and began scrubbing toilets” (2006:85).  
Others report uncomfortable situations as well: “One day, while I sat in the canteen at 
lunch, a tall, handsome, blond medical student came to my table and sat down with me. 
He asked where I came from. When I answered that I came from Korea, he asked if 
people had enough to eat there. I flushed bright red, because for Koreans there is no 
greater shame than not having enough to eat. My poverty was embarrassing enough to 
me. So, offended, I turned away and left in embarrassment” (Park-Reining, 2006:57). 
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Compared to other migrant groups, the Korean nurses were housed in better 
accommodation, although even here problems occurred, for example in relation to 
cooking (Yoo, 1991:27). German nurses, living in the same accommodation, 
complained about the lingering strong smell of garlic, after the Korean nurses cooked 
together in the evening (1991:27). But, Korean nurses, like Mrs Pak and her friends, got 
together to counteract bad experiences and misunderstandings, and to fight their 
homesickness together. Cooking Korean food and getting together was an important 
link to home and everything familiar, and narratives about food are often used to 
highlight different issues such as a sense of displacement. Mrs Pak pointed out how 
difficult it was to buy Korean food, and many others of my informants echoed how very 
difficult it was to buy decent rice and chilli powder, which made it necessary to ask for 
parcels from Korea from their families. One of the prevailing memories concerning 
such parcels are not the food, but what German custom officials apparently did to them. 
Quite frequently, these parcels were opened and checked. Mrs Pak wasn’t the only one 
who complained that customs officials slashed the packages their parcels contained, 
thus somehow violating and disrespecting a vital link to Korea. The indignation with 
which such tales were told, about spilled chilli powder everywhere, subtly underlines 
the ambivalence with which narratives regard Germany. The dreams of an opportunity 
and independent life met with reality in Germany, and the young women that arrived 
found that they were typecast and met with stereotypes. 
Eating together created a sense of community and stalled homesickness, but it also 
served to reinforce Korean moral values and structures. Korean girls waited until their 
parents arranged a marriage for them, but some of the Korean nurses took matters into 
their own hands and met and went out with German men. The taboo on socializing with 
foreigners had applied only to women in Korea (Choi, 2008:05), and the idea that young 
Korean women could go out with foreigners was unsettling. Some, like Mrs Pak, 
thought badly of such women, especially the one she knew to be married, but implied 
that all Korean women who socialized with German men were giving them a bad name. 
It was a sentiment that the women who did go out with Germans or married them 
repeated, saying that other spoke badly of them (Berners & Choi, 2006).  
The wide distribution of Korean nurses across Germany also meant that many had no 
access to the contractually promised Sozialberatungsstellen [social advice bureaus], 
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which effectively left the nurses in rural areas without a place to turn to (Yoo, 1991:27). 
Some Korean nurses did not even obtain a Korean version of their work contract, and 
combined with the lack of care and cultural differences, it is fair to say that the initial 
years of Korean nurses in Germany were hard and badly organized. Nonetheless, many 
stayed. The difficulties of starting over again on the Korean job market worked as a 
deterrent (1991:29). Work experience in Germany, according to Yoo (1991) was of no 
value for Korean employers. Furthermore the ages of the women that had migrated to 
Germany ranged from 18-30 years old, with the majority being aged 21- 25 years old 
(1991:28), which meant that returning women were aged between 24- 27 years old, and 
therefore almost too old for marriage (1991:29).  
While recruitment for miners slowed down in the 1970s, the shortage of qualified 
hospital staff in Germany prevailed, making nurses the more valuable source of labour. 
But the economic crisis in the 1970s meant that the German states sought to deport 
guest-workers whose contracts had run out. Notably, the recruitment of Korean nurses 
and miners continued till 1977, whereas other guest-workers ceased to be recruited by 
1973. Still in the late 1970s, after recruitment ceased for them, Korean nurses were 
faced with the possibility of being deported. According to Yoo (1991) no Korean nurse 
was deported, but some chose to leave in light of such difficulties. In 1978, after 
protests that began in Berlin, Korean nurses successfully gained leave to remain 
indefinitely.  
By that time, many had married. Some had married German men, while others married 
Korean students studying at German universities. Mrs Pak and Mrs Kim each married 
one of the ca 8000 Korean miners, becoming the stereotypical couples of the ‘classic 
story’ of the second generation. Once they had children, the German education system 
provided another incentive to stay. Since schooling is free and universities, until 
recently, demanded no fees, a good, while also cheap, education for children was 
possible. That meant that not only sons, but daughters could have a university 
education. In the social hierarchy of Choson Korea that would mean that suddenly girls 
could rise into the yangban class, and even mothers with only one child, a daughter -like 
Mrs Kim and Mrs Pak- could gain status and standing. ‘Korea’, as the second 
generation learned about it, thus became an idealized image of the Choson period that 
lived on in Germany. And Germany, for the first generation, became ‘something like 
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home’ as Mrs Kim put it. Home, but not quite. But having found Germans who would 
stand in as ‘surrogate grandparents’ for their children and through the links to Korean 
friends, that served as ‘aunties’ to one another’s children, the Korean community turned 
into a familial network that to some degree retained the traditional structures, and in 
other respects was entirely new. Thus they fused together the old, and the new to create 
a kind of family life where “creative culture-building takes place in the context of 
external social and economic forces as well as immigrants’ pre-migration cultural 
frameworks” (Foner, 1997:1),which I will explore further in the next chapter.  
 
4.6.Conclusion 
 
Although there is no such thing as a timeless tradition, immigrants may come to think of 
life in their home society in these terms (Foner, 1997:963). The former is the land of 
origin,  
“constitutes a detour through the past enabling future generations to produce 
themselves anew and differently. It is a resource of history in the process of 
becoming more than being: not “who we are” or “where we come from”, so 
much as what we might become, how we have been represented and how that 
bears on how we might represent ourselves” (Hall, 1996:04). 
 
‘Traditional’ Korea, Korea as my first-generation informants remembered, and my 
second-generation informants’ parents transmitted it, derived much of its legitimation 
from the Choson period, the ‘good old time’ Mrs Kim evoked, albeit differently in the 
Viennese cafés she frequented. By the time the first generation left Korea, the country 
was in transition and modernizing, but the migrants took away an image of ‘timeless 
tradition’ that informed who they would become, and how they represented themselves. 
Providing a point of departure both figuratively and physically, Korea provided the foil 
for continuity and change. 
The first generation broke with ‘traditional Korea’ by converting to Christianity, yet 
held on to Confucian and Buddhist values. They wanted educational opportunities for 
themselves that Korean traditional gender roles denied them, while still striving for 
yangban class. They changed the traditional focus on sons, asserting their own 
individuality and achievements, but still see part of their identity vested in their 
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children’s academic success. And they asserted themselves, although direct conflict 
resolution was not traditional in Korea. But thanks to that, in 1978 the Korean nurses 
won the right to remain in Germany indefinitely, provided they had lived and worked 
there for eight years. They won that right for their husbands, their children and for 
themselves. Still, Beckers-Kim (2005) asserts that the immediate environment regarded 
Korean nurses in Germany as “quiet, diligent, gentle and a little exotic” (2005:192).  
Berner & Choi (2004:13) claim that the majority society called them ‘gentle’ or ‘yellow 
angels’, one relating to the perceived ‘gentleness’ of Korean women, and the other 
referring to phenotypical appearance. But angels are not human. And these angels are 
specifically called ‘yellow’ for the alleged colour of their skin, so while seemingly 
benign, this piece of remarkable racism from the German press, reduced Korean nurses 
to outlandish, selfless, dependent creatures, whose only purpose it was to help.  Another 
headline from 1978 shows more of this sort of patronizing kind of representation in the 
media. ‘The gentle angels have sorrows’ the newspaper Frankfurter Rundschau titles on 
the 22.03.1978, referring to the protests of Korean nurses against planned deportations. 
It elicits the image of gently weeping angels that suffer their sorrows quietly. In fact, the 
Korean nurses were angry and demanding what they considered their right. The image 
of the emancipated Korean migrant woman in Germany does not fit easily into debates 
about migrants in Germany. As a matter of fact it is something of an oddity.  Traditional 
Korean society was patriarchal and oppressive for women, but as I hope to have shown, 
it also offered opportunities for women to gain power and assert themselves. The 
Korean nurses in Germany negotiated their position, mediating between traditional 
Korean gender roles, and their individual aspirations as ‘modern’ women.  Their 
success, the stories of hardship, sacrifice and drive to rise through the hierarchies, which 
Mrs Kim identified, create the basis for the narratives of self-production for the second-
generation.  
“Pioneers” is a word my informants often used, to speak about their mothers, expressing 
their admiration. One informant drew a comparison with the diving women of the 
Korean island of Jeju
56
, who resisted the Japanese during the occupation period, and the 
first generation women, calling them ‘heroines’. The comparison is an interesting one, 
since the women of Jeju, the Haenyo, were known for their independence, being the 
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 The diving women of Jeju harvested marine algae and shellfish, going as deep as 20m without modern 
equipment.  
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heads of their households and the fact that daughters were prized higher than sons, since 
only women dived
57
. Alas, according to Gwon (2005), the historical reality of the 
Haenyo was that due to class restrictions, their status was and remained low, they were 
often exploited by merchants and discriminated against, before the end of the Korea 
war. The myth of independent, economically successful women however, fits the first 
generation narrative of self-representation better, positioning them in a tradition of 
brave and successful women, and by extension, their daughters. It also serves to 
differentiate, and elevate the first generation women within the hierarchy of migrants 
(Mandel, 2008); if not in the eyes of the majority society, then within the women’s 
narratives and the eyes of their own children. The story of the first generation is “a 
resource of history in the process of becoming more than being: not “who we are” or 
“where we come from”, so much as what we might become” (Hall, 1996:04).  
In Chapter 5, I will explore the self-understanding of the second generation, by looking 
at the dynamic character of relations between the first and the second generation; 
looking at the way values were transmitted, and which values were transmitted, and 
whether they changed.  
 
 
5. “You have to have Korean parents to know what I mean”: Kyopo women, 
continuity and change 
 
“Many German-Koreans [meaning the second generation58] are assimilated so 
far that they have entirely appropriated the rituals and practices of the German 
majority society, in spite of the conflict of not being at home in both cultures. 
The majority of German-Koreans finds that the traditional, conservative and 
Confucian-influenced practices of their parents, aren’t for them [kaum noch 
etwas anfangen] and are assimilated to the point of being unrecognizable [as 
Koreans]” (Hyung, 2008:139)  
 
Hyung (2008) positions the second generation in this quote as ‘between cultures’ and 
claims that the second generation has rejected the first generations’ values and practices 
so entirely that they are almost entirely assimilated to the majority society. He implies 
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 http://www.visitkorea.or.kr/enu/SI/SI_EN_3_6.jsp?cid=260918 
58
 Hyung uses both ‘kyopo’ and ‘German-Koreans’ to refer to the second generation.  
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that there is a rift between the first and the second generation, and a culture-conflict in 
which the second generation has to choose sides, ending up displaced between all sides.  
“It’s easier for us,” a first generation woman told me, “at least when we get asked where 
we are from, we can say ‘Korea’. We were foreigners, we still are, so it’s not that hard. 
But it must be difficult for your generation. It’s different, isn’t it?”  
There seems to be a chasm between the first and the second generation of Korean 
migrants to Germany; a difference of experience that dichotomises the first and the 
second generation, and equally Germany and Korea that leaves the second generation 
displaced. Hyung (2008) goes so far as to say that the second generation’s experiences 
make them reject the first generation’s practices and values, and assimilate to the 
majority society. The second generation German-Koreans become an anomaly in that 
they are without a Heimat as a physical, mental and cultural space, belonging nowhere 
and almost vanishing into the majority society. But, filial relations and histories are the 
products of interactions between individuals whose goals and strategies are formulated 
through cultural systems of meaning. Hence, for German-Koreans, continuity is as 
much a theme as change. The complexity of filial relations, their continuity and change, 
the constant negotiation, are informed by several factors, both interior and exterior. The 
parents’ generation’s experiences and aspirations- learned in a Korean context- shape 
filial relations and inform the way the second generation perceives itself, while at the 
same time they are informed by their everyday experiences within the majority society. 
In this chapter, I posit that that dichotomising the first and the second generation, and 
equally dichotomising Germany and Korea, is too simplistic to understand the position 
of the second generation of German-Koreans in Germany. Casting the first generation 
as reactionary and unchanging, and characterising the majority society in similarly 
absolute terms, creates a discourse in which the second generation appears displaced. I 
aim to take a different approach in exploring the self-understanding of the second 
generation of German-Koreans by exploring the dynamic character of relations; looking 
at the way values were transmitted and which values were transmitted, and whether they 
changed, I focus in particular on mothers and daughters.  
I present a fieldwork incident which is reflective of many others I experienced with 
second generation women. Using this, I aim to identify cultural legacies, and cultural 
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change. To do so, first, I discuss pre-migration cultural influences, focussing on family 
experiences, norms and cultural frameworks. I explore traditional Korean family 
structures and the role of women within the family. Then I will explore family patterns 
of Korean migrants to Germany and ask: Have they changed? And if so, how? Building 
on the previous chapter “Yellow Angels”, I show how the mothers situate themselves in 
the framework of traditional Korean filial relationships and gender roles, and how these 
frameworks are subject to negotiation and change.  
This will lead me to a discussion of factors that have shaped German-Korean migrant 
families and informed the experience of second generation. I will trace continuity and 
change, using different examples. The second generation questions ‘Korean’ filial 
relations, portraying the parent generation as reactionary and as continuing advocates of 
the ‘Korean’ system. I ask what consequences the continuity of the ‘Korean system’ 
has, especially for young second generation women, and how these experiences shape 
their self-understanding and the way they situate themselves in relation to Korea and 
their German environment. I ask whether the second generation is displaced and 
“assimilated to the point of being unrecognizable” (Hyung, 2008:139). In this context 
the question of integration into the majority society and the experience of being othered 
arise, but for the purpose of this discussion I focus on the first and second generation’s 
relations with each other and on Korea, rather than the discourses that surround them 
within a majority society context.  
My main argument is that the second generation positions itself as a group whose 
identity requires a new word to describe it: kyopo. Their experiences are shaped by the 
continuity of Korean filial relations, the everyday experiences of their German 
environment with which they contrast them, and the experiences of visiting Korea, and 
seeing themselves as different from ‘Korean-Koreans’. They draw on all these 
experiences to position themselves as kyopos. 
 
5.1.‘The other Korean’- Meeting Johanna 
The first meeting between Johanna and myself  took place in a small student café, quite 
different from the setting her mother, Mrs Kim, later chose. We had never met before. I 
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didn’t know Frankfurt well, so we had some difficulty deciding via e-mail on a place 
that she would reach easily, and that I would find without great difficulty. Neither of us 
was greatly worried about recognizing the other. It was a foregone conclusion for both 
of us that we would. We were used to being ‘foreigners’ and the majority society 
identifying us as such, so both of us were looking for the waiting foreigner. Later, 
during my fieldwork I often did the same with other informants. Johanna was easily 
enough identifiable, and recognized me equally easily, when both of us were looking 
out for die andere Koreanerin [the other Korean woman], as Johanna put it, referring to 
the ethnic implications of our looks from the perceived perspective of other passers-by.  
Johanna arrived by bicycle, coming straight from university, and was dressed casually 
in jeans, running shoes, dark sweater and jacket. She had long straight hair, always kept 
in a neat pony-tail. Her clothes were discreetly expensive and ordentlich [neat], neither 
fashionable nor unfashionable, but practical. Later she explained to me that her mother 
always insisted that she look orderly, and that it was “one of those things you do to keep 
your parents happy”, even though she no longer lived at home.  
The café she had chosen to meet in was as different as can be from the cafés her mother 
later chose. It was a popular student café that doubled as a pub in the evening, with an 
unvarnished wooden floor, darkly painted walls, mismatching chairs and tables that 
were a little worn, painted in dull blues and orange without varnish. The interior left the 
impression of carefully arranged decay. Alternative music came from the loudspeakers, 
and every table was furnished with a candle in an old wine bottle and a heavy glass 
ashtray as a centrepiece. We chose a table away from the front windows. It was quiet, 
except for the music, with few others present, but smoke was already thick in the air. 
 The first thing Johanna did, after ordering tea, was light a cigarette. She explained that 
she had come straight from lectures and desperately needed one, looking around 
carefully before lighting up. Much later, by the time I had been in Frankfurt long 
enough, I realized that inadvertently I had begun looking around myself too, before 
lighting a cigarette, taking on the behaviour of the young women around me, who 
always feared that someone might see them and report it back to their mothers. Being 
caught smoking would reflect badly not only on them, but on their mothers by 
implication, hence we couldn’t sit by the large windows, but had to sit further to the 
back to minimize the possibility of detection.  
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To her knowledge Johanna’s mother never ventured into this café, and neither did any 
of her friends, who rarely had occasion to come to this part of Frankfurt so close to the 
university. Hence most of the passers-by in the street that we could see were students as 
well and unlikely to tell Mrs Kim that Johanna was smoking. Thus our whole first 
meeting was from the beginning influenced by the rules of behaviour set for us by the 
influence of our respective mothers. Both of us could use this as a point of reference for 
the beginning of a conversation and the shared amusement that we had had no trouble 
recognizing one another. We were both influenced by an environment, in which we 
were easily identifiable as ethnically different, and by the Korean-influenced home-
environment in which we had grown up. It served as a starting point for our chat, which 
didn’t begin as a formal interview. Our chat was intended in the way of sounding out 
Frankfurt and the Korean community there. Hence it was more an informal conversation 
and an exchange of experiences than an interview with specific questions, although I did 
take notes. Many of the events and experiences we shared, centred around everyday 
encounters. After beginning with lighting a cigarette and explaining to me that she had 
just been to lectures, Johanna asked me if I had found the café easily.  
I told her that I’d had some trouble, getting lost around the Botanical Gardens close by 
the university, and told her how I’d stood in the middle of the pavement, grappling with 
my map, when a blond man in a business suit had asked me in German-accented 
English if he could help me. Perplexed, I had answered in German, which made him 
laugh in surprise and say: “Oh, you’re German!”  
Rolling her eyes and laughing, Johanna shared similar experiences with me, about 
similar incidents. “Sometimes it’s funny,” she said, “sometimes it’s just annoying, if 
you aren’t recognized as German.”  
“So what would you say you are?” I asked.  
It took Johanna a while to answer, before she shrugged and said that she supposed she 
was: “A bit of both.” And quickly added: “But when I was doing my exchange year in 
France, I liked saying that I’m Korean when people asked- to make myself more 
interesting. Germany was just around the corner and there were so many Germans 
around. And old people in France still get upset about the war and stuff.”  
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Johanna’s nationality is German, but both her parents came from Korea in the 1970s. 
“They all came over as nurses and miners, didn’t they? What about your mother, was 
she a nurse too? See, they all came over like that. Then got married, had children and 
just stayed, or did your Mum ever seriously think about going back? My parents did 
think about it, but I guess my Dad more than my Mum, and you know how it goes! 
What, you don’t know the joke? My Dad likes telling that joke!”  
At that point, she sat forward eagerly, grinning with glee. “So, you know how there 
used to be village elders in Korea in the villages, and one day, the village elders- all 
men- decided to find out who really had the power [wer wirklich das Sagen hat] in the 
village. So they draw a line in the dust, and say that everyone who decides at home 
should go to the right, and everyone who doesn’t, should go to the left. All the elders go 
to the left, except one man. So they’re surprised, and ask him: ‘Do you really get to 
make the decisions at home?’ At that he answers: ‘No, but my wife said I should go to 
the right.’ That’s the way it goes at home too and my Dad says you can’t argue with a 
Korean woman.” Johanna said it was a joke from Korea, although it exists in variations 
in Germany as well, but in the course of talking about her family, it was one of the few 
times she mentioned her father, Mr Kim. She mentioned him by the bye, focussing on 
the relationship with her mother when talking about her home life and what she knew of 
Korea.  
This incident highlights several recurrent themes, centring on the ambivalent positions 
of the second generation in relation to the first and to the majority society.  There are 
three themes that run through the incident; these need to be contextualised to understand 
the incident fully. In the course of our meeting several things were said and happened 
that show the way young kyopo women position themselves.  
The main theme is shared experience that provided a basis for us to relate to one 
another. From the beginning of the incident to the end, shared experience was the red 
thread that ran through the incident, connecting all other themes. We both expected to 
meet ‘the other Korean woman’ in a relatively crowded place. In a city like Frankfurt 
that is popular with tourists and has a large foreign student population, to any 
reasonable person it might sound impossible and naïve of us to blindly set out to meet. 
But through familiarity with German practices of othering, and by reading visual and 
bodily codes we managed to meet. This shared experience provided the basis for further 
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discussion of identification, this time by the majority society. Johanna made it clear that 
sometimes others’ identifications annoyed her and that sometimes she thought it was 
funny. She also related to me how she used it to her advantage, while pointing out that 
in a different environment, like France, she considered herself German.  
Another point of shared experience is the experience of having Korean parents. Johanna 
was both concerned and dismissive of the concept of filial piety, wearing clothes that 
she liked, but that would also satisfy her parents. And even in public, she was concerned 
with being caught smoking. The continuity of a Korean-influenced home-environment 
and change was a recurrent theme. It also served as the point of departure for talking 
about gender, albeit in a joking way. But what is more important in this incident is not 
what was said or done, but what wasn’t said and done, the explanations Johanna did not 
give and the questions I did not ask: in other words, implicit, shared knowledge. We 
both assumed that the other would know what we were talking about on the basis of 
having one or two Korean parents, living in Germany and “being a bit of both”.  
This incident illustrates that the relationships between first generation parents and their 
children are shaped by the first generations’ experiences learned in a Korean context, 
which shape the experience of everyday life for the children. Moreover it shows critical 
awareness of filial relations and gender issues. But it also highlights everyday 
experiences within the majority society environment and the shifting positions of the 
second generation that they use to situate themselves. To fully comprehend, this 
incident needs more context to highlight what I mean when I say that what was most 
important was ‘what was not said’- how the assumption of shared experience, of 
continuity and change within a German environment, is used to create community and 
self-understanding.  
 
5.2.Mothers and Daughters – Change, Continuity and Expectations  
This section looks at traditional ideas about Korean families and the concept of filial 
piety in order to examine continuity and change in cultural conceptions and social 
practices. In a new setting—here, that of Germany-- these do not continue unchanged, 
but are restructured. That is not to say that there is such a thing as a timeless traditional 
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Korean family, but I argue that migrants may come to think of their home society in 
such terms. To contextualise Johanna’s way of presenting herself and her Korean 
mother, in particular, it is necessary to look at such constructions “from the natives’ 
point of view”--as if they were fixed and timeless--before discussing the way in which 
they are altered or reinterpreted. Yanagisako (1985) in her work on Japanese filial 
relations in the United States points out that migrants may construct their own versions 
of tradition as they conceptualize the past to make sense of their current experience and 
to speak to current dilemmas and issues (Foner, 1997:963). These invented traditions 
can have a life of their own in that immigrants may interpret and act upon the present in 
light of their own models of the past (Yanagisako, 1985:247).  
The first generation of Korean female migrants to Germany continued some elements, 
while breaking with others. While most of my informants narrated how they met their 
husbands, making their own choices and moving away from arranged marriages. 
Innovation and continuity went hand in hand. Thus, narratives about the families they 
raised reiterated a “matrifocal family culture” (Cho, 2002:177), allowing the first 
generation women to see themselves both in continuity with tradition as honoured 
mothers, while at the same time asserting their own modernity (compare chapter 4 
“Yellow Angels”). Here Korea as the origin of values was the point of reference, putting 
actions within a recognized and honoured framework that explained their actions. In her 
work on Japanese Americans Sylvia Yanagisako (1985), discusses the interpretations of 
filial relations between the Issei (first) and Nisei (second) generation of Japanese 
Americans. She writes that when she asked Issei men who were junior sons whether 
after marriage they had lived with their parents, a common answer was: “No, in Japan59 
it’s the first son who must live with his parents.” (1985:161).  
Similarly, when I asked a first generation Korean woman who only had daughters, I 
frequently received the answer: “In Korea60, people want sons.” Thus, as Yanagisako 
writes about the Issei that they ‘depict the “Japanese way” as having little ambiguity, 
inconsistency or indeterminacy’ (1985:161), the first generation Korean women present 
‘Korean’ filial relations as fixed and bound by rules, as ideal models of relationships. 
But “if immigrants bring with them a ‘memory of things past’ that operates as a filter 
through which they view and experience- and create new lives […], it is also clear that 
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 My italics 
60
 My Italics 
113 
 
 
much changes (Foner, 1997:965). Thus, the first generation of women had no difficulty 
recounting and explaining deviations from the rules, and recognizing them as change. 
Many narratives on bringing up children in Germany focussed on the sacrifices made 
for these children that again highlight the continuity and change in filial relations. Mrs 
Pak said about bringing up her daughter and paying for her education:  
“It was difficult, because we didn’t have much money, so my husband and I had 
to work full-time, both of us, but I even got educational television channels for 
our daughter. It was very expensive. Sometimes my husband and I didn’t see one 
another for a long time, because we were working different shifts. We used to 
leave notes on the kitchen table, things like- please buy more rice, and such 
stuff. […] I wanted a son, in the beginning, but I decided I didn’t want another 
child, it was too hard. Because I had to work so much I never had time to sit my 
exams to qualify as a nurse. And I had to continue supporting my parents in 
Korea. My brother didn’t do it, even though it was his task. So even though he 
was the son, I was like a son. Write that down: son or daughter it makes no 
difference [Ob Sohn oder Tochter ist doch egal.]… Initially, I wanted a Korean 
man for her, but then I would have preferred a German man. My husband [when 
their daughter decided to get married to an American citizen] said that I raised 
my daughter wrong.” 
Mrs Pak framed her narrative about raising her daughter and filial relations in terms of 
continuity with the framework of yangban success and values and maternal self-
sacrifice to allow her daughter the best possible education. Her husband played a 
marginal role in her narrative on bringing their daughter up. She portrays her husband in 
the role of provider, who helped her provide for the child that would transfer status and 
power onto her.  
At the same time in wanting an education for herself, in focussing on a daughter and 
asserting herself as being “like a son” she used and deviated from the ideal traditional 
framework of how things are done in ‘Korea’. Within the framework of Confucian 
patriarchy in terms of which traditional Korean society is often described (Cho, 
2002:170), Mrs Pak situated herself as the self-sacrificing mother, demanding respect 
through maternal identity and role, as the mother of a successful daughter. But she also 
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stressed her own modernity and change, breaking away from traditional Korean 
thought.  
The joke Johanna told me about gender relations in a Korean village in an unspecified 
past (see above) is telling. The gender relations the joke portrayed at first seemed at 
odds with the image of Korea as a traditional patriarchal society, but on closer 
inspection the crucial and revealing question in the joke is “Do you really get to make 
the decisions at home?” In the timeless, traditional Korea the joke evokes, the answer is 
naturally “no”. Thus, the joke actually reveals a continuity with yangban organizing 
principles that gave a mother absolute power over the domestic sphere. “That’s the way 
it goes at home too,” Johanna added and cast her mother in the role of “a Korean 
woman.” 
As a matter of fact, maternal influence and the implied reference to rigid notions of 
Korean filial piety informed this entire meeting, from Johanna’s clothes to her body 
language, and the choice of seating. Her mother, she said, always insisted that she 
looked ordentlich [neat and orderly], and Johanna obliged her long after moving out of 
home, to keep her happy. While she smoked, she remained mindful that someone might 
see her and report back to her mother. Smoking, as a bad habit, is acceptable for boys 
and men, but a woman smoking in public reflects badly on the mother that raised her, 
and Mrs Kim would have been embarrassed if someone had seen her daughter smoking.  
Johanna was aware of that, having been raised by Korean parents in the spirit of “a 
timeless past of family tradition” (Foner, 1997:963). In this family tradition that defines 
female success by way of children, Mrs Kim’s success depended on her only daughter, 
so Johanna couldn’t smoke where someone else could see her, but asserted herself by 
doing it anyway. She wasn’t alone in doing so. Kathrin, Jong-Soon and many other 
female informants secretly smoked in the same way Johanna did, and asserted that they 
told “little white lies to keep my parents happy”, while they indulged in activities that 
went uncontested for women of the majority society.  
When talking about filial relations, husbands are largely absent from the mothers’ 
narratives, but with that absence comes another pointed absence, which has an impact 
on the second generation women in terms of gender. Husbands are foremost seen as 
another mother’s sons, which by implication indicates the presence of another women: 
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the mother-in-law. Traditionally the mother-in-law was the most powerful female in the 
household. Good sons had to be loyal, firstly, to their mothers. Cho (2002) relates how 
during the 1960s in Korea, young husbands began to think that their loyalty as 
household heads was to their nuclear family, and suffered from torn loyalties between 
wife and mother (2002:174). The first generation Korean women in Germany spent 
most of their married lives, except for visits to Korea, away from the scrutiny of their 
mothers’-in-law, and didn’t want their daughters to have to live with a conservative 
mother-in-law, hence Mrs Pak’s change of heart in wanting a German man for her 
daughter, despite previously having thought badly of Korean women going out with 
German men. Different standards applied to sons and their wives. Within the yangban 
framework a son’s success was a mother’s success, a sign that she had raised him right; 
his success was the reward for her sacrifice and suffering.  
One first generation mother that I interviewed had two sons. She had come to Germany 
as a nurses’ aide, and her husband had come as a miner61. They had two sons of whom 
she was very proud, but also embarrassed. Neither of her sons had done well in school, 
and neither had graduated from university. One of them had gone into nursing and the 
other had become a mechanic. Whenever possible, their mother avoided mentioning 
their professions or quickly stressed that they earned very well, even without a degree, 
claiming some sort of success. Their financial success without a degree, was a 
continuous cause of embarrassment to her, while her own and her husband’s financial 
success was a point of pride.  
There is no such heightened expectation for daughters on the surface. Narratives on 
family represent a difference in what mothers wanted for their daughters as compared to 
their daughters-in-law and their sons. A daughter’s academic success was presented as 
desirable, but not a necessity. However briefly looking at the competition between Mrs 
Pak and Mrs Kim about their daughters, illustrates the difference between actuality and 
representations. Mrs Pak and Mrs Kim used to work in the same hospital in the 1970s, 
got married at the same time, and had daughters at roughly the same time. Mrs Kim 
proudly told me about Johanna that she didn’t 
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 Notably, he was one of the few miners that were actually qualified in Korea as miners, not a former 
student or white-collar worker.  
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“regret not quite getting a university degree, because that way I had time for my 
family[…]. Both Mr Kim and I had to work full-time, but I wanted her to have 
the best [possible education, including a private school and tutors].”  
Mrs Kim’s narrative in many ways reflects Mrs Pak’s above, focussing on the sacrifices 
and her pride in providing Johanna with a good education. She also continuously 
referred to her husband as “Mr Kim”, indicating a distance between them, and casting 
him in the role of provider, while she raised ‘her’ (not ‘their’) daughter.  
Mrs Pak and Mrs Kim were engaged in a competition between their daughters. Gossip
62
 
within the community indicated that Mrs Kim portrayed her daughter, Johanna, as better 
than Mrs Pak’s daughter, who hadn’t attended university, but gone into banking. Mrs 
Pak was deeply hurt, especially since her daughter had recently married an American 
and her husband had also accused her of raising her daughter wrong. She lamented these 
accusations. In her narratives, she framed her relationship with her daughter in terms of 
self-sacrifice and suffering for her daughter’s education, and then quickly counteracted 
her daughter’s ‘failure’ with an account of success, such as Mrs Pak’s daughter earning 
very well in banking, as an indicator that she did not fail as a mother.  
Neither the above mother of two sons, nor Mrs Kim and Mrs Pak were unsuccessful 
themselves. Their families had achieved a degree of middle class comfort that rendered 
them successful in the eyes of the community, whose narratives of origin stressed the 
economic hardships they had endured in 1950s Korea, and the deprivations in Germany, 
while sending money home. Their success was highly regarded and they showed it 
outwardly in discreetly expensive clothes and expensive cars, but within the 
‘traditional’ framework of Korean families, the failure of children to succeed at higher 
education, and thus fulfilling the yangban ideal, was a cause of embarrassment for 
them.   
What the disagreement above also highlights is the difference between the 
representations and the actuality. Expectations for daughters differ on the surface, but 
the way in which first generation women spoke of their daughters situated this different 
expectation in terms an innovation and continuity of yangban ideals, which is to say 
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 I learned about the gossip from various sources, mainly first-generation women, who would allude to a 
disagreement between the two women, and from second-generation informants who had heard about it 
from their mothers, and finally heard a brief account from Mrs Pak.  
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that: Mothers transferred their own aspirations for themselves onto their daughters and 
harboured expectations similar to the expectations of sons. The expectations of sons 
remained the same. Change was gender-specific.  
“Son or daughter, it makes no difference.” Mrs Pak said, after admitting that she 
initially wanted a son. Similarly my mother told me that our Korean relatives in Korea 
were relieved when her first child was a boy, because now she had a son. Traditionally 
sons were valued above daughters, whose birth was what the Chinese refer to as “small 
happiness” (Patterson, 2000:139), meaning that true happiness comes with a son. In 
connection with their own individual dreams and aspirations, first generation Korean 
mothers in Germany altered and changed such traditions to a more equal approach for 
sons and daughters.  
However, as already indicated with the smoking incident, the approach was more equal, 
and not fully equal. For the parent generation, an educated, successful German-Korean 
daughter is both continuity and change. Thus, to say that immigrants change, does not 
mean that they become fully assimilated. Yanagisako (1985) argues that immigrants and 
native born Americans may have apparently similar norms, regarding for example 
conjugal relations, but they may conceptualize these norms in light of different folk 
histories. Transferring her observations from American-Japanese to German-Koreans, 
the same holds true: immigrants “interpret their particular cultural histories in ways that 
generate issues of meaning and symbolic categories that in turn structure their kinship 
norms” (1985:260).  
 
5.3.‘You have to have Korean parents’- The second generation of German Koreans  
“My German friends sometimes don’t understand. You have to have Korean parents to 
understand.” Kathrin, Jong-Soon and Johanna, all at various points made that statement. 
Usually they shrugged at the same time. They considered it given that there were limits 
of communication and that only someone who had Korean parents- or at least one 
Korean parent like I- would understand what they were talking about. Or rather: that 
they would understand without requiring a long explanation.  
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In this section, I explore how the second generation understands and conceptualizes 
itself in relation to the parent generation, the majority society and Korea. Having 
explored traditional Korean notions of filial relations, and the conceptualization of 
women’s status, I am looking at the second generation here, and how they view and 
negotiate the first generation’s discourses, and situate themselves. For the second 
generation, the family is also the space in which “the handing down of cultural identity 
through the generations” (Parker, 1995:86) takes place in ways that need to be 
negotiated with the everyday experiences in the majority society. Yanagisako (1985) 
writes about Japanese- Americans and their children that they built their lives there and 
drew on models of “Japanese” as well as “American” kinship, creating a “Japanese-
American” synthesis (1985:22). In order to explore how this is done and articulated, I 
begin with identifying several different ways of handing down cultural identity and the 
conflicts that arose from them. Then I will look at gender specific issues, before 
examining how the second generation talks and thinks about the perceived discrepancy 
between ‘Korean’ and ‘German’ ways, and how it positions itself.  
 ‘Korea’ as it is known from the narratives of the first generation is a place that the 
younger generation has no active part in. The second generation is removed from it due 
to having no shared experience of authenticity, while at the same time linked to it. New 
generations are ‘agents of change (Fortier, 2000:89)’. aThe second generation regarded 
their parents’ stress on academia and good grades with ambivalence, but recognized the 
sacrifices their parents made. According to Beckers-Kim (2005) 95% of second 
generation German-Koreans pass their Abitur and attend university. It sounds like a 
resounding success story, but such success came at a price and isn’t as straightforward 
as the number suggests. To quote Kathrin: “A Korean mother will do anything, 
absolutely anything for her children. German parents won’t. Korean parents will 
sacrifice anything for their children to succeed. That’s why we’re successful, but you 
have to play by the rules.”  
Most of my informants agreed, stressing not only how important education was to their 
parents, but the various sacrifices their parents had made, such as hiring tutors, buying 
expensive books and instruments, or ordering special – at the time- expensive foreign 
language TV channels to help with language education. “Korean parents will do 
absolutely anything for their children,” was a statement my informants repeated to me, 
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their facial expressions sometimes indicating that the statement wasn’t wholly positive, 
because of the implied parental pressure.  
Patterson (2000) points out, the stress on education caused conflicts and in spite of high 
achievements, the second generation was critical of the parents’ generation and their 
experiences with education. This is best exemplified by an example taken from the 
kyopo forum online. One of the German-Korean members wrote autobiographical posts 
about his experiences growing up in Germany, mostly about family life. These pieces 
enjoyed immense popularity, until they suddenly stopped and the member disappeared. 
Most of the responses to the posts were enthusiastic. “Somehow all kyopos seem to have 
experienced the same thing.” Or “It’s like reading my own diary”, were among the most 
often repeated replies to the posts. Moving away from the parental narrative centred on 
the sacrifices made by parents for their children, the posts in this forum shed an even 
more critical light:  
“Talking about ‘seven’. That’s how many kilometres my parents had to walk to 
school, in summer and winter, mostly barefoot. Aha. Because the family was 
very poor, and that is why they always worked hard and were very diligent. 
Mother and father were at the top of their class. My parents were careerists. 
Hang on, careerist and then working in a coal mine? Why not doctor or lawyer? 
University was unaffordable, all right, that’s why not. Or was it the duty to wear 
shoes? Barefoot to university, in winter, walking seven kilometres. No one cared 
to do that [darauf hatte einfach keiner Bock]. School was important, and we got 
that idea. […] The Korean63 didn’t have any problems in school, was always 
diligent and extraordinarily helpful, especially in maths his son/daughter showed 
extraordinary performances. […] There weren’t many Realschüler or 
Hauptschüler
64
. You might as well just become a Penner
65
.”  
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 ‘The Korean’ [der Koreaner] pokes fun at older German books and language usage that refer to an 
entire people in the singular, making it look and sound as if every member of a certain people were the 
same. An example of this usage would be the 1932 book “So lebt der Russe” [This is how the Russian 
lives] the German title of a book by the American William White. Compare to earlier discussion in 
chapter 3.  
64
 Germany has a three-tiered education system. Hauptschule provides the education necessary for manual 
work. Realschule for white-collar work and Gymnasium prepares for university.  
65
 German colloquialism for someone who doesn’t work has no future and is possibly homeless, i.e.: the 
antithesis of the first generation’s aspirations.  
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Some of my informants referred to their parents’ desires for good grades as a form of 
tyranny. The pressure of expectation was too much for some. One of my informants, 
Sophie, a university graduate, said:  
“All hell broke loose if I brought home a bad grade. My German friends thought 
getting a Zwei
66
 [two] was pretty good. For my mum that wasn’t acceptable. It is 
a good grade, but she wanted more and better. That was too much for my 
brother. He finished school and got his Abitur, but you should have been there 
when he decided not to go to university. He’s a civil engineer now, and our mum 
is so proud. It was a bit easier for me, but they [meaning the first generation] all 
want their sons to become doctors, lawyers or civil engineers, don’t they?”  
Alexandra recalled that,  
“I always did very well in school, so no, I can’t say that I ever felt pressured. 
Probably in primary school a bit, but once I got into the Gymnasium, I just did 
well on my own. They pushed my brother far, far more. After all, he was the 
son. It wasn’t crazy, and they didn’t mind if you came home with a Zwei, but a 
Drei was grenzwertig [on the border of the acceptable].” 
Sophie’s and Alexandra’s statements highlight the importance of gender and the way 
the second generation experienced a difference in expectations. Like Kathrin they 
differentiated between Germans and Koreans, meaning her everyday school 
environment and her parents respectively, but made a difference between her experience 
and her brother’s. Gender deserves special attention for two reasons- for one, because of 
the traditional preference for sons in Korea, and for another, because it is an aspect 
often ignored when discussing identity, and especially migrant identities.  
Elaine Kim (1993) writes:  
“Certainly it was possible for me as a Korean American female to accept the 
fixed masculinist Asian American identity posited in Asian American cultural 
nationalism, even when it rendered invisible or at least muted women’s 
oppression, anger, and ways of loving and interpreted Korean Americans as 
imperfect imitations of Chinese Americans; because I could see in everyday life 
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 The German grading system in school used numbers ranging from one to six, one being the highest.  
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that not all material and psychic violence to women of colour comes from men, 
and because, as my friends used to say, ‘No Chinese [American] has ever called 
me a “gook” (1993:x).  
This suggests that gender is only a part of a larger pattern of unequal social relations in 
which Asian American women and the desire to unite with the men to contest the 
overarching racial ideology that confines them both (Espiritu, 1997:104). While I am 
looking in more depth at the issue of ‘racial ideology’ and gender in the German context 
in chapter 6 ‘The Good Foreigners’ the issue of gender within the Korean community 
needs discussing here. Just as the first generation made different experiences based on 
work and gender, the second generation experiences gender as a vital component of 
their identity, and there are marked differences in experience.  
Speaking of kyopo identity as a concept, gender differences were less apparent except 
when my informants spoke of parental expectations of boyfriends or spouses, and the 
differences between their treatment and their brothers’. Of my female informants nearly 
all had at least one brother. Some also had a sister or several, but the general trend was 
for a son and a daughter within my informant’s families. Narratives about growing up 
from my female informants with brothers, centred on the unequal treatment at home, in 
spite of the first generation’s assertions that gender made no difference. Household 
chores were a main point of contention. As Christina, a female informant with one older 
brother, recounts:  
“When I was small, my mother showed me how to do laundry and ironing, and 
then I had to do it myself. Do you think my brother ever had to do any ironing? 
No, he got everything ironed, nicely folded and only had to open the wardrobe to 
pick out a fresh shirt. I always had to help my mother out, but he never did, 
because he was a boy. She spoilt him rotten, because that’s what Korean mothers 
do with their precious sons.” 
My female informants with brothers quietly resented the difference in treatment and saw 
a double standard that disadvantaged them. This did not only extend to housework, but 
also to personal liberties. Hye-Ung said:  
“Boys just get more liberties. That’s just the way it is, and on top of that they get 
their mothers doing everything for them. They get spoilt rotten [Die werden 
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verhätschelt]. My father didn’t want that. He thought it was bad for my brother, 
and that he should learn to be more independent. Not that it was unfair, but that 
he would get a weak character from being so spoilt. [...] It’s different if you’re a 
girl, because something could happen, so they try and protect you more.” 
As Sophie put it: 
“My brother and I were raised differently, no doubt. I was never allowed to 
spend the night anywhere, because ‘a Korean girl doesn’t sleep in other people’s 
houses’- he could just do what he liked. I had to be the good Korean girl, and I 
always had to help around the house. It was unfair that I had to do all that stuff, 
and he had our mother or me do it for him. He couldn’t even iron his own shirts 
when he left home, and I’d been doing it for years. My Dad was just the same.”  
Anne:  
“When we were teenagers, my brother would just go out, and no one ever asked 
him where he was going. With me it was: where are you going? Who are you 
going with? When are you coming back? Of course parents always worry more 
about girls, but it was annoying that he could just come and go as he pleased. I 
would definitely say that they gave him much more liberty than me. Sure, my 
German female friends’ parents asked them too about where they were going, 
but it was different. If they wanted to stay out, then they could, but if I wasn’t 
home when I said I would be, all hell would break loose.   
Another point of contention were disagreements. Central to traditional Korean 
Confucian values is the notion that children should obey one’s parents and elders 
without question as they are older and wiser. This held particularly true for my female 
informants.  
“You don’t argue with Korean parents. If they tell you to do something, then you 
do it. You can’t really rebel, because they do so much for you. And if you did, 
and someone heard about it, they would lose face. Keeping up appearances is 
important to them. But it’s even more important that you do as they say at home. 
Otherwise they have failed as parents. My brother got away with much more 
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than I ever did. I had to be the good Korean daughter, who keeps quiet and 
smiles, and doesn’t complain.”  
These experiences of gendered upbringing, and being disadvantaged, seem to play an 
important role when it comes to finding a partner for the young women. Hyung (2008) 
notes a trend amongst second generation German-Korean women: “there are barely any 
Gyopo
67
 [sic] women that marry Gyopo men, even if I cannot give statistics. Gyopo 
women take einheimische [native] men for boyfriends or future spouses. In contrast 
Gyopo men are rarely seen with native German women. They usually start relationships 
with native Korean women […] (2008:231)”. Lee (1991) claims that nothing is known 
of the relationships of the second generation. Having no statistics to support such a 
claim either, I can only say that most of my male informants had Korean-
born/Japanese/Chinese girlfriends, who mostly had come to Germany as students or 
whom they had met on visits to Korea. My female informants either had German 
boyfriends or had married Germans.  
Hyung (2008) quotes a young second generation woman:  
“From the beginning, since I reached the age when you slowly start having a 
thing for boys, I never felt drawn to Koreans. I felt drawn to German boys. 
Maybe that was defiance on my part, because at home I had to play the dienende 
[serving] daughter for my brother and my parents. That’s the culture in Korea. 
Women have to help in the household and be nice. With my German boyfriends 
I was free of such restraints and could show myself as an emancipated 
individual” (2008:231-232).  
Many of my female informants echoed such sentiments. Kathrin told me that her father 
was adamant that she should not bring a Gelbhaar [yellow hair] home as a boyfriend. 
Other female informants echoed such ideas from their fathers in particular. “My father 
wants me to marry a Korean, but going out with German guys is easier. They expect 
less, and pitch in. A Korean man would expect you to do his laundry, because that’s 
what his mother does, but here the boys learn how to do their own housework. So 
they’re used to it.”  
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 ‘Gyopo’ is the Germanicized form of Kyopo. Both are in use, although in online forums the Anglicized 
spelling is the preferred one.  
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Time and again, my informants stressed how fathers in particular, opposed German 
boyfriends. Anne recalled hiding her boyfriends from her parents.  
“I think that’s something we’ve all done. When I was a teenager, it would have 
meant trouble, bringing a German boyfriend home. My father wanted a Korean 
for me, and would have had a fit. He’s calmed down now.”  
Narratives about conflicts with parents centred on the different gendered experience; 
fathers were at the centre of these conflicts as the “authority figures authority figures 
responsible for setting a good example and, when necessary, meting out discipline” 
(Patterson, 2000:137). Many of my informants reiterated the notions Patterson (2000) 
describes. Many of my informants shared that experience of their fathers, who barely 
featured in narratives; when they did include their fathers, it was to contrast them as 
‘old-fashioned’ with the mothers, or to point out their absence. In talking about families 
and growing up, most of my informants’ narratives centred on their mothers, siblings 
and friends. They presented their fathers as ‘old-fashioned’ or as disciplinarians, and in 
narratives in which they appeared more often, they were portrayed as the ones who “still 
want to return to Korea”.  
One of my female informants told me that when she got married, she had been going 
out with her (German) boyfriend for several years and had long ago introduced him to 
her family. Her father had ignored the boyfriend as best as he could, hoping that he’d go 
away eventually. Only when she told him that she was going to get married to the 
German boyfriend, did the father finally acknowledge him. Similarly, Mrs Pak (above) 
recounted how her husband accused her of “raising my daughter wrong” when their 
daughter got married to a non-Korean. My second generation informants described the 
fathers as rigidly holding on to Korean values and practices, especially with regards to 
the treatment of their daughters and their partner-choices. Hurh and Kim (1984) noticed 
a similar attitude amongst Korean-Americans. More than 60% of the respondents to 
their survey stated that they disapproved of intermarriage [with other ethnic groups], 
while only one third approved (1984:79). The chief reason their respondents gave were 
“differences in feelings, thinking, and customs between races; Koreans must marry 
Koreans; a dislike for mixing blood; etc” (1984:80). The first generation women I spoke 
to, weren’t opposed to intermarriage, but the second generation had experienced 
resistance from their fathers mainly. Some of my informants reasoned that a second 
125 
 
 
generation German-Korean man would be better able to understand them, having shared 
many of the same experiences, or as Kathrin put it: “You have to explain less.”  
Sarah echoed those sentiments:  
“I would have preferred a kyopo, when I was younger. When you’re talking 
about Korean things, then they just know and understand, because you have a lot 
of experiences in common. And I thought it would be easier with my parents. 
Whenever I had a German boyfriend I hesitated introducing him, because my 
parents wouldn’t be unfriendly, but not precisely happy either. When I met my 
[German] partner, I stopped worrying. My parents have accepted him, and that’s 
that.”  
At the same time, the second generation women were not opposed to intermarriage. In 
fact, all of them had German boyfriends or husbands, unless they were single. All 
women in particular stated their dislike of what they perceived as traditional Korean 
gender roles, fearing that even a German-Korean man would insist on such traditions. 
Or as Sophie put it: “Why would I want to marry some Korean mother’s spoilt little 
boy?”  
Looking at gender relations from the point of view of cultural legacy and continuity and 
change is limiting. It fails to sufficiently explain the phenomenon that Hyung (2008) 
and I have observed in marriage patterns or the choice of a partner. Regarding gender 
from this perspective limits understanding to the narrow conclusion that young second-
generation women are rebelling against Korean patriarchy and reactionary fathers and 
brothers, while young second-generation men resort to ‘importing’ brides. From this 
perspective it would be easy to conclude that second-generation women consider 
Germany and the majority society as liberating and therefore embrace it, while first 
generation and second generation men are reactionary and oppressive. This would 
indicate a return to Chin’s (2007) trope about the oppressed Turkish woman, but the 
issue is far more complex than that. I return to the discrepancy between genders 
repeatedly in the following chapters, discussing masculinity and femininity, and 
conflicting notions of masculinity.  
The second generation portrayed fathers as the ones who bought expensive VCRs that 
could play Korean videotapes, sent by relatives from Korea, so that they could watch 
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Korean dramas
68
 or listen to Korean music. Fathers, in the narratives of the second 
generation, were the reactionary forces in their families; the ones that “held on to 
Korea” in the form of Korean passports and traditional values. The second- generation 
perceived fathers as the ones who had never quite arrived in Germany. Comparing such 
statements to an informant’s father’s statement, about a visit to Korea and no longer 
recognizing it as his home, it would be appropriate to ask the question which ‘Korea’ 
the fathers hold on to, and want to return to. Unfortunately, it would far exceed the 
scope of this thesis to discuss this issue in depth. Nonetheless, I maintain that the second 
generation narrates a sense of displacement that they notice in their fathers
69
.  
The second generation saw their fathers as very different from their German friends’ 
fathers. In their narratives, their fathers do not provide role models for successful 
masculinity in everyday German society. Although I lack the voices of the first 
generation men and therefore focus on the way they are represented and perceived by 
those around them, these representations highlight how the second generation women in 
Germany situate themselves, and think about gender.  
Part of this phenomenon is surely the personal and individual experience of having 
brothers on the side of the women, but another facet of this is the way in which the 
majority society stereotypes second-generation German-Korean men as effeminate. I 
return to this perception in chapter 6 “The Good Foreigners” to explain the situation of 
German-Korean men. Nonetheless, it is important here to point out that there is a 
difference of perception that creates a possibility for second-generation German-Korean 
women. The majority society views them positively, in a similar sense to their mothers, 
who were called “yellow angels”. While this positive perception, combined with the 
educational opportunities and a tradition of changing and challenging Korean patriarchy 
as their mothers did, presents a chance for second-generation women, it is also limiting. 
It depends on a cliché of a frail, subservient and quiet Asian woman, creating 
limitations in everyday life. Hyung (2008) presents the example of a young German-
Korean woman, a medical doctor and an emancipated woman that did not correspond to 
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 Mainly Korean period dramas set in the Choson period. The Korean film industry produces many of 
these, especially series that run for several seasons and portray the re-imagined social world of the 
Choson period.  It would be interesting to explore these dramas and the way the first generation 
consumed them in more detail, but that would far exceed the scope of this thesis.    
69
 It would be interesting to explore  the published self-representations of first-generation Korean men in 
Germany, their consumption of Korean period dramas and personal narratives in depth to gain a better 
understanding of the way they position themselves.  
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the cliché of a reserved, humble Asian woman. He describes how that prejudice became 
her “downfall, because every now and then she contradicted her superior. The answers 
came tactlessly, like: ‘You are behaving very rudely for an Asian woman’” (2008:141). 
He goes on to describe her job-interview:  
“The chief of medicine asked me if I was Korean, which seemed to surprise him. 
Then, the usual: he paid me a compliment, said that my German was without a 
flaw. I don’t know if he read my in papers that I was born here. Then he dared 
ask me to greet him in Korean, and I obliged, since I did not want to be impolite 
at the first meeting. Every German-Korean is different in their own way and 
form, like every individual. What connects us is our connection to Korea and our 
looks, TRY-underwear and cheap BYC- socks
70
, which every German-Korean in 
the course of their lives has worn at least once” (2008:142).  
The crux of the matter is that in order to fully comprehend the situation of the second 
generation of German-Koreans, it is insufficient to focus on the complexities of filial 
relations, change and continuity. The second generation’s lives are lived in everyday 
Germany, and to fully appreciate the complexities and the gender relations, it is 
necessary to discuss the second generation within a German environment and everyday 
lived experience as well. I will do this in chapter 6 “The Good Foreigners” in more 
detail, but what is important here is the statement of connection via shared experience.  
Actually, not everyone has worn TRY underwear or BYC socks at one point in their 
lives, and not every second-generation German-Korean woman smokes and hides it 
from her parents, as Kathrin was fond of claiming. And not everyone had to listen to 
endless tapes of Korean music sent by Korean relatives on car journeys. Not everyone 
still sings these songs at karaoke. And not everyone likes bulgogi
71
 or has a sudden 
craving for fried pigs’ stomach when drunk, as Jens assured me “all German-Koreans 
do”. Such sweeping statements were popular amongst my informants, but the two things 
everyone did have in common was having Korean parents and the fact that they were 
living in Germany.  
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 Korean brands  
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 Marinated and then barbecued beef  
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5.4.‘The deep sadness of being Korean in German(y)’- Language and becoming 
kyopos 
 
Having explored continuity, change and conflicts with the parent generation, tracing the 
way in which the second generation situates itself in relation to the first, in this section I 
explore how they articulate their difference.  
Language is an important factor in the transmission of cultural values. While many of 
my informants spoke no Korean or very little Korean, a few did speak Korean or had 
learned some at the Koreanische Schule
72
. Importantly, at the lower spectrum of my 
informants’ age group, the number of Korean-speakers was higher. My older 
informants, those born in the late 1970s and the early 1980s mostly told me that their 
parents did not teach them Korean for fear that they would learn neither German nor 
Korean properly, which would have impaired their academic future in Germany. At the 
time they were children, the Turkish psychologist Öktem studied Turkish migrant 
children in Germany, and found that many Turkish children spoke neither German, nor 
Turkish to any level of fluency, coining the phrase about them “illiterates in two 
languages” (Wilpert, 1977:480). According to my informants, paediatricians advised 
their parents that it might be too confusing to teach them two languages and that they 
might become ‘illiterates in two languages’ as well. In Hawaii, Patterson (2000), notes 
that “English was the native tongue of the second generation” (2000:131), and that 
amongst themselves, the second generation spoke English rather than Korean. Similarly, 
German is usually the language of communication, and the key to academic success. 
What this means is that the Korean stress on academic success is combined and 
translated into German.  
In practice that meant that for most of my informants, German was not only their first 
language, but also the one spoken at home. Mothers generally had better German-
language skills than fathers, although depending on social interaction with co-workers 
and their environment, paternal language skills varied. Most of my informants who 
spoke little or no Korean, said that they “would quite like to learn Korean”. A few of 
my female informants referred to their limited abilities as “Kitchen Korean”, meaning 
that they spoke and understood enough to follow the commands their mothers gave 
them in the kitchen, while cooking. Christina said that:  
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 The Koreanische Schule was an extracurricular Saturday school, set up by the first generation to teach 
Korean. Some of my informants attended it as children, others did not.  
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“My parents insisted on speaking German at home, although they would talk in 
Korean to one another, especially when we children weren’t supposed to 
understand something. So we picked up a few words here and there, not enough 
for a deep conversation, but enough to say simple things. I never had much 
opportunity to speak Korean, so when I do now, I still sound like a child with 
limited vocabulary.”  
‘Koreanness’ at home was transmitted using German, highlighting the differences 
between the parent generation and the second generation subtly, creating a link with 
Korea, while at the same time indicating that the present and future for the second 
generation lies within Germany. Patterson (2000) observed a similar pattern among the 
Koreans in Hawaii: “the second generation spoke ‘tainted’ Korean to the first generation 
and English amongst themselves and with others. For the second generation, mastery of 
English was crucial to their success” (2000:131). Educational success is crucial, and 
within a German context only possible when one is fluent in German. Fluency in 
German and lack of Korean language skills thus is not considered a loss amongst the 
first generation, but a necessary means for success for the second generation. 
“German, you have to speak German properly. Not like the Turkish children, 
who don’t speak proper German, or proper Turkish, so you’ll do well in school!” 
Anne recalled her mother saying. “I wonder how she knew they didn’t speak 
Turkish properly.”  
But according to Kim (1986), the second generation in Germany suffered from their 
inability to speak Korean, or speak it fluently, leading to an identity crisis. The 
experience of Korean parents, a German majority environment, and the alienation from 
Korea as a source of identification, as well as the inability to speak Korean either at all, 
or sufficiently, sets the second-generation apart and led to the use of the word ‘kyopo’ as 
self-description for the second generation of German Koreans. In the original meaning 
of the word, kyopo simply means ‘Korean, living in a foreign country’, and thus is 
inclusive not only of the parent generation, but all Koreans living outside of Korea. At 
first glance, using the term to exclusively describe the second generation, seems to 
indicate that they consider themselves Korean, abroad and not at home (Korea), 
although all of my informants were born and naturalized in Germany. Kyopo thereby 
seems to exemplify the identity crisis Kim (1986) asserted.  
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Roberts (2008) analyzed the use of self-identifications in German-Korean online 
forums. She claims that most of the young people and adults online who stated their 
opinion on identity defined themselves mainly or partly as Korean, and using words 
with a Korean background to identify, like “Hanguks”- a word borrowed from Korean 
(2008:2). Roberts (2008) observes that other names are used to express different issues, 
like cultural knowledge or linguistic ability, like “70-90% Koreaner” meaning that the 
poster wants to say that his knowledge and linguistic ability isn’t perfect. “Other terms 
used attempt to explain ethnicity, like the term ‘Ganzkoreaner’ [Full-Korean] or ‘100% 
Koreaner’ (2008:2).” According to Roberts, “bi-cultural identity is expressed through 
the Korean terms ‘Kyopo’ (Korean living in a foreign country) and ‘Isae’ (second 
generation), with both terms using ‘being Korean’ as a point of reference. It appears that 
all [forum-] members accept both identities, but there are many discussions, where 
people argue about which one describes their identity better. Some members identify 
without a problem with the term ‘Koreaner’, while others find ‘Kyopo’ more fitting, 
since they recognize that they are different from the ‘Koreans from Korea’ and do not 
want to see themselves as exclusively ‘Korean’” (2008:4). She concludes that the 
second generation uses such terms as ‘real Koreans’ to distinguish themselves from 
‘Koreans from Korea’, and that the usage of adjectives like ‘real’ indicates a deficit in 
Koreanness that the second generation feels (2008:3). She asserts that the second 
generation in Germany lives between two worlds and is unhappy in both, feeling that 
they are mainly regarded as non-German (2008:6).Using the most popular self-
description kyopo represents, for Roberts (2008), a solution for the second generation, 
since it connects both sides, but is also fraught with problems. The term kyopo is not in 
common usage in Germany, hence is only meaningful for Korean-speakers. What is 
more, it underlines the “connection to being Korean” (2008:8), which Roberts thinks 
does not reflect the self-understanding of the second generation, lacking the German 
component vital to the self-understanding and suggest different words like “German 
with Korean background (2008:8)” as an alternative.  
The question is whether those who identify as kyopo need a new name that would better 
reflect the German component, or whether Roberts’ suggestion would limit the German-
Korean meaning. While it is true that the word kyopo is not in common German usage, 
it is questionable whether linguistic constructs like the one suggested would better 
reflect “the double belonging” (2008:8) than the word kyopo that “with the emphasis on 
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being Korean, possibly hinders acceptance into German society, which maybe wonders 
why the Koreans insist on their ethnic identity” (2008:8). However, such a conclusion 
ignores that the word kyopo – in a German-Korean second generation context- does not 
mean ‘Korean living in a foreign country’, but ‘second generation German-Korean 
living in Germany’. That is to say that it is not a straightforward reflection of ethnic 
identity, but expresses specific circumstances and a community of feeling bound by 
shared experience.  
I am not debating a Korean component of kyopo identity, but that Roberts (2008) 
largely ignores the project of creating a community and an identity that encompasses all 
components, and expresses difference. Roberts’ (2008) approach attempts to move away 
from an essentialized Korean identity. She claims the second generation of German 
Koreans feel deficient in ‘Koreanness’, so she suggests a hybrid identity that 
emphasizes being German with a Korean background. This would “recognize the 
German [identity] as the dominant one” (2008:8).  
In the course of my fieldwork, I came across a concept that would at first glance support 
Roberts’ (2008) argument that Koreanness is deficient among the second generation. In 
the first round of formal interviews I conducted, I asked the question ‘what do you 
consider typically Korean’, hoping to gain a better understanding of the concept of what 
constitutes Koreanness from my informants. All of my informants named several things, 
some of which indicated a trend, like naming different foods. But nearly all of my 
informants presented me with one word: “Han”. Unable to speak and understand 
Korean, I asked what it means, and then proceeded to ask everyone who mentioned it. 
The answers varied, but everyone agreed that it was the essence of Koreanness. A direct 
translation is impossible, although “sorrow” or “sadness” come close, without 
sufficiently explaining the concept behind it.  
Korean scholars variously explain Han in philosophical, historical and psychological 
terms, for example: “[...] Han is the central experience of the Korean people as a result 
of centuries of foreign oppression, tyrannical rulers, discrimination against women and 
slavery” (Yi, 1996:57). Han is frequently translated as sorrow, spite, rancor, regret, 
resentment or grief, among many other attempts to explain a concept that has no English 
equivalent. (Dong-A 1982: 1975). Han is an inherent characteristic of the Korean 
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character and as such finds expression, implied or explicit, in nearly every aspect of 
Korean life and culture.  
Han is sorrow caused by heavy suffering, injustice or persecution, a dull lingering ache 
in the soul. It is a blend of lifelong sorrow and resentment, neither more powerful than 
the other. Han is imbued with resignation, bitter acceptance and a grim determination to 
wait until vengeance can at last be achieved. (Bannon, 2008) 
Han is passive. It yearns for vengeance, but does not seek it. Han is held close to the 
heart, hoping and patient but never aggressive. It becomes part of the blood and breath 
of a person. There is a sense of lamentation and even of reproach toward the destiny that 
led to such misery. (Ahn 1987) 
Han can also be fatal. Elaine H. Kim (1993) writes: “Han [is] the sorrow and anger that 
grow from the accumulated experiences of oppression. Although the expression is 
frequently and commonly used by Koreans, the condition is taken quite seriously. When 
people die of han, it is called dying of hwabyong, a disease of frustration and rage, 
following misfortune.” 
 My informants didn’t use the expression frequently and commonly. On the contrary. 
The only times they spoke about Han, was when I asked them in the interviews what 
they considered ‘typically Korean’. Other answers to the same question, like references 
to food, or stereotypes they had mentioned, came up frequently, but Han, which 
everyone agreed was central, remained pertinent through absence. I did ask all of my 
informants for an explanation for what Han meant to them. Here are some of the 
answers:  
“Han is the deep anger and sadness the Korean people felt because of the 
Japanese occupation period, and the atrocities they committed against the 
Korean people.” 
“It’s like a deep hurt you feel in your soul, but can’t talk about. All Korean 
people have that in common. It’s part of the Korean soul, like an underlying 
sadness.” 
 “It’s about suffering and endurance. Suffering in silence and dignity. Han 
ennobles you.” 
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“If I had to translate it, I would say it’s a bit like Weltschmerz, but it’s something 
that all Koreans have in common.” 
“Han is the anger and resentment you feel towards your mother-in-law. 
Mothers-in-law treated their sons’ wives quite badly, traditionally, and you 
couldn’t say or do anything against it. It’s about suffering in silence.” 
These are but some of the answers I received, although most were variations thereof. 
Weltschmerz was the closest I came to a German translation, although as pointed out, 
Weltschmerz is a more individualistic feeling that stems from the realization of the 
cruelty of the world, and the circumstances caused thereof, leading to internal sadness. 
Han is both individualistic and communal. The understandings and explanations my 
informants gave me, varied, but everyone had an understanding that shared the idea of 
suffering, silence, resentment and dignity.  
One answer an informant gave me, jokingly, was: “If you have to ask, you’ll never 
understand!” 
While David meant his flippant answer as a joke, it was revealing. Han wasn’t 
something my informants discussed. It was nothing they all had one monolithic 
understanding of. But they all knew what it meant, and that it was an intrinsic part of 
being Korean; an intrinsic part of being Korean, Elaine Kim (1993) claims that Koreans 
speak of frequently, and apparently one which permeates literature, art and film 
(Bannon, 2008). At first glance, it seems that the rather different understandings and 
explanations my informants gave me, indicate the ‘deficiency in Koreanness’ that 
Roberts (2008) asserts. The explanations my informants gave me, they had from their 
parents, who were faced with the same difficulty as they were explaining to me: trying 
to translate a difficult concept into German. Translations being notoriously difficult for 
concepts, subtle meanings get lost, when direct equivalents are unavailable, and the 
context is absent. However, I argue that my informants’ varied answers are not 
indicative of any deficiency, but indicative of the malleability of the concept. 
Comparing them to the more theorized explanations of Han above, my informants’ 
answers are neither lacking, nor exceeding the scope.  It bears repeating that “Han is the 
central experience of the Korean people as a result of centuries of foreign oppression, 
tyrannical rulers, discrimination against women and slavery” (Yi, 1996:57), arguing that 
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the emotion behind Han remains the same as circumstances change throughout history. 
That is to say that Han is a timeless concept, applicable to ever changing-circumstances.  
Chu (2008) writes about the “postmemory han” of the second generation of Korean 
Americans, as something transmitted through their parents by way of tales of 
experiences of suffering. She puts these first generation tales within the specific context 
of the Japanese occupation period of Korea, and draws comparisons to the way in which 
the children of Holocaust survivors “remembered” their parents’ suffering. Although 
not experienced firsthand, the transmitted memories come alive, but are altered: “A 
second generation Korean American might be haunted by her parents’ anguish, but she 
would be equally haunted by the knowledge that she herself was not directly vicitimized 
by the circumstances that led to such pain” (2008: 98). Thus the second generation 
Korean American’s personal Han, while connected to both the parents and the memory 
of collective suffering, is individualistic insofar as it adds a layer of experience that is 
new to each generation.  
Han functions for my informants in the same way. Far from static, the concept has both 
collective and individual meaning for them. It is a concept their parents transmitted and 
translated, thus making it relevant to their own experiences. Transmission need not even 
be verbal. In the previous chapter “Yellow Angels”, I have mentioned Mrs Pak’s 
negative experiences in German hospitals and her coping mechanism of singing: “So I 
used to sing when I was cleaning on the wards, just sing and sing till I no longer felt so 
angry and frustrated.” Singing plays a central role in Korean sociability, and the 
importance of singing will be further discussed in chapter 7, paying particular attention 
to Han in conjunction with gender. What is important here, is that the parent generation 
did transmit the concept to the second generation, who made it their own, both 
continuing and changing it. They all said it was something essentially Korean, and yet 
they never speak about it.  
I argue that in subtle ways Han is present, although not explicitly stated. One thing my 
informants would talk about in formal interviews and social meetings was the 
experience of constantly being asked “where are you from?”  
Johanna told me that:  
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“I sometimes get annoyed. You know, you meet someone and you talk to them, 
and then they ask you where you’re from. Of course you know what they mean, 
but they don’t want to say ‘You look funny, what’s up with that?’, so they try to 
find a way around it. You can just see it, how they’re trying and can’t think of 
anything. Sometimes I make their lives difficult, and say ‘I’m from Frankfurt’, 
and then you can see them blush. They don’t know what to say then, and so they 
try again and say things like: ‘yes, but where are you from originally?’. It 
depends on whether I’m in a mean mood or not, but if I am, I’ll tell them that 
that’s where I’m from originally. And then they get really flustered, because 
they just don’t know what to say. So I usually put them out of their misery and 
tell them that my parents are from Korea, and then they try being clever and ask 
whether they’re from the North or the South. Can’t get out of the North, can 
you?”  
Johanna wasn’t the only one who ‘sometimes got annoyed’ and left those that asked to 
try find different ways of asking, before telling them that her parents came from South 
Korea originally. Behind these stories lay the painful experience of constantly being 
“othered” and constantly reminded that the majority society doesn’t see one as 
“properly German”. The listeners invariably would nod, and reply with phrases like “I 
know what you mean”, having shared the same experiences and frustrations. 
Frustrations that began with Mrs Pak’s experience of being called a “dirty Korean”, or 
being relegated to cleaning despite being a fully qualified nurse, or the fathers’ 
experiences of being marginalized as miners. Han may be a Korean concept, but it 
transcends a narrow definition of ‘Koreanness’ in the lives of kyopos, who apply it to 
their experiences in Germany.  
Similarly, at my first meeting with Johanna, we established ourselves in narratives of 
shared experience: “They all came over as nurses and miners, didn’t they? What about 
your mother, was she a nurse too? See, they all came over like that.” Establishing a 
shared history and shared experience, meant that she could assume that I would know 
“what she meant” since I had a Korean mother. In other words: some things no longer 
needed saying, or requiring long explanations. “You know what I mean”, was shorthand 
tapping into a world of perceived, shared experiences and shared understandings. 
Korean parents meant shared experiences that the other could relate to, which in turn 
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meant that some things could be left unsaid on the assumption that they would be 
understood within a certain shared framework of meaning by the listener. (I will return 
to this discussion in chapter 7.) 
Thus, I argue that deficiency does not stem from insufficient Korean language skills as 
Kim (1986) claimed, or that using the self-description kyopo is indicative of deficiency 
at all, as Roberts (2008) asserts. Such an approach is only valid if one accepts 
‘Koreanness’ as a monolithic concept one can be deficient in. I posit that regarding 
someone as deficient in Koreanness, indicates that Roberts’ (2008) understands 
‘Korean’ as an essential identity. However, the crux of being kyopo is not ‘Koreanness’ 
as such, but the shared experience of having Korean parents, and living in Germany. 
Kyopo takes on a specific meaning for the second generation, referring to double 
belongingness in relation to Germany, and is an identity that is a narrative of self-
production.  
 
5.5.‘Somehow all kyopos have experienced the same’ – Narratives of self-
production 
 
Moving “beyond the paradigms of ‘identity crisis’ and ‘between two cultures’” one can 
“develop a more refined view of identity formation” (Parker, 1995:173). This sees 
identities as formed in two ways; through narratives of self-production, and through 
defences against unwelcome attributions made by others (1995:173)”. Using an 
example by the same anonymous source as above, taken from the kyopo online forum, I 
intend to show how the second generation creates narratives that situate them in relation 
to the first generation, their German majority society environment, and a timeless ideal 
of ‘Korea’.  
 “The generation Korea, yours, mine, our generation is only in existence because 
at some point our fathers and mothers once liked one another (‘liking’ seems a 
better word than ‘loving’.) Since my parents really liked one another then (they 
had to) I was made. Yes, my parents had sex and they had it with one another, 
which I absolutely cannot imagine, and you probably can’t either, since other 
than our German friends, I’ve never chanced on them on a Sunday morning in 
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their bedroom naked ‘wrestling’ or ‘doing sports’. No kissing (neither French 
kissing nor on the cheek!), and absolutely no holding hands. Why, I never!  
On birthdays there was and is a polite handshake. And that’s the be all and end 
all. After all though, it’s not Gorbatchev and Kohl meeting one another after the 
fall of the Berlin wall, but only Mom and Dad. That which connects my parents 
still are probably the tax benefits and the status within the Korean community. 
Not that my parents have much status, but probably they imagine they do (like 
any Korea family). Fact: My parents don’t match very well, and they don’t 
particularly like one another, which I’ve known since I was ten years old. Some 
are shocked by this, but I’ve always found ‘Al Bundy73’ much more realistic 
than the ‘Cosby family’, who are just sick and way too harmonious.”  
In contrast, the official narrative within the setting of formal interviews centres on 
acknowledging the sacrifices parents have made, referring back to ‘Korea’ as a source 
of tradition and explanation of parenting styles. The second generation conceptualizes 
filial relations in terms of a contrast between cultures, seeing much of their lives and 
actions influenced by a ‘Korean past’ and ‘tradition’, much more so than the first 
generation would explicitly claim. In contrast to the first generation, ‘Korea’ in 
discourses on family and filial relations serves less as a point of departure from 
tradition, but as a justification for conservative parenting, when compared to ‘German’ 
parenting. They agree that their upbringing was governed by ‘Korean tradition’, but as 
Yanagisako (1985) asserts for the Japanese American Nisei, the second generation sees 
expectations of obedience and duty not communicated so much by what the first 
generation said, as by what they did. In the official narrative in formal interviews, due 
respect is paid to the sacrifices the parent generation made, however more informally, 
such as on the kyopo online forum a different light is shed on the perception of Korean 
parents. For one thing, the above segment highlights the different perception of 
relationships between spouses, contrasting the Confucian family relations between 
spouses with an immediate environment in which spousal relationships are supposed to 
be more intimate than mother-child relationships.  
                                                 
73
 The protagonist of a once popular US show called ‚Married with Children’, depicting a dysfunctional 
family, while the ‘Cosby Show’ was equally a show about families, though in this case a harmonic and 
successful family. Both shows ran for many seasons on German TV.  
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Second-generation informants ridicule the apparently very polite manner in which the 
parents meet, reminiscent of Mrs Kim’s insistence of referring to her husband as “Mr 
Kim”; they liken this to the frosty political relationship between East and West during 
the Cold War, which they see as far removed from Western notions of families and 
familial love as possible. This leads to a perception of family life as dysfunctional as the 
comparison with Al Bundy indicates. Time and again the narrator draws in the reader, 
creating a sense of community, while relating personal experiences, which posits the 
reader and the narrator between two different cultural frameworks of reference, thus 
creating a third. On the one side are the Korean parents, whose actions and behaviour is 
considered typical for Koreans, typical for Korean parents and telling of their 
contemporaries’ behaviour and way of relating to one another. On the other are ‘our 
German friends’, whose experiences with their parents are assumed to differ vastly from 
the readers’ and the narrator’s, to such a degree that they render the behaviour of the 
Korean parents strange and at odds with the ‘German’ environment. This kind of 
narration creates a community of narrator and readers, who both share the same set of 
experiences, cultural references and awareness of both the Korean parents and ‘our 
German friends’, putting each at odds with the other. The discrepancy between different 
realms of experience and the drawing on different frameworks of interpretations in the 
above segment cannot be resolved, as long as the discourse dichotomises ‘Korean’ and 
‘German’. ‘Koreanness’ and ‘Germanness’ are not mutually exclusive, but reside 
together in juxtauposition. They are presented as mutually exclusive, but being kyopo is 
inclusive of both concepts. The solution is provided through ambiguity, in which an 
amalgam of elements combine to create a community of narrator and reader. “Those 
who’ve lived through it understand me.” The segment continues at a later point, going 
on to address the reader directly: “And you understand me, don’t you?”  
The narrator relates the tale of a childhood visit to Korea, one of two that he undertook 
in his life, and all when he was a child, finishing with:  
“You can imagine that that was a real culture-shock for a spoilt German-Korean 
like me, can’t you? For the next few years, I didn’t really feel tempted to fly to 
Korea. Generally my image of Korea changed since that point of time. 
Disappointment, maybe? Or did I realize that something wasn’t right with me? 
139 
 
 
Am I truly Korean? A real one, I mean. Is that my culture? Would I rather eat 
pizza or rice?- Pizza, but does that make me an Italian?”  
Again, the questions raised here are aimed towards the reader, and much more explicitly 
state the discrepancy between ‘Korea’ and ‘Germany’ as two different frameworks for 
identity, explicitly creating a new category, while at the same time calling into question 
the markers of identity. What is Korean? What is German? What makes one Korean or 
what makes one German? And how can these different concepts of identification be 
synthesized? Or do they need to be? The final question raises the question, which the 
speakers are posing to themselves, whether such strict categorizations are useful at all. 
Underlying the last paragraph is the narrator’s sense of displacement when visiting 
Korea, which I will return to in chapter 7. Korea in the present day has changed vastly 
from the time of the first generation’s migration, but as mentioned previously, visits to 
Korea were sporadic for most of my informants. Some of my informants said that their 
first visit to Korea was great to begin with. Johanna described it as follows:  
“Suddenly no one stares at you, suddenly everyone looks just like you. But then 
you realize that you miss a lot of things you’re used to from Germany, and 
everyone knows you as ‘the German girl’. And you don’t have as much liberty.”  
Hyung (2008) recounts a German-Korean informant saying: “If I go into the street in 
Germany, people stare at me dumbly, and it’s the same thing in Korea, as if they knew 
that I am not a native Korean” (2008:222). Another says: “If I met Koreans [in Korea] 
they were always acting so stiffly. Initially I didn’t know whether it was anything to do 
with the fact that I’m a foreigner. Later I realized that that’s to do with the Korean 
culture […]”.  
The experience of being a foreigner in Korea is one of the shared experiences. The 
anonymous narrator of the kyopo forum puts his sense of alienation into stark terms:  
“One word: outside latrine. Those who’ve experienced it, understand it. And you 
understand me, don’t you? We can spare ourselves the details. I want to return to 
Germany.
74”  
                                                 
74
 At the time of writing the narrator was a grown man, recounting childhood experiences in the Korean 
countryside.  
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Like the above narrative indicates, I posit that the word kyopo does not indicate a 
deficiency, but awareness of a specific individual and shared experience that creates a 
community. Anne said: 
“Every Sunday, we spent two hours in Korea, attending services. That was it. 
Two hours, every Sunday, and Germany for the rest of the week. I found 
Sundays boring, and the only reason I went, was to meet other kyopos.” 
Using ‘German with Korean background’ as a self-description portrays an 
understanding of a fragmented German-Korean identity that is additive in its nature. It 
dynamically combines the fragments of two static concepts. The understanding of the 
word kyopo in a German-Korean context seeks to encompass multifaceted experiences 
that narratives such as the one above highlight. The definition of being kyopo is 
dependent on combining a Korean past with a German present, creating a community of 
shared experience and understanding that transcends that of ‘our German friends’, and 
that of the ‘Korean parents’.  
My first meeting with Johanna illustrates the point. Johanna and I were looking for ‘the 
other Korean’. Used to the constant experience of being othered or “stared at dumbly” 
as Hyung’s (2008) informant put it, we had an expectation of visual difference, based 
on the knowledge that one or both of our parents had migrated from Korea. The 
knowledge that the majority society identified us as ‘other’ also served as a shared basis 
of experience, when we were talking about members of the majority society being 
surprised. Johanna said that she either thought it was funny, or she was annoyed when 
others didn’t recognize her as German, in Germany, but almost in the same breath 
shifted positions and recounted how she claimed to be Korean while in France, to make 
herself interesting and set herself apart from other Germans, and so as not to offend 
older people who connect Germany to WW2. Identification seemed a choice to her, 
depending on her situation, how she wanted to portray herself and what was most 
advantageous at the moment. At the same time, the expectation that older French people 
would get upset with her for identifying as German indicated that Germanness played a 
role in her self-identification. But when asked how she would describe herself, she 
would say “a bit of both”.  
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Contrary to ideas about culture conflicts and resulting identity crises that operate “with 
a static notion of what constitutes a culture and values, assuming that they are 
transplanted […] wholesale, and are either taken up or refused outright by young people 
growing up here” (Parker, 1995:11), Johanna’s approach to identity was inclusive. 
Notably she didn’t say ‘half and half’ or ‘German-Korean’, or used any form of self-
description that dichotomizes two different categories, but used the words “bit” and 
“both”. That is to say that she neither identified fully with either and did not identify in 
equal parts with both, but left leeway for herself to shift her position as she pleased; 
although she did acknowledge that that is not always possible due to outside ascriptions.  
 
5.6.Conclusion 
Hyung (2008) claims that the kyopos in Germany are so assimilated that they are almost 
unrecognizable. He further asserts their rejection of their parents’ values, traditions and 
practices. The claim that the second generation in Germany is displaced and situated 
between worlds, unhappy in both, is one that is reiterated time and again, not only about 
the second generation of German-Koreans, but about other second generations, like the 
Turkish second and third generation. The idea of the second generation as individuals 
that are displaced and torn in a conflict of cultures, at odds with their parents’ 
reactionary world and not quite at home in the majority society, dichotomises Ausland 
[foreign country] and Deutschland [Germany]. Generalizations about the resulting 
‘plight’ of those seen as in direct conflict and stranded between two value systems 
(Parker, 1995:12) are easy to make when analysing in terms of such a dichotomy. This 
approach conceptualizes migrant children as in conflict with their parents, “facing the 
difficulty of negotiating two incommensurable value systems” (Solomos 1988). The 
resulting- inevitable cultural conflict- victimises the second generations, as “vulnerable 
to identity conflicts and low self-esteem” (Parker, 1995:12). Such an approach fails to 
take into account the possibilities and agency of second generations, positing the parent 
generation and the majority society as polar opposites. Identity is not a readily 
measurable attribute, but more of an ongoing construction (1995:13) and negotiation 
that does not happen ‘in spite’ of different cultures, but is a continuous process of a 
“shifting combination going beyond a stark either/or dichotomy” (1995:14).  
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Looking at the second generation of German Koreans in Germany, the framework that 
dichotomizes is insufficient, but still in use. It pitches the first generation against the 
second, portraying the second generation as displaced between cultures. At the same 
time, the second generation narrates its own identities and histories, recognizing 
conflicts, changes and continuities. While they themselves represent the first generation 
as ‘reactionary’, they are also aware of the changes in ‘Korean’ filial relations, and that 
filial relations are subject to negotiation. Yanagisako (1985) writes about Japanese 
American Issei and Nisei that they share the same conception of ‘Japanese’ filial 
relations, but disagree on when relations of this type existed. The Issei allege that their 
own relations with their parents were the last and there is some fuzziness when 
‘American’ relations began. The Nisei do not portray the Issei as readily acceding to the 
‘American’ way, but rather represent them as continuing advocates of a ‘Japanese’ 
system. Yanagisako (1985) assert that the Issei agree that the ‘old rules’ are no longer 
socially appropriate, but the Nisei also consider them inherently flawed.  
The same statement can be made for the first and second generation of German-
Koreans. Relating certain practices back to ‘Korea’ serves as legitimization of those 
practices as well as a point of departure for change. ‘Korea’ serves as a fixed point that 
provides meaning, just as ‘Germany’ does. The construction of timeless and idealised 
‘Korean’ family traditions and filial piety creates a sense of a system that lacks 
ambiguity: a system people used to justify practices or challenge them, while at the 
same time using it as a shared history that conditions experiences used to create 
community. Korean tradition is the key to a code, explaining throwaway statements like 
“I think we’ve all hid our boyfriends”.  Not everyone has hid their boyfriends, but 
tapping into ‘Korean’ family traditions, the listener can decode a wealth of information, 
without having to ask. After all, if you have to ask, you’ll never understand. Or rather: 
If you have to ask, you’re not one of us.  
Hiding one’s boyfriend and not smoking in public are but two practices that illustrate 
the gendered nature of kyopo identity. My female informants were keenly aware of the 
gendered difference in their upbringing, and expected other kyopo females to have 
shared the experience, hence be fluent in their own, gender-specific code. Even without 
ever having had to hide a boyfriend, I knew “what Korean parents can be like”, and how 
to be a ‘good Korean daughter’. However, such code was strictly female, not mentioned 
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in the presence of male informants, and thus subtly reproducing the gendered spheres of 
‘Korea’. Among female friends, ‘traditional’ Korean friendships between women 
remained, at the exclusion of males, who did not share the code.  
Just like ‘Korea’, ‘Germany’ is used as a point of reference that provides meaning. It 
stands for the present, and everyday lives without which the construction of traditional 
‘Korea’ would be meaningless. The crux of the matter is that ‘Korean tradition’ and the 
shared experience created from it, depends on the foil of a German everyday life. ‘The 
classic story’, the myth of the nurses and miners, is specific to Germany, as are the 
consequent experiences. Theorists like Kim (1986) and Roberts (2008), and others who 
have written about identity crises among second generations, fail to appreciate the 
experience of being kyopo not as one that is deficient, but a process of continuous 
articulation of shared experiences that are highly dependent, not on essentialized notions 
of Koreanness and Germanness, but on the experience of growing up with Korean 
parents in Germany.  
Thus, once a year on the 15
th
 of August, the Korea Verband E.V. invites the German-
Korean community to a Sportfest [Sports Celebration]. In a ceremony that 
commemorates Korea’s liberation from Japanese colonial rule, German-Koreans of all 
ages and from different cities compete against one another in different sports; there are 
food stalls and in the evening, there’s a party and a concert with a popular band or artist 
invited from Korea.  
Johanna: “They [meaning the first generation] do that for us [the second 
generation], the party I mean. But they’re there to show off their new 
cars. It’s like a whole parade of expensive cars. Koreans always do that. 
Showing off
75. It’s so silly. But there’s lots of good Korean food, lots to 
drink, and a party in the evening. It’s good fun.”  
It was fun, and there was a lot of food, and a lot of expensive cars. It was also an 
experience that everyone who has attended school in Germany can relate to and few 
Korean-Koreans could. But for the first and second generation of German-Koreans in 
Germany, in the way it is organized, it presents a link between a Korean past and a 
                                                 
75
 The parent generation is showing off their personal success, as having come from poor migrant workers 
to being able to afford expensive cars.  
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German present, and between generations and a link between Korea today, and 
Germany today in the form of the band.  
It is “a bit of both”, synthesizing what appears exclusionary, without becoming 
essentializing. Being kyopo is neither deficient in Germanness, nor Koreanness, and it 
does not require a prioritization of one concept over the other. Instead, it is a narrative 
of self-production and shared experiences that create community. 
 
 
6. The Good Foreigners - The Limits of Identity for Kyopos 
 
During the time of my fieldwork, the media constructed the social situation and 
educational achievements of the Turkish minority- especially of the second generation - 
as big problems. This affected the second generation of Koreans in Germany, raising 
questions about the integration of migrant children into the majority society. In this 
chapter I look at the broader discourse on integration and identity, within which the 
kyopos are situated and situate themselves. I ask: how do they come to be regarded as 
the ‘good foreigners’? What are the implications of the discourse by the larger German 
society for their self-perception and integration into the majority society? What are the 
possibilities for hybridity? 
In order to give a sense of the issues that kyopos face and the complex and ambivalent 
responses to their positioning in German society, I first present two incidents from my 
fieldwork. The first is a formal interview with a young German-Korean man, Klaus. 
The second is a kyopo party, where an informal discussion and comparison of migrant 
groups took place. These two different events, with their specific settings and narratives, 
help us understand the way kyopos position, see themselves and imagine they are seen. I 
draw on these incidents throughout the chapter.  
Within the German discourses on migration and integration, the Turkish minority is 
typically defined as ‘Bad Foreigners’, who are unable to integrate into German society 
and actively refuse to adopt a German identity. The difficulties become apparent, 
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particularly, with regards to the second generation. I consider the position occupied by 
the kyopos in this discourse: according to many Germans and in their own eyes too, they 
are the ‘Good Foreigners’. Contrasting their behaviour and values with the Turkish 
immigrants, kyopos stress their success and the ways they have accepted German values 
and ways of acting i.e.: the demanded perceived German identity. I posit that 
comparative discourses are part of an ongoing process of identification that creates “a 
wholeness, which is filled from the outside us by the way we imagine ourselves to be 
seen by others” (Hall, 1996:287).  In the course of these narratives, kyopos express 
awareness that they are not fully accepted as Germans. They may be contrasted with the 
Turks, but both groups are, ultimately ‘foreigners’.  
The section that follows further develops this point, considering incidents where non-
ethnic Germans become aware of the majority society’s implicit belief in a racial 
definition of Germanness (as white) and consequently, the degree to which they are 
excluded from the recognition as fully German- not because of their beliefs, actions or 
values, but because of their phenotypical distinctiveness from Caucasian Germans. In 
the next section a further discussion of the implications along gendered lines follows, to 
explore the constructions of masculinity and femininity among the second generation. 
Finally, I look at Korean racial prejudices, and the discussions about those with one 
Korean and one German parent as a further layer of complexity. These experiences that 
non-ethnic Germans face reveal the limitations and insufficiencies of the integration 
discourse, and aim to highlight how kyopo identity is not only a “narrative of self-
production” but also a “defence against the unwelcome attributions made by others” 
(Parker, 1995:173) that circumscribes the articulation of possibility.  
 
6.1. Two fieldwork incidents 
Incident 1: Formal Interview with Klaus  
I met up with Klaus for a formal interview in January 2004. He was one of the kyopos 
who had answered one of my posts on kyopo.com
76
 and agreed to talk to me. He asked 
to do the interview in the evening due to his work commitments, so we met in a bar in 
                                                 
76
 An online forum for young German-Koreans. Cf chapter 2.  
146 
 
 
the inner city in the evening. He was still dressed for work in a very formal suit, though 
without a tie and nursing a glass of wine, while frowning and considering my questions.  
Generally, before answering, he considered my questions carefully and then replied, but 
in the course of the interview he spoke more freely and a conversation developed. He 
had been telling me about his parents and the expectations his parents had of him, and 
for him. His father, he had told me, had worked his fingers to the bone trying to provide 
him with a better future and a good education. He told me that he admired his father for 
that, but also voiced his criticism that the first generation in his opinion, remained too 
connected to Korea, and even more so, criticized that ‘the first generation demands of 
the second to make a choice- do you want to be German or Korean. The second 
generation is put up against the wall and has to choose, so instead we’re kyopos, 
because we depend on two categories.’  
The first generation, in his opinion ‘remained in Korea deep within their hearts’ and 
demanded a similar affection and fondness for Korea from the second generation. But, 
‘Korea is far away,’ Klaus told me. ‘Korea is far away,’ he repeated, whilst shrugging 
and pulling a face that indicated that he didn’t greatly care about Korea. ‘So saying ‘I 
am a proud Korean’, makes me sick [zum kotzen]). I mean, it’s just like saying ‘I’m 
proud to be right-handed’, isn’t it? What’s the point? Koreans just have prejudices, left, 
right and centre.’  
 
Incident 2.: A kyopo party at which too many Germans were present 
About a month later, he and another few of my informants went to an organized and 
public kyopo party together. After about an hour at the party, my informants with whom 
I’d come, agreed that the party wasn’t a success. It was bleak midwinter, it was raining 
and snowing outside, and we were sitting in a dark bar that remained fairly empty. Only 
three other tables were taken, and people wandered in and out to the dance floor and 
counter next door, and back again. A few familiar faces wandered in and out, but due to 
the bad weather not nearly as many people as usual had shown up.  
The party was one of a series of parties held every two months in different locations, 
organized by kyopos for kyopos with the specific intent of giving kyopos a place to 
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meet. Mostly, they were held in Frankfurt, where the organizers were based, but twice 
they were held in nearby Mainz in a large university bar with an adjacent dance-floor 
area. While the word ‘party’ implies that this is an informal get-together, as a matter of 
fact it might be better understood as a more formally organized night with a rented 
location whose rent was paid for by raising an admission fee. As a comparison one 
might think of ‘themed’ nights in clubs, however the term used was ‘party’. Anyone 
willing to pay the fee could attend. The admission to parties usually cost around three or 
four Euros and drinks were cheap. A bigger party was held for Christmas in a more 
formal setting, drawing a larger crowd in formal attire, but the parties held throughout 
the year were informal.  
The parties usually drew familiar faces and were an opportunity to catch up with kyopo 
friends with rarely more than two or three non-kyopos present. But that particular 
evening, there were about ten or twelve non-kyopos. My informants with whom I was 
sitting around one of the tables in the room connected to the dance floor, agreed that the 
party wasn’t a success.  
Klaus was particularly irritated. Sitting in one of the booths along the side of the bar, he 
was looking out at the small crowd that was dancing, drinking one beer after another. 
‘It’s not that good this time-too many Germans.’ 
By that time the party had been going on for a few hours, and considering that it was 
open to the public, a few people who were not ethnic Koreans had found their way into 
the bar. While open to the public, the term ‘party’ implies a closed setting and a 
celebration, hence the implication being that kyoponess was celebrated here, by those 
who could lay claim to it. Thus the non-kyopos stood out. There weren’t many, maybe 
ten or twelve – mainly young men- at best, and most of them crowding around the bar 
for drinks, but according to Klaus that was too many already. Not really in a talkative 
mood, he continued repeating that there were “too many Germans” around.  
“It ruins the atmosphere.” He claimed, “We’re not amongst ourselves tonight. I don’t 
come here for that! What’s the point of having a kyopo party, if the potatoes take over? 
They just don’t belong here, and they’re not really participating either. Look, not one of 
them is dancing. They’re just here to check out the girls.”  
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He was referring to a group of young, Caucasian-looking men who were leaning against 
the bar, looking at the dancers, instead of dancing. The bar was quite crowded, mostly 
with other kyopos, and most of them men, while those dancing were mainly women. 
One of the young women was dancing with a non-kyopo, who had come with her, but 
other than her and him, the groups didn’t mix.  
Jens, who was sitting with our group, didn’t object to the presence of the non-kyopos. 
“What are you complaining about? It’s an open party, so why shouldn’t they come? 
And we’re only ‘rice-potatoes’ too.” 
“It’s not the same when they’re here.’ Klaus insisted. ‘The other parties lately were 
much better. Not so many Germans.”  
“What do you expect if you’re throwing a party in a university pub? There’s cheap beer 
on sale, of course people are going to come! They’re only here for the beer.” Alex said.  
Klaus wasn’t so easily pacified and continued complaining for a while that having the 
Germans here would ruin the mood, the setting and the atmosphere. He insisted that it 
was a kyopo party, organized by kyopos for kyopos so that kyopos could get together. 
The “potatoes”, meaning the Germans, had no place there and their motives were 
dubious. “They’re only here to check out the girls,” he kept repeating, “and just wait till 
it gets late enough, and they’re drunk enough to dance. They all can’t dance to this sort 
of music.”   
“This sort of music”, meant R’n’B, which was a staple at most kyopo parties, as I found 
out from my informants and by means of observation. “Only black people really can 
dance to that.” Alex said. “It’s funny. Koreans don’t like black people, but they like the 
music. They think they’re better than them, but then Koreans always think they’re better 
than everyone. We’re always the best in everything!”  
At this point, Jens butted in again. “It doesn’t even have to be true.”  
And Klaus agreed with him. “Just ask my Dad, he’ll tell you how great the Koreans are. 
They’re the best in everything, according to him, and he’s oh-so proud to be Korean. I 
mean, after he’s been living here for more than thirty years, he still holds on to his 
Korean passport, which is no use to him. Every single time he gets to a border, they 
check him. It’s much easier having a German passport. They don’t give you shit if 
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you’re trying to travel somewhere, no visas needed for the States either. He’s just 
stupid. What an idiot!”  
Jens was getting cross with Klaus’ negativity and began teasing him that the Koreans 
were the best at some things. “Compared to the Turks we’re so much better, aren’t we?”  
Initially it wasn’t entirely clear whether he meant it or was joking, but he clarified his 
statement saying that he had been joking, but ‘if you look at it, we are, aren’t we? I 
mean, they barely make it through the Hauptschule. And most criminals in Frankfurt are 
what? Turkish. It’s because they don’t give a shit [Weil es sie einen Scheiß interessiert]. 
No education, no future, no perspective.’  
Klaus agreed with him on that, gesticulating to underline his points. “The Germans 
think that we are the better foreigners, and you know what, they’re right. It’s because 
the parents don’t care. Look at them and look at us. Most of them can’t even speak 
German properly. Our parents made sure that we do. They cared, and you know what 
it’s like, don’t you? You’d better make the grades in school, or else…”  
He didn’t need to finish that sentence, but only rolled his eyes and grinned at us. Our 
small group was laughing and nodding, toasting one another with beers, because we did 
know. “Can you imagine what would have happened if you ever came home with a bad 
grade or got into trouble with the law?” he asked us, winking. ”My parents would have 
made the police look like orphans [Meine Eltern hätten die Polizei wie Waisenkinder 
aussehen lassen
77], I’d have been in so much trouble.” 
There is no concrete meaning behind the ‘or else’ and the ‘trouble’ he described, but the 
shared idea that each and every one of us understood immediately that our parents 
would be disappointed and that this was a shared link between kyopos. A lack of 
academic success would have meant losing face and status within the Korean 
community for the parents, and the disappointment would have led to constant 
arguments at home. Again, the rest of our group agreed with him and described parental 
disappointment, possible loss of face and status, and agreed that as a kyopo, showing 
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“the slightest sign of becoming assi 78 like the young Turkish migrants”, Korean parents 
would have disciplined them.  
‘And they don’t even speak German properly.’ Both Klaus and Jens repeated, shaking 
their heads.  
Jens: ‘Our parents care. They made sure we speak German. It’s a lot to do with our 
mothers, isn’t it? I mean, if you look at it, the Turks came over as guest-workers too, 
only the men though. And then they sent for their wives, who became housewives. 
Never had to work, so they never had to learn German, and stayed amongst themselves. 
So they spoke Turkish at home, and because the Germans hired uneducated Turks, the 
kids didn’t learn German and no value was placed on education. They all come from 
Anatolia, and that’s the poorest part of Turkey, you know? And now the Germans are 
complaining about them left, right and centre, because the kids are criminals.’  
“Compared to the Turks, our parents had an education. They didn’t just take anyone to 
become a nurse or a miner. They were educated people.”’ Klaus looked to the party-
goers he had identified as ‘Germans’ again and scoffed. “What can you expect if you 
cart a load of Anatolian peasants into your country?”  
Distracted by the activity on the dance floor, he got irritated again. “What’s the point? I 
come here to meet other kyopos, not to hang out with that lot. If it continues like that I’ll 
stop coming to the parties.”  
Everyone agreed. Both incidents highlight several recurrent themes, centring on the 
ambiguous positions within the debate on Germans and immigrants. These need to be 
contextualised to understand the currents in conversation. Both discussions draw on the 
perception of German society of migrants and the discourses surrounding them, which 
both situate kyopos as well as creating a discourse they use. This can best be seen when 
opposing the formal interview setting with the informal chat at the party. The interview 
and the chat took place in different settings that directly influenced the tone.  
During the interview that took place at the bar, Klaus and I stood out as an ethnic 
minority, while those around us appeared to be German, based upon their language. 
                                                 
78
 A-social: colloquial adjective used to describe someone or an action that is not socially acceptable. In 
this case it refers to the stereotype of Turkish migrant youths being disruptive, criminal, uneducated and 
disrespectful.  
151 
 
 
Surrounded by the everyday majority society, Klaus answered my questions with 
deliberation, criticizing the first generation more than the majority society. He talked 
about his father keeping his Korean passport and showing pride in being Korean that his 
son ridiculed. Klaus valued a German passport since “it makes it easier to travel”. He 
reduced a German passport to a piece of paper while his further comments indicated his 
ambiguity: Although he was a German national, in the eyes of the majority society he 
remained a foreigner. He didn’t consider himself as ‘fully German’ as those around us, 
nor as ‘fully Korean’ as his father. Instead, he explicitly stated that “we depend on two 
categories”, meaning Korea and Germany, “making us kyopos”. 
However within the informal setting of the party, it was precisely the arrival of several 
visible members of the majority society, which sparked resentment, and led to a less 
conciliatory debate about migrants. Contrary to the interview here, kyopos were the 
majority. When the roles were reversed, and visible Germans attended a party that 
though public, implicitly was designed to celebrate ‘kyoponess’, Klaus explicitly said 
that the Germans ‘just don’t belong here, and they’re not really participating either’, 
sounding reminiscent of the discourse used to debate the issues of migration and 
integration within the German public, only this time voiced about the attending 
Germans.  
Within the interview that took place in a situation in which kyopos were the visible 
minority, the discourse used, veiled the ambiguity of being a ‘rice-potato’, while it came 
to the fore at the kyopo party, organized by kyopos for kyopos so that kyopos could get 
together. The ambiguity of being German and yet not looking German- and open 
resentment- led to reflections on the most prominent group of migrants within Germany 
and comparisons. They criticised perceived underlying public attitudes when faced with 
the challenge of integrating migrants. To fully comprehend, this needs to be 
contextualised further by looking at the discourse surrounding the largest migrant group 
within Germany.  
 
6.2. Koreans are the ‘Good Foreigners’- the Kyopo Success Story 
‘Koreans are the good foreigners’, was a statement I often heard from my informants 
during my fieldwork. Being ‘the good foreigners’ means that there are ‘bad foreigners’, 
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and those are identified as the Turkish minority. Kyopos refer to the parent generation of 
Turks as ‘Anatolian peasants’ which implies a variety of different issues. A closer look 
at these implications helps beginning to explain how the kyopos contrast themselves 
with the Turkish minority. The kyopos are the ‘good foreigners’, while the Turkish 
minority make up the ‘bad foreigners’ that provide the foil for the educated, middle-
class Korean minority. In short, the kyopos stand for everything that the Turkish 
minority is not; they are everything that is ‘good’ and ‘desired’ in foreigners.  
Within the above framework, kyopos see themselves as having achieved all that a 
migrant second generation can achieve to integrate. They have successfully negotiated 
the pitfalls of conflicting cultures and found a resolution, showing the outward signs of 
success, such as educational success. Klaus, like all my informants, sees his future in 
Germany, where he lives, works and has friends and family. He, and others, frames 
himself in terms of civic citizenship. “Korea is far away,” he said, “and what our parents 
tell us about Korea doesn’t exist anymore. That makes it our parents ‘Korea’, doesn’t it? 
We go to Korea on holidays; our lives are here.’ Hence, Germany is ‘home’.”  
Kyopos stress the way they have come to adopt German values, explain their success by 
stressing the perceived similarity between German and Korean values to explain their 
own success. Using the image of the ‘Good Foreigner’, kyopos talk about themselves as 
having all the qualities desired by the majority society. “Koreans are cleverer than 
Turks, more intelligent, more diligent, better…” was how one of my informants 
summed up the success of the kyopos. He went on to doubt that the national crime 
statistics even had a number for kyopos
79
, pointing out the educational successes of the 
kyopos again; kyopos are the opposite of the Turkish minority.  
However, in the majority society discourses, the kyopos play a marginal role, and it is of 
little significance here, whether or not German society truly regards them in such a 
positive light. What is important here is the process of imagining themselves, as they 
are seen by others. “Identity is actually something formed through unconscious 
processes over time, rather than being innate in consciousness at birth. There is always 
something ‘imaginary’ about its unity. It always remains incomplete, is always in 
process. [...] Identity arises not so much from the fullness of identity, which is already 
inside us as individuals, but from a lack of wholeness which is filled from outside us, by 
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the way we imagine ourselves to be seen by others.” (Hall, 1996:287). Thus, narrating 
how the kyopos imagine the majority society sees them is a form of active imagining 
and positioning within the perceived discourses on integration and identity. To further 
explain the positioning of the kyopos within the discourse and highlight their success, I 
look at four themes: Secularism, language fluency, educational success, and the position 
and treatment of women. These four topics are a source of particular pride to the kyopos 
and situate them directly within the discourse on ‘good’ and ‘desired’ foreigners. It 
opposes kyopo modernity to Turkish backwardness, elevating the status of the second 
generation within the hierarchy of foreigners (Mandel, 2008).  
One of my informants was a founding member of the committee that organized the 
kyopo parties. As mentioned previously, most of the first generation in Germany either 
attended or attends various Christian churches, holding services in Korean. According 
to my informant, and others, the evangelical churches, once a meeting point for the 
second generation, had a tendency to splinter into different congregations
80
, frequently 
interrupting second-generation social networks, and at the exclusion of the Catholic 
second-generation. Most of my informants told me that they attended church mainly to 
meet their kyopo friends, having little or no interest in the actual (Korean-language) 
services, or being more interested in attending a church of their own choosing. Many of 
my informants identified as agnostic, atheist or apathetic, while others were believing, 
or nominal Christians. The co-founder of the party-committee told me that “one of the 
reasons we started these parties was to get everyone together, away from church, to 
have a space where we can socialize freely.” 
While no one ever said it overtly, the secular nature of socializing, and most of all the 
willingness to leave religion out, can be constructed as ‘modern’ and ‘German’, when 
contrasting it with the perception that the Turkish minority clings on to Islam as a 
justification for perceived backwardness. In socializing, kyopos rejected the constraints 
of religion, as the bulwark of negative tradition, while accepting the implicit Christian 
foundation of secularism (Asad, 1993).  
Fluency in the German language is a key way that the kyopos use to distinguish 
themselves from the Turkish second or third generation. At the party Klaus and Jens 
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repeatedly pointed out that ‘they don’t even speak German properly’. The kyopos on the 
other hand speak excellent German and are by and large native speakers. If German 
language, as Friedrich Merz (Schuhmann in Kavoori and Fraley, 2006:96) noted, is one 
of the three elements of German Leitkultur, then the kyopos have successfully mastered 
this element, while the Turkish minority hasn’t. The explanation behind the fact that 
most kyopos are native speakers, I have given in the previous chapter. What should be 
noted here though, is the making of a myth, reiterating parental sacrifice, and the parent 
generation’s willingness to be ‘good foreigners’ by making German the main language 
at home. Learning German was seen as an investment into the future, once more 
opposing the backwardness of the Turkish minority, not to say their unwillingness to 
sacrifice and adopt German, with the progressiveness and thereby success, of the 
Korean minority.  
Another element of the kyopo success story is education. 34% of all children in 
Germany attend gymnasium and leave school with the Abitur, a high-school 
qualification which enables them to go to university. Among the Turkish minority only 
10% of people of Turkish descent, and 2% of Turkish citizens in Germany obtain a 
university degree
81
. Almost all of my informants, with one exception, had gone through 
higher education, obtaining a university degree. Even that one exception however had 
still taken the necessary university entrance exams, Abitur. Compared to the Turkish 
minority, the educational successes of the kyopos are astounding
82
. Most of my 
informants explained the educational success with the Confucian influence, which the 
parent generation transmitted to the second generation, in which the poor scholar is 
better than the rich merchant. However such pride also stemmed from the previously 
mentioned educational hierarchy in Germany, and the admiration for the 
Bildungsbürgertum
83
, and the ascribed lack of migrant Bildungswille, and its underlying 
racial assumptions. Stressing education repeatedly therefore can be seen as an attempt to 
transcend racial hierarchies.  
My informants agreed that the above tenets made them upwardly mobile, while the 
Turkish minority remained backwards, socially static. To highlight the difference, they 
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contrast the first generation women’s situation to that of Turkish women, who are all 
seen as housewives and mothers, who never had to work in the majority society’s 
world, never had to learn German properly, and hence did not raise their children 
appropriately. Neither Jens, nor Klaus are alone in this perception. The first generation 
nurses are talked about as ‘pioneers’ and ‘heroines’ and the qualities of courage and 
determination are prized. Unlike the Turkish first generation women, the first generation 
Korean women were conceptualized as educated and future-oriented women, who 
influenced their children’s lives for the better. My female informants added that they 
stressed education for daughters. At the heart of this seems to a contradiction, insofar as 
that in informal chats about home and growing up, my informants were less flattering 
about their mothers’ different treatment for sons and daughters. However, in the 
unflattering comparisons made with the Turkish minority women, my informants 
glossed over what they considered minor, personal quibbles, which did not detract from 
the heroic narrative of brave pioneers that partly explained their own success. Compared 
to that, the Turkish minority women are perceived as voiceless, uneducated and 
oppressed. Kyopo men and kyopo women consider themselves equal. Kyopo women are 
not overtly oppressed, as the Turkish girls and women are conceptualized to be, but are 
educated, modern women who make their own choices. 
The kyopos are situating themselves within a majority-society led discourse to explain a 
perceived acceptance of German society for them. In the formal interview, Klaus 
employed the official discourse, telling the success story of the kyopos, as tale of 
migrant children that portrays modernity and integration. Educated, eloquent and 
middle-class, in the formal interview, Klaus reiterated the model of ‘co-existence’, 
showing his affluence and success, and thereby the kyopos’ success, by inviting me to 
an elegant bar, rather than a café or a pub. Korea was the past, Germany is the future, 
and ‘our lives are in Germany’. He situated himself very clearly, asserting his position 
as one of the successful kyopos, being eloquent, affluent and repeatedly refusing my 
offers to pay for his drink as a small sign of appreciation for letting me interview him. 
On the contrary, he insisted on footing the bill and being gentlemanly in holding doors 
and chairs for me. In the model that politician Friedrich Merz suggested, his treatment 
of me, as a woman, clearly defined his enlightened masculinity that fitted into the 
German model, opposed to the Turkish minority. Klaus made his priorities clear and 
repeatedly assured me that ‘our lives are in Germany’. Yet within the formal setting a 
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question lingered uncomfortably: Why do Germans need to integrate into German 
society?  
 
6.3. Remaining foreign in spite of being ‘good’- Kyopo everyday experiences of 
being an Ausländer 
 
So far, much has been made of the self-description ‘kyopo’, as an alternative to 
monolithic conceptions of ‘Germanness’ and ‘Koreanness’. But, even though its 
meaning has altered for the kyopos, at its heart lies a sense of ascribed foreignness. In 
this section, I look at everyday experiences of being conceptualized as a ‘foreigner’. 
This needs to be contextualized by looking at hegemonic ideas of German ethnicity, and 
how ethnic Germans perceive Germans of other ethnicities. Particularly looking towards 
the Afro-German
84
 experiences will help shedding light onto the kyopo experience of 
being ‘othered’ and perceived as a foreigner. This also raises the question of ethnic 
expectations that come with being ‘othered’. The discourses surrounding ‘looking 
German’ furthermore necessitate a closer look at gender, and the way in which 
foreigners are gendered.  
While the kyopos utilize the official discourse and situate themselves as successful 
within it, creating a hierarchy of migrants based on it, at the same time they share many 
experiences with other migrant groups. Yet, the societal discourse on migration and 
integration disregards the very real implications that prevailing attitudes towards 
migrants have. Pushing integration debates into the cultural realm does not defuse 
situations of everyday discrimination or the feeling of being rejected by the majority 
society. These are experiences the kyopos make in everyday life, being reminded that 
they are visible, easily identified as foreigners, meaning that they don’t truly belong and 
need to justify their presence.  
As previously mentioned, constantly being asked where one comes from ‘originally’ 
was a point of shared experience, and connection between kyopos. Annoying or 
amusing as my informants found these instances, while subtly serving as a reminder of 
phenotypical difference, the majority of my informants claimed to never have 
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encountered overt racism. Being called “Schlitzauge” [slit-eyes] as a child by other 
children was the experience the majority of my informants cited as instances for 
experiencing overt ‘othering’. Another shared experience was, Frankfurt being a magnet 
for tourists, waiters and shop-assistants addressing my informants in English, assuming 
that they were tourists. Tales like Anne’s were common: 
“I was trying to find my way around [part of town], and must have looked a bit 
lost, so a guy approached me and asked me in English, if he could help me. It 
was so obvious that he was German, but he was nice and I didn’t want to 
embarrass him, so I played along.”  
Or Christina:  
“The waiter thought he was being nice and polite speaking English to me. He 
looked really stunned [vedutzt] when I answered him in German. But then he 
also thought it was funny. [Aber dann fand er’s auch witzig]” 
The kyopos do not look German, but are othered. They are visible and therefore 
identifiable as ‘the other’. Visualism of this sort, marks the ideological process, which 
reduces race and ethnicity to physical properties so that ‘ways of looking’ become 
‘ways of being’ (Yue, 2000:178) that are imposed from the outside. “They,” according 
to Johanna, meaning the Germans, “cannot distinguish between the different 
nationalities. They can’t tell a Chinese or Thai from a Korean.” While this is a 
generalization and a stereotype in itself, Johanna refers to the experience of being 
labelled ‘Asian’ or ‘Chinese’, rather than ‘Korean’ or ‘kyopo’, which she resented. 
However, in Germany, stereotypes about Asians, as my informants experienced them as 
children, were conflated to stereotypes about the Chinese. Such stereotypes can be 
found when looking at a particular children’s song that I had to sing in school, when I 
was a child. A non-representative poll amongst friends and acquaintances, and my 
informants told me that they all had to sing this song. The lyrics go:  
“Three Chinese with a double-bass, 
sitting on the street chattering, 
then came the police: What is happening here?  
Three Chinese with a double-bass.”  
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There are eight stanzas to the song, which repeats the same lyrics over and over, 
consecutively replacing the vowels with the monophthongs found in the German 
language, i.e.: a, e, i, o, u, ä, ö, and ü. Whether this has any educational value or not, as 
a child, I shared the experience of having to sing this song with the majority of friends, 
acquaintances and informants. While few of the ethnic Germans ever thought much by 
it, for the kyopos, this song has the implication that a gathering of three Chinese men 
with a musical instrument, who do something innocent, already causes a public 
disturbance and requires policing. Thus, having often been identified as ‘Chinese’, 
kyopos learned as children that their presence required justification and was out of the 
ordinary, while their peers learned that this was normal.  
A group that poignantly shares the same predicament, yet is devalued by the kyopos, as 
Alex pointed out at the party, are blacks in Germany, or Afro-Germans. People who are 
visibly identifiable as ‘the other’ are regarded with caution to the extent that ‘Afro-
Germans, Asian Germans, Sinti Germans and other hyphenated Germans seem not to 
count as part of the German population’ (Opitz, 1992:136). For most of these groups 
that means that in spite of their citizenship and having grown up in Germany, they are 
not recognized within society and because they appear to be foreigners they are most 
often treated as such, being made to feel that they do not really belong. Asante (Asante 
in Blackshire-Belay, 1996) underlines this situation with an anecdote, when the then 
German Chancellor Kohl replied to an African German’s question by speaking of the 
way his government was dealing with immigrants, whereupon the querist reminded him 
that he was a German. However to the chancellor, he did not look German, having 
internalized the racialist conception of Germanness. Kyopos face the same challenge in 
everyday life, not looking German, and being identified as foreign and treated 
accordingly. Thus, integration is still perceived of more as a one-sided process of 
foreigners accommodating themselves to German society than as a reciprocal process of 
mutual rapproachment in which German society must also find a new identity, one not 
based on exclusion and separation (Opitz, 1992).  
Yue (2000) recounts a conversation with an Afro-German that almost word for word 
repeats what Johanna recounted, ending with: ‘But you don’t look German (2000:175).’ 
Not looking German and having that pointed out to them is an experience the kyopos 
share with the Afro-Germans, who from childhood onwards realize that their 
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background is seen as unusual. Thus, on grounds of their appearance, they are forced to 
grapple with their identity in German society, a society that essentially considers itself 
white. In fact, it is almost impossible for both Afro-Germans and kyopos to meet the 
expectations of those that have them, but speak perfect German, have German names 
and live a very normal everyday German existence (1992:141). Schultz in Opitz (1992) 
quotes an interview she conducted with Afro-German women, where one of them says:  
“…people find you interesting because of your colour, and because they expect 
that there’s an exciting story behind it. A lot of people assume that I have a 
particular relationship to Africa, even when I explain that I have never lived 
there. They tell me that they were in Africa, took a drumming workshop, and are 
fascinated with how Africans dance…I always wonder why they’re telling me 
this. (1992:149)” 
Many of my informants narrated the same or similar experiences. ‘Koreanness’ 
becomes externalized, raising an expectation of being different, placing the onus of 
accepting that difference and acknowledging one’s foreignness upon the othered. 
Conversely, ‘Koreanness’ used to be most often identified with ‘Chineseness’, although 
only roughly 6000 people of Chinese origin live in Germany (Yue, 2000:186). Different 
Asians are often homogenized into one monolithic concept that is ‘Asian’ (Espiritu, 
1997). In Germany, ‘Asian’ is often identified to be synonymous with Chinese. What is 
Chinese is seemingly identified easily thanks to an abundance of Chinese restaurants, 
sporting red lanterns, golden dragons and sometimes pavilion ceilings (Yue, 2000:186). 
Yet, these interior designs reflect the German idea of what ‘Chinese’ looks like, being 
designed by German interior designers, whereas more subtle designs are considered 
‘inauthentic (2000:186)”. 
When discussing the negotiations of identity amongst second generation Chinese and 
Korean Americans, Kibria (2000) makes the point that her informants only became 
aware of their difference via expectations of ethnic knowledge, requiring the need to 
explain themselves. For the kyopos these ethnic expectations extend to being asked 
whether they speak Korean, or people assuming that they must be good at Taekwondo.  
“People are shocked when I tell them that I don’t speak Korean.” Johanna commented 
on such expectations. “They find that incredible. Or Taekwondo. It’s not like we’re all 
masters at that, is it? Can you do Taekwondo?” She and others laughed such instances 
off, calling the Germans silly for such expectations, at the same time the laughter often 
wore thin and bitter.  
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Others recounted similar experiences. Sarah said that:  
“people find you exotic and interesting, and are always curious. Where are you 
from? How long have you been here? It can be annoying, so I deal with it by 
telling them that my parents are Korean, but I am German.”  
Constantly being faced with the expectation of difference, being displaced within one’s 
own society, leads to different strategies of adaptation. At its worst this means 
internalizing the racism directed at them (Opitz, 1992:140). Many Afro-Germans 
respond to the racism of their society by attempting to adapt to societal stereotypes that 
determine the image of Blacks, allowing themselves to be cast as affable, spirited, funny 
and wild types who add flavour to the lives of white people (1992:141).  
The majority society has ethnic expectations and also judges the authenticity of those 
they have ‘othered’. Kyopos are judged on the basis of their looks and are not only 
expected to be different, but different in a way that will support preconceived notions 
and prejudices. Kyopos may be ‘the Good Foreigners’, and situate themselves within the 
discourse of successful integration, comparing themselves to the Turkish minority, but 
they are still foreigners. Telling, however, is the fact that Johanna and others often used 
blatant stereotypes and generalizations about the ‘silly Germans’, as a way of coping 
with the sense of displacement.  
At the party, in a space removed from everyday life, a space in which the ethnic 
expectations from the outside were removed and replaced with own expectations, those 
identified as ‘Germans’ were considered an intrusion. The ‘potatoes’ could be identified 
visually analogous to the way kyopos are usually identified as ‘the Other’. The felt gaze 
that kyopos feel in everyday life, demanding justification for their presence, in this case 
turned against the present Germans, who were seen to be intruding. One could say that 
the Germans became the Ausländer, the ones that do not belong on the basis of their 
phenotypical appearance, and the ethnic expectations that come with them. In this sense, 
it was a reversal of roles, and the subsequent conversation that revealed the complexity 
of the kyopos’ situation. Contrary to what Klaus said in the formal interview, it depends 
on more than two categories. It situates the kyopos not between German and Korean, but 
within a much broader framework, in which discourses on German and non-German, 
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backwardness and modernity, good and bad, masculinity and femininity, and ethnic 
expectations play out.  
Klaus, at the party, in contrast to the interview setting, did not stress the idea of co-
existence, but openly denounced the presence of Germans. He claimed that they were 
“taking over” and “not participating”. Again, one could say that he was situated within a 
particular discourse, however this time, his choice of words sounds reminiscent of 
calling the Turkish minority ‘unintegrable’ and refusing to participate in German 
society. “Not one of them is dancing,” Klaus complained. In short, the present non-
kyopos failed to assimilate, and hence could not be integrated into the normal 
proceedings of the party. However, they could not be part of that party, because they 
were immediately identified as ‘the Other’.  
Jens pointed out to him that the party was indeed open to the public, and described all 
kyopos present as ‘rice-potatoes’, returning in a joking manner to the idea of a 
hyphenated identity, akin to ‘Asian-American’ or ‘Afro-German’. He qualified his 
statement quickly though by claiming that the non-kyopos were only there for the cheap 
beer, after no one picked up on his conciliatory attempt. My fieldwork notes say that the 
atmosphere was uncomfortable, mirroring what Klaus said about the present Germans 
ruining the atmosphere. No one truly wanted to engage with the fact that non-kyopos 
were present. Thus the conversation turned to the safer and established discourse on the 
kyopos being ‘the good foreigners’, and the hierarchy of migrants within Germany. In 
short, the experience of rejection came to the fore when the minority/majority roles 
were reversed, but the coping strategy was to participate in the dominant discourse, and 
accepting the underlying racist assumptions as providing enough leeway for continued 
success.  
 
6.4. ‘I even have Chopsticks’- Gendered Limitations of transcending Foreignness.  
 
In this section, I look at the construction of ethnicity along gendered lines, which 
renders a particular group as a whole effeminate, to contextualise the events at the 
kyopo party. The dominant discourse on masculinity is a discourse on German 
masculinity, from which the kyopo men feel excluded on the basis of being ‘othered’. 
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German masculinity is modern, compared to backwards Turkish masculinity that 
oppresses women. It is constructed as opposed to an atavistic, juvenile, Islamic, 
suppressive and so forth Other masculinity (Schuhmann, 2006:95).  
The discourses of progressiveness and atavism are often symbolized in the icon of the 
Western white emancipated woman and the gender-sensitive white man. The assumedly 
natural born chauvinistic non-Western man and his victimized Other woman serve as 
contrast foils for white phantasms of their own advanced civilization (Schuhmann, 
2006:91). Unlike the Turkish minority, Asians do not quite fit into this framework, but 
are feminized. Chan (1972:68) writes about the stereotype of the emasculated Asian 
man that,  
“The white stereotype of Asians is unique in that it is the only racial stereotype 
completely devoid of manhood. Our nobility is that of an efficient housewife. At 
worst we are contemptible because we are womanly, effeminate, devoid of all 
the traditional masculine qualities of originality, daring, physical courage, 
creativity.”  
Kyopo men can claim modernity through their treatment of women, but within the 
discourse on masculinity they are emasculated, fitting neither the idea of real German 
men, nor being the threatening Other man. There is neither a positive nor negative 
definition for kyopo masculinity within this discourse. The conflation of societal 
discourses and of discourses on masculinity that restricts kyopo men’s agency: On the 
one hand, they do not fit the definition of German masculinity due to their physical 
appearance, on the other hand, claiming the opposing masculinity, which is constructed 
as threatening, oppressive and mainly Turkish, would undermine their claim to 
successful integration and modernity.  
In the absence of ‘bad’ kyopo masculinity, in the perception of the majority society, the 
position of kyopo women is dependent on German notions of women and femininity. 
Kyopo women are subject to the same ideas that circumscribe German femininity, but 
they are also othered. While Asians in general are considered gentle and effeminate, 
Asian women in particular are subject to an ongoing process of orientalization. Some of 
my female informants regarded these experiences as positive, as making them “more 
interesting”. Johanna, in a previous chapter, related how she would call herself 
“Korean” while studying abroad, using her “excoticness” to her advantage. Positioning 
herself as Korean, she felt, gave her an advantage over other Germans.  
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This incident is telling about how identities are situational, and depend upon 
positioning, however other situations shows the limits of free positioning. Most of my 
female informants had a few stories to tell about dating experiences with German men, 
which are telling. Johanna told me about an incident, where she had met a seemingly 
nice young man at a party.  
“[...] So I told him that my parents came from Korea. He invited me for dinner, 
and told me: ‘I even have chopsticks!’ What do you say to that? I have a knife 
and fork at home? Can you tell me what he was expecting? What was that all 
about?” 
Christina told me about a proposed blind date.  
“My friend told him that my parents were from Korea, and said to me that his 
response was, that Korean girls always have such pretty hair and skin. I wasn’t 
impressed. It just rubbed me the wrong way.” 
Sophie:  
“A friend of a friend was quite drunk at a party. He told me that he normally 
doesn’t go for Asian girls and doesn’t find them pretty at all. As in, none of 
them. Right, because goodness knows how many billion women all look the 
same! And then, he told me that I am the only exception, because I’m really, 
really pretty. What? Seriously? I should have said that I don’t normally go for 
idiots, but you’re really pretty too.” 
My informants laughed such incidents off, as ‘guys being stupid’, but beyond the 
awkwardness of misguided mating behaviour, there is racial stereotyping, and 
objectification at play. In this context, one of Johanna’s assertions- that Germans can’t 
distinguish between a Thai woman and a Korean woman- is particularly important. 
Looking at Thai women, and how the majority society perceives them, will make the 
importance clearer.  
In Germany, the prevalent image of Thai women is that of a ‘mail order bride’, once she 
is within Germany. Thailand itself evokes images of German men going on sex-tourism 
trips to Bangkok. Although the number of Thais constitutes a small fraction of all 
foreigners in Germany, the overwhelming majority of Thai women migrate either as sex 
workers or as wives. Since 1975, increasing numbers of Thai women have migrated to 
Germany with their German husbands (Piper, 2003:54). The majority of these Thai 
women are badly educated, expresses little interest in learning German and intend to 
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return to Thailand eventually (Piper, 2003). They are known as ‘mail order’ or 
‘catalogue’ brides, which has acquired pejorative meanings.  
The mail-order bride business celebrates the myth of oriental, subservient femininity, 
boasting that Asian women are faithful, docile and exotic (Simons in Kelson & DeLaet, 
1999:132). Dating websites offer explanations for the growth of the mail order bride 
industry. Free information on the internet gives advice ‘for the purpose of helping men’, 
and explain that more men want mail order brides today because of men’s unhappiness 
with Western women (Simons, 1999). Men, apparently cannot find the kind of wives 
they want, because the women have chosen for themselves a career path other than that 
of wife, for which the feminist movement is to blame (1999:129). The white women’s 
movements have created a backlash for which patriarchy is taking issue in justifying the 
conquest of Third World women (Tolentino, 1996).  
One ad, quoted in Simons (1999) reads: “Congratulations, you have taken the first step 
toward discovery of an eternal treasure that will happen when you find your number one 
Asian lady, whose main objective in life is to please her husband. The enthusiasm 
shown and the pleasure they derive in accomplishing this goal is almost embarrassing.” 
But it is only ‘almost embarrassing’, not plainly wrong in objectifying an Asian woman. 
The position of women in the business is clarified in another ad that asks: “Where else 
will you find a girl who will clean your toenails with a toothbrush?” (Meng, 1994).  
Notably, the Asian woman here becomes a ‘girl’, not an adult, and her position is quite 
clearly at her husband’s feet. The Asian ‘girl’ is not a “modern European women in the 
twenty-first century” (Schuhmann, 2006:97) that real German men need no enlightening 
in dealing with, but a childlike object that delights in submission and knows her place. 
Notably in two of the above examples from my informants, the men used the word ‘girl’ 
to refer to the women, who very much consider themselves ‘modern European women 
in the twenty-first century’, and not ‘Asian girls’ that conform to the stereotypes their 
conversation partners possibly had in mind.  
A stark example for the objectification of Asian, and especially Thai women comes 
from a German dating website. The site puts great stress on how Thai women like to 
“spoil their husbands”, which makes them “the best sort of woman you could wish for”. 
Thai women are praised as “positive women, very friendly, always entertaining and a 
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true addition to your family.
85” The blatant stereotyping in the first part of the latter 
sentence aside, ‘they are a true addition to your family’ [Eine wahre Bereicherung für 
die Familie] is a phrase usually used in Germany to describe the acquisition of pets. The 
language used commodifies Thai women, reducing them to the status of, albeit 
generally beloved, animals, like loyal dogs who faithfully obey their master’s 
commands.  “Women in Thailand are different than other women,” the German site 
cited above claims, and goes on to say: “not only because of skin colour and looks, but 
an important part of being different is their culture and their attitude towards life.” As 
one continues reading the site, Thai women are praised for being family-oriented, 
helpful, friendly and respectful towards their husbands. In short, they are the antithesis 
to ‘other women’, which presumably in this context means German women. The 
mention of skin colour, combined with ‘attitude to life’, which is clarified as meaning 
‘spoiling their husbands’, makes the Other woman a commodity that does not belong to 
the German collectivity, and hence treatment of her does not define German 
masculinity. The Other woman in this case becomes the object of powerful fantasies of 
conquest, whose homeland becomes “every single man’s paradise, where the main 
activity is chasing and conquering the fairer sex” (Tolentino, 1996:69). She becomes an 
object for a fantasy in which a German man “always has the upper hand in dealings with 
Asian women” (1996:69).   
“Women are usually the creatures of a male power fantasy. They express unlimited 
sensuality, they are more or less stupid, and above all, they are willing.” Said 
(1978:207) writes about the project of Orientalism, and the Other woman. This 
stereotype informs Johanna’s stereotype on several levels. On the one hand, she asserts 
that Germans as a whole are unable to distinguish between different ethnicities when it 
comes to Asians, on the other hand, she refers to a stereotype about Thai women, which 
she opposes with Korean women’s moral superiority. One of Hyung’s (2008) 
informants, who is a German-Korean actress, says:  
“It is another disadvantage that I am only ever seen as an Asian woman. Alas, 
that is a big problem. That’s why I no longer attend castings where I would need 
to play a Thai prostitute. It doesn’t matter how well I could play the role, I just 
don’t look like a Thai woman.” (2008:154) 
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Being mistaken for a Thai woman is considered insulting by kyopos, as it implicitly 
challenges their success of integrating and the successful identity they construct for 
themselves. Being labelled ‘Thai’ calls into question the morality, education and 
language skills of kyopo women, means slipping in the hierarchy of migrants and 
suddenly no longer being recognized as ‘the good foreigners’. It means being devalued, 
explicitly objectified and considered loose. Thai women are the negative Other women 
to kyopo women, who are educated, successful and modern.  
For kyopo males the implications of having ‘their’ women tarred with the same brush as 
Thai women adds insult to injury. They are emasculated in majority society, considered 
effeminate and seen to be lacking the perceived masculine traits of aggressiveness and 
authority, while ‘their’ women are the objects of male fantasies for other men. At the 
kyopo party my informants repeated the statement that the non-kyopos were only present 
“to check out the girls.” Jens’s conciliatory statements about the beer as a motive for 
their being there did nothing to make their presence less dubious. Aware of their own 
status, my circle of informants felt threatened by the German men, and suspected them 
of having come for sexual adventures. My informants’ grumblings grew loud when they 
observed those they had identified as ‘German’ watching the dancers rather than 
participating. In the framework of the objectification of Asian women, they commented 
on what they observed by objecting to it. Their presence obviously was no threat to the 
Germans, who did not accord them masculinity anyway, while the Germans were there 
to ‘check out’ the sexualized Asian women. In this case it was the way that my 
informants perceived ‘their’ women to be positioned that belied the success story of 
integration. Instead, the kyopo men felt marginalized and proceeded to comment to ‘just 
wait till it gets late enough and they’re drunk enough to dance’. This implies Dutch 
courage
86
, which also by implication, a kyopo man doesn’t need, hence asserting a 
superior form of masculinity.  
There is a darker, uncomfortable undercurrent, if one bears in mind Hyung’s (2008) and 
my assertion in the previous chapter, regarding marriage and relationship patterns 
among kyopos. While these remain to be explored, at the time of my fieldwork, all of 
my female informants in relationships, had German partners. My male informants were 
either single, or had a Korean/Japanese girlfriend who was a student at the university. 
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My female informants explained their partner choices in different ways, some like 
Sophie, being vocal about finding kyopo men spoilt, because of doting Korean mothers, 
others like Sarah explaining that “you can’t choose who you fall in love with”, or 
“German men don’t expect you to do every little thing for them”. Still others, like 
Kathrin would have preferred a kyopo, but “the choice is limited”. While the fact that all 
my female informants in relationships had a German boyfriend, partner or husband, 
goes to show that the majority society isn’t homogenous in its objectification, it 
appeared to create an underlying tension with the male kyopos.  
Not only were ‘their’ women the objects of male fantasies for other men, while popular 
culture denies manhood to Asian men, it endows Asian women with an excess of 
‘womanhood’, sexualizing them, but the presence of ‘potatoes’ served as an 
uncomfortable reminder that even ‘their’ women seemed87 to reject them. In this 
process both sexism and racism have blended together to produce the sexualisation of 
white racism (Wong, 1978:260). Linking images of Asian men and women, Elaine Kim 
(1990) suggested that Asian women are portrayed as sexual for the same reason that 
men are asexual: “Both exist to define the white man’s virility and the white man’s 
superiority” (1990:70). These underlying currents in conjunction with female partner 
choices, at the party, manifested in resentment.  
The conversation at the party puts kyopo women into an awkward position. Cast as 
sexually available, Asian women become yet another possession of the white man, who 
are passive, subservient, dependent and domestic (Espiritu, 1997:97). Kyopo women are 
caught between the danger of being stigmatized as stupid, promiscuous and objectified 
as ‘Asian woman’, and the discourse on being ‘good foreigners’, while at the same time 
serving as a foil to kyopo masculinity. In order to participate in all discourses, kyopo 
women need to assert their superiority by rejecting the socially constructed ideal ‘Asian 
woman’ in majority society.  
Kyopo women are caught between the need to expose the problems of male privilege 
and the desire to unite with the kyopo men to challenge the overarching racial ideology 
that confines them both. At the same time their achievements as being modern, 
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independent and educated are conflated with kyoponess as a whole. This harkens back 
to Elaine Kim’s (1993) stance that it was easy for her as a “Korean American female to 
accept the fixed masculinist Asian American identity posited in Asian American 
cultural nationalism, even when it rendered invisible or at least muted women’s 
oppression, anger, and ways of loving because I could see in everyday life that not all 
material and psychic violence to women of colour comes from men, and because, as my 
friends used to say, ‘No Chinese [American] has ever called me a “gook” (1993:x) 
In the next section, I will discuss discourses about German/Korean people. Due to the 
marriage patterns already mentioned, these discourses deserve a closer exploration.  
 
6.5. ‘Treason and other Opportunities’- ‘Korean’ Racial Prejudices and 
Articulating Possibility  
 
“May I ask you a personal question?” Melanie was worried. She and her German 
husband were considering starting a family. “Growing up, did you ever resent your 
mother?” 
Of course I had, especially as a teenager. At the time, everything was so unfair. “That’s 
not what I mean,” Melanie said, and hesitating, told me what was truly on her mind. 
“Did you ever resent her for being Korean? For making you, you know, mixed 
[gemischt]? Wasn’t that difficult for you? How did people react? Did you resent her for 
it?” 
While an in-depth discussion about the children of German/Korean
88
 couples would far 
exceed the scope of this work, it is helpful to use perceptions other kyopos have of them 
as a lens, to better understand the complex discourses at the party, concerning the 
hierarchy of migrants, and the articulation of kyopo identity. In this section, I discuss 
Korean racial hierarchies, the changing perception of German/Koreans, and the way 
discussions about them reveal tensions and the possibilities to articulate hybridity.  
“My parents would be fine, if I brought a German boyfriend home,” Christina 
told me, “but they would have an apoplexy, if I brought home a boyfriend whose 
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skin was darker than mine. I was friends with an Afro-German, and my mother 
begged me not to start a relationship with him. She said that it would cause 
nothing but trouble, and people would look down on me, and therefore her. 
Which people? Neighbours, church, her friends...It used to be that going out with 
a German was bad, but people are still prejudiced.”  
A few of my female informants told me that their parents would be displeased, 
especially if they began a relationship with a Turkish-German or an Afro-German. 
“Koreans are prejudiced”, they would say in the way of an explanation, echoing Klaus, 
or “it’s to do with Koreans not liking to mix blood”, while others said that concern 
motivated their parents, like Christina’s, saying that “people [Germans and Koreans] 
wouldn’t treat us, and possible children, very nicely.”  
“It used to be the same way for German/Korean Mischlinge [mixed blood 
children], but now everyone thinks they’re so pretty. Back in Korea, you either 
have to have plastic surgery or be a mixed-blood-child to become a model. It’s 
because they have bigger eyes, and look more Western, so they’re considered 
very attractive these days. Western, but not too foreign. Koreans used to be very 
close-minded and prejudiced about mixed-blood-children, but now it’s 
fashionable. Better even if you’re half German and half Korean. Koreans in 
Korea regard Germany highly, they think it’s cultured, refined, hard-working 
and exports only quality goods. If you’re half American, half Korean, it’s not so 
good. Koreans don’t like Americans anymore, because of the military bases in 
Korea, and the way they act, as if they own the place. But German/Korean is 
good.”   
Like many of my informants, the one quoted above, used the word Mischling without 
hesitation in their description of what they perceived as a Korean hierarchy of 
acceptable intermarriage. The Korean equivalent to Mischling is “Hon-Hyol- Ah” 
[mixed blood child], and unlike my kyopo informants, the Korean friends who told me, 
were keenly aware that it is a derogatory term. The negative implications hark back to 
the days of the hermit kingdom, the taboo for women to associate with foreigners, and 
Korean nationalism. The Korean nation is constituted in a narrative centring upon blood 
and soil, evoking very strong emotional responses. Korean women are symbolic of the 
nation, embodying the ‘good wife, wise mother’ ideal, which already implies the bearer 
170 
 
 
of the nation and thus the purity of blood, which will guarantee that Koreans are indeed 
of one blood. Kim (1998) Thus, jokingly, several of my informants told me that my 
mother had committed ‘treason’, when marrying my father and having a Mischling. 
Much eye-rolling accompanied those jokes to clarify that this used to be the parent-
generation’s stance. But there was ambivalence:  
 “I used to envy Mischlinge. Why? You’ve got it easier, don’t you? It’s easier for 
you to integrate, because you’re mixed, because you don’t look that different. 
You’re more relatable for the Germans, because you’re different, but not too 
different. Exotic enough to be interesting, but not too exotic, so you fit in easier, 
don’t you?” 
Or:  
“I think Mischlinge have it harder, because you’re neither this really, nor the 
other. The ones I know, I would say, are totally German. But it’s like they’re 
missing something, because they’re not really completely German. They still 
look different, they still carry a bit of Korea around. And I think sooner or later, 
they all start searching, and become interested in Korea.” 
While it would be interesting to oppose a few German/Korean voices, the point here is 
not who is right, or indeed if there is a right or wrong, but to illustrate the similarities 
with the German discourse in chapter 3 about Negermischlinge and racial hierarchies, in 
which the kyopos situate themselves, and others. What the discussion about Mischlinge 
shows, are not only the ‘Korean’ prejudices my informants were always quick to deride, 
but also an internalized, essentialized notion of what it means to be ‘Korean’ and what it 
means to be ‘German’, which Mischlinge seemingly flaunted.  German/Korean persons 
were conceptualized as not feeling “the sharp edges of ethnicity” (Hyung, 2008) as 
much, as even being “fashionable”, and yet oddly deficient. The Mischling discussion 
throws light onto the limits of identity negotiation for kyopos from a ‘Korean’ 
perspective that is strikingly similar to the German construction of Germanness. 
‘Koreanness’ comes with its own ethno-cultural understanding and racial hierarchy, 
which resembles ‘Germanness’ in its essence, and thus seemingly limiting kyopo 
identity. The logical conclusion would be an identity crisis.  
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But what the discussion also shows, especially Melanie’s hesitant questions, is an 
awareness of the negativity of racial hierarchies, Korean or German, and the attempt to 
negotiate a changing understanding. Melanie’s carefully expressed fear of resentment 
from her future children with a German, indicates awareness of the negative, racist 
implications of being cast as a ‘mixed blood child’, not only by the majority society, but 
within the Korean minority. The first generation, like Mrs Pak and others, used to think 
badly of Korean nurses with German men. The second generation are negotiating 
moving away from Korean racial hierarchies, while trapped in a German one, using 
German/Koreans, their perceived inherent hybridity and the changing perceptions 
around them, as a possible gap between the two hierarchies, to articulate ambiguity and 
possibilities for themselves. ‘Korea’, in this case, is not the Korea of timeless traditions, 
but serves as an example for how even this seemingly timeless repository of 
legitimation can change, questioning the structures that limit kyopo identity, and 
creating room for negotiation and positioning.  
The ambiguity and difficulty of articulation was present at the party. Alex said that 
“Koreans don’t like black people, but they like the music,” and “only black people 
really can dance to that [R’n’B music].” He summed up the prejudice and racist 
expectation in one, and proceeded to point out that “Koreans always think they’re better 
than everyone.” Equally, Klaus said that within the setting of the formal interview. 
“Koreans just have prejudices, left, right and centre.” However, again one has to bear in 
mind the different settings. In the setting of the bar, and in an interview, devaluing the 
parent generation’s prejudices and preconceived notions meant fitting into the discourse 
on successful migrant integration. He situated himself in opposition to the Turkish 
example where children seemingly accept the parent generation’s ideals and prejudices, 
and thereby fail to integrate. Klaus was talking about his position within the German 
hierarchy of migrants. 
Jens’ statement about ‘rice-potatoes’ reveals more, in the context of a kyopo party. 
Jokes can be telling about serious, underlying issues, just as the jokes about my mother 
committing ‘treason’ were indicative. What the brief discussion of Korean prejudices 
and racial ideas show, is the tension that the static concepts of Koreanness, and 
Germanness create, in which the hybridity of ‘rice-potato’ that German/Koreans are 
seemingly inherently living, provides an opportunity. 
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6.6. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I attempted to show the complexities of identity negotiation within a 
framework of essentialized identities, imagined outward ascriptions and experienced 
outward ascriptions, in which kyopos position themselves. I argue that the German 
discourse on integration and identity offered the kyopos an opportunity to present 
themselves successfully as foreigners, denying full Germanness. They cannot fulfil the 
demand of taking on a German identity. Being kyopo offers an alternative to monolithic 
conceptualizations of ‘Korean’ and ‘German’, and negotiates the prevalent rhetoric on 
culture clashes and identity crises, or “not feeling at home in both cultures” (Hyung, 
2008:139). But it fails to question the underlying hierarchies, ideas and gender roles, 
even though subtly challenging them. Ultimately though, it means being an Ausländer 
in the eyes of the majority society, because: “immigrants carry their foreignness in their 
faces” (Stolcke, 1995:8). 
The politics of identity combine notions of a fixed and inalterable original culture with 
notions of migration, change and transformation. Nationalist conceptions of identity are 
simultaneously challenged and conformed to, relying on narratives of an original core 
culture. (Fortier, 2000:96). Tentatively, and by way of discussing their own racial 
stereotypes, looking to the change in Korean perceptions of mixed marriages and their 
children, the second generation engages in articulating ambiguity and possibilities for 
identity and identification. They are aware of being marginalized in German society, 
and explore possibilities of situating themselves. If change is possible within the 
seemingly timeless repository of tradition, i.e.: Korea, the possibility may exist in 
Germany. It is a possibility particularly pertinent for the second generation of women.  
 Kyopo men and women experience such issues in different ways. Majority society 
discourses utilize women as objects rather than as part of society, making Germanness 
intrinsically male. And the kyopos use much of the same discourse to prove their own 
success. When kyopo women speak, gendered difference of experience is pushed to the 
background. They tend to unite with kyopo men against the conceptions and 
constructions that define them both. But: being kyopo is experienced in different ways 
for kyopo men and kyopo women. They are both identified as ‘the Other’, but while the 
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former are desexualized and emasculated, the latter fear being objectified and tarred 
with the same brush as the stereotypical and racist views of Thai women indicate.  
Currently, the kyopos- both women and men- are trapped in a discourse that denies them 
full ‘Germanness’, and offers an opportunity only by accepting the label ‘foreigner’. 
Full ‘Germanness’ not being flexible enough, or even available as an identity, kyopo 
identity serves not only as a continuation with the parent generation, but also as 
alternative to “one’s ascription by others” (Jenkins, 1996:20). In this discourse that 
problematizes foreigners, pitching themselves against the Turkish second and third 
generation, is a way of making the best of a bad situation, negotiating an alternative 
identity.  
In the next chapter, I will further explore the complexities of identity negotiation among 
kyopos, by looking at a space removed from both the parent generation, and the 
everyday German environment. By looking at a karaoke bar as a popular spot for 
socializing, I aim to explain how the kyopos synthesize ‘Koreanness’ and ‘Germanness’, 
as relevant to their lives through performance, creating both community and identity.   
 
 
7.“Doing Karaoke, Doing Identity”: Performing Kyopo Identity 
 
At any first generation Korean gathering in a private home, the place to be if you are a 
child is in the kitchen. Men, relegated to the living room, sit, drink beer and talk 
politics, while the women make food, share recipes, exchange the latest gossip and tales 
about the old days and how it used to be in Korea when they were young. As a child 
you get the obvious benefit of being pampered, petted and the first to try all sorts of 
freshly prepared food, and you get the most interesting tales about Korea, and how 
‘things’ are done there.  
But the timeless parental Korea, where ‘things’ are done in a certain way only exists in 
tales, in the kitchen and during two hours, on Sunday. Identities are always linked to the 
context in which they are lived and therefore are dynamic in formation, meaning that 
they are grounded in the mundane details of social interaction, habits, routines and 
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practical knowledge (Edensor, 2002:17). Particular places can serve as signifiers of 
identity, while equally serving as an intersection for individual paths to congregate. 
Such spaces stabilize social relations in time-space (Gren, 2001:217) and are produced 
through habit, relying on unreflexive, familiar routines in which meaning becomes 
sedimented in time as successive social and cultural contexts are materialised, 
remembered, projected and performed upon space (Edensor, 2002:56).  
Having looked at the way in which kyopo identity is shaped in the previous chapter by 
contrasting the second generation with the parent generation, and by interactions with 
the majority society, in this chapter I look at the way in which kyopo identity is 
constructed and performed in a kyopo space. I ask why there is a need for such spaces. I 
look at the setting of a karaoke bar as a space where kyopo identity, away from the first 
generation and the broader German society, is performed and through performance 
negotiated. In order to explore this process of negotiation and gain an understanding, I 
briefly look to narratives about visits to Korea and food, to explore a realization of 
hybridity among the second generation, necessitating a creative negotiation of identity 
that encompasses different experiences, not shared with the parent generation. The 
feeling of discontinuity with the parental ‘Korea’ and the everyday experiences make 
the karaoke bar a significant place for the negotiation of identity. I ask how the kyopos 
negotiate identity through performance, and explore the different ways in which they 
articulate hybridity. To show these different ways, I explore several issues, beginning 
with embodiment, and the use of language. Gender is a pivotal factor in the setting of 
the karaoke bar and in the performance of kyopo identity, which highlights the 
possibilities and limitations of kyopo identity.  
I posit that this is a space where kyopos perform and embody that identity. In this space 
kyopos create a ‘community of feeling’ that exists only in the transient moment of 
expression and performance and that they kyopos therefore seek to reproduce 
frequently. Through practices of socialibilty and singing, kyopos strive to create a link 
between the past and the present. They create a link between perceived tradition and 
perceived modernity, between ‘Koreanness’ and ‘Germanness’, drawing on two forms 
of identity that are constructed as contrasts and creating a new synthesis. I posit that the 
negotiation of kyopo identity is an ongoing process in which kyopos situate themselves 
between static concepts of ‘Germanness’ and ‘Koreanness’ to articulate identity. While 
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this process is malleable and open to interpretation, I argue that it is both empowering 
and limiting for women.  
 
7.1.The Karaoke Bar at the Korea Haus 
 
The karaoke bar in the Korea Haus was a popular place during the time of my 
fieldwork. Karaoke- meaning literally ‘empty orchestra’ -was invented in Japan, in the 
1970s and has since spread all over the world, the available music repertoire, differing 
from country to country. It is a form of entertainment in which amateur singers sing 
along with recorded music, using a microphone and a sound system. Usually the song is 
a well-known pop song, rendered acoustic to replace the voice of the original singer 
with that of the amateur. Lyrics are displayed on a video screen, usually with a moving 
symbol or changing colour to guide the singer along.  
Both spaces serve as spaces for cultural production, the kitchen at home serves to create 
continuity, while the karaoke bar is frequented by the second generation, the kyopos, 
only. In the course of my fieldwork, going karaoke- singing was a popular pastime for 
my informants, with the karaoke bar providing the space for negotiating identity, and a 
common channel and a focus point for debate and expression of difference. Within this 
setting, the kyopos differentiated themselves both from the parent generation and wider 
German society, while at the same time difference and continuity were performed and 
processed.  
The importance of this place can only be understood within a certain context and on 
closer examination of the way the patrons make use of that space, the types of behaviour 
displayed and the construction of the space itself. The locality is important in not being 
immediately visible to the outside and also being an important meeting place for the 
kyopos in Frankfurt. Thus it is not only a space in itself but a space that kyopos 
constitute as a stage not only for singing, but for the performance of identity, which is 
separate from the first generation, removed from and yet connected to the spaces shared 
with parents. 
Other than it being hard to find the karaoke bar in the Korea Haus differs from other 
places in Germany, where karaoke is sung as a special event on special occasions. To 
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my knowledge and amongst my German friends, karaoke is still regarded as a fad, a test 
of courage to see who is brave enough and torture everyone else with their singing. By 
contrast, the karaoke bar is a specialized place where karaoke is sung every night of the 
week. Inside the Korea Haus, it provides a focal point for kyopos who live scattered all 
over Frankfurt and work in diverse places.  
My informants described ‘karaoke’ as a semi-traditional Korean pastime, although they 
consistently used the Japanese word ‘karaoke’ to describe it. They told me that the 
‘traditional’ Korean way would combine drinking in a group and singing individually 
within a social gathering. Later, my use of the word ‘karaoke’ to describe to first 
generation informants about this pastime, caused confusion amongst them, where they 
insisted that ‘karaoke’ was ‘Japanese’ only. However they recognized the described 
setting as ‘Norae- Bang’, while the kyopos used the word ‘karaoke’.  In modern- day 
Korea the word ‘karaoke’ is used to describe bars of doubtful reputation, mainly 
catering to Japanese businessmen and male tourists (Otake & Hosokawa, (1998: 186) in 
Mitsui & Hosokawa (1998)).  
During my fieldwork, going out to karaoke bars was part of participant observation 
research, and the bar I most often went to with informants was inside the Korea Haus in 
Frankfurt am Main. The Korea Haus is located close to the main train station and the 
red-light district in Frankfurt, within easy walking distance to my flat. It serves mainly 
as a Korean restaurant, a revolving door at the glass front, a flight of stairs downwards 
towards a large dining room that is slightly too plush and at the same time too utilitarian 
to feel like a restaurant. At the time of my fieldwork, large fishtanks separated long 
tables that were lined with rococo-style chairs that were upholstered in burgundy red. 
Later queries turned out that it mainly caters to large tourist groups from Korea. Being 
conveniently situated opposite Frankfurt’s main train station, well-connected to the 
airport and close by a large parking lot for tour buses, the restaurant mainly catered to 
bus tours. However, it also houses a karaoke bar, and amongst my informants going to 
sing karaoke was a popular form of entertainment. 
On a typical evening I’d go there with a friend, who was also an informant, usually 
Alex, quite late in the evening, sometimes as late as two o’clock in the morning, usually 
to find familiar faces, such as Kathrin and Jong-Soon, singing karaoke already. In order 
to get to the bar that is located behind the restaurant, one must cross the entire dining 
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area- usually darkened in the evenings- for a door at the very back. From the outside, 
especially late at night, one can easily pass the bar by a thousand times without ever 
realizing that it is there. Sometimes even the front door to the darkened restaurant is 
locked, and one must ring the doorbell to gain entrance. It is a hidden place, only for 
those who know where it is and how to find it, and in that sense an exclusive place, 
removed from the nightlife around the main train station.  
The heavy steel door at the back of the restaurant, past the fish tanks and the cream-
coloured faux rococo chairs and tables, leads down a narrow corridor, past the toilets 
and a door to the left at the end leads into the bar. The bar itself is small and dark, filled 
with plush sofas in dark colours, arranged in pairs facing one another across a low table. 
Closest to the door is the counter where one can purchase drinks and request songs. The 
decoration behind the bar consists of plastic flowers in pinks and light blues, and small 
figurines, which several of my informants somewhat derisively referred to as “the sort 
of kitsch Koreans like”, meaning the first generation, rather than kyopos.  
Towards the far end is a slightly elevated stage with a small TV screen for the singer so 
that he or she can face the audience, two microphones and a large screen behind the 
stage, showing the song’s video and announcing the song- number coming up next. 
While most of the sofas are arranged towards the wall, there are two larger sofas in the 
middle, lengthwise to the screen and bar, catering for larger groups. The walls are 
painted in a dark blue, the entire place is dimly lit and usually quite smoky. Smoking is 
something nearly everyone does. The rules are straightforward: there is a minimum 
amount one must spend on drinks and no limitation to the amount of time spent on stage 
singing.  
On entering, one habitually greets the bar-staff behind the counter with an indicated 
bow, not to do so would be impolite. Bowing to the bar-staff who was usually an older 
man in his late fifties is considered to be natural, as a mark of respect to one’s elders. 
Once the bar staff returns the bow and indicates towards the sofas, one sits down, the 
bar-staff comes to take your order and brings ledgers, pens and scraps of paper. Usually 
patrons choose beer, though the later the night the more popular stronger drinks, such as 
whisky, become. One chooses a song from the book, writes down the song’s number on 
the paper and hands it to the bar-staff. My first experience at the karaoke bar, briefly 
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after settling in Frankfurt, began with my utter astonishment at almost exclusively 
finding Korean songs in the ledger.  
The bar was never too crowded not to find seating space, but was usually well-filled, 
though always with more men present than women. After entering and indicating a 
small bow to the elderly man operating the bar and the karaoke machine, we’d find 
somewhere to sit and greet others. The proprietor would then come to give us the 
booklets containing the songs and a basket of crisps, taking our drinks order. Generally, 
beer in jugs was the preferred drink but later at night stronger drinks, usually American 
whisky or rice wine was drunk.  
A little small-talk conducted in German with acquaintances would follow and then we’d 
choose a song to sing. All conversations were in German, but the majority of songs 
were in Korean and the behaviour in keeping with ‘traditional’ Korean socialising. Most 
of my informants either spoke little or no Korean at all, so conversations in the karaoke 
bar were held in German. Chats revolved around everyday issues and gossip. The only 
Korean words in such chats referred to Korean food or spirits, which have no German 
equivalent. The evening would continue with small-talk, generally enquiring about life, 
in between rushing up on stage to sing another song. The songs were mainly in Korean, 
pop-songs that were popular in Korea, recently or not so recently and for most part slow 
ballads were the favourite ones to be chosen.  
Even if someone some of them didn’t speak Korean, many of my informants were used 
to singing along phonetically, due to the prevalence of English pop music in the German 
charts. Being used to singing along in a language other than German, picking up Korean 
songs wasn’t difficult. But, since I never listened to Korean pop music at home, and 
unable to speak Korean or read basic Korean, I had to pick from a much smaller 
exclusively English selection of pop-songs
89
. During my time visiting the karaoke bar in 
the Korea Haus, there were no German songs in the ledgers. It stands to reason whether 
this was due to explicit design, the general prevalence of English pop music in German 
charts or importing the tapes from Korea. The latter is the most likely explanation 
however the bar prided itself with a badly hand-painted sign that it also offered Chinese, 
Japanese and Thai songs. However, I never found a Chinese, Japanese or Thai song in 
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 Korean has a rather straightforward phonetic alphabet, which makes it possible to read properly without 
actually knowing the language. Had I been able then to read the Korean alphabet and known a few songs, 
I could have sung in Korean as well.  
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the ledgers
90
. Eventually, while drinking and eating crisps, which are always provided 
and free of charge, one’s number comes up and then it is time to run for the stage to 
sing. No matter how badly one sang, a song always ended with applause, and returning 
to socializing and small-talk. Then one returned to one’s seat, and chatting and 
conversation would resume, till it was time to leave.  
One evening was different: two young German women came to the karaoke bar. They 
came with a group of kyopos and immediately stood out, being blonde and identifiable 
as being ethnic Germans. This rendered them visible outsiders. Like me, the two young 
women could only sing English songs and settled on a fast pop tune to perform together. 
Both of them went up on stage, laughing and jostling one another. Both of them were 
visible embarrassed to stand on stage with the lights on them, passing by others who 
showed frozen smiles.  
As a matter of fact, when they approached the stage, everyone around them went silent 
and watched them. While they were struggling with the long-corded microphones, they 
were trying to push one another to the front of the small stage. Neither of them seemed 
to know the song very well and they struggle with the fast pace of the tune, as well as 
reading the words on the screen quickly enough. In short, they did quite badly, and 
much worse than anyone else I had ever seen and heard perform at the karaoke bar. It 
was never unusual for strangers to pick up a microphone to support a struggling singer, 
but in this case not even the group they were with showed any inclination to help. Soon 
afterwards, the two young women left without their kyopo friends. Once they were 
gone, the evening continued as normal, as if the interruption had never happened, and 
no one said anything about it. “They probably didn’t enjoy themselves. And there are 
mostly Korean songs in the books.” Alex commented when I asked him what he 
thought. “Not everyone likes karaoke.” 
To fully comprehend what happened that evening this event needs to be contextualized 
by looking at the discourses surrounding kyopo identity and the way in which the 
karaoke bar is used and understood.  
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 Even without knowing these languages, differentiating Korean, Chinese, Japanese and Thai writing is 
possible to the trained eye.  
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7.2.‘And then I realized how German I was’ – Experiences of Hybridity 
 
“My elderly neighbour was forever annoying me, complaining to me about this 
or that, even about the way I walked up the stairs. But it wasn’t only her 
stairwell, was it? So I gave her a piece of my mind. She was so shocked. How 
dare I? A good Korean girl is always supposed to keep silent and swallow her 
own opinion, especially when talking to her elders. You’re supposed to be 
respectful, just because they’re older than you, and for that they expect you to 
just roll over [kuschen]. That’s when I realized how German I am.”  
 
Sophie told me this story about a stay in Korea, while on business.  In this section, after 
having looked at intergenerational relationships, and the process of positioning within a 
framework of outward ascription, I am exploring another facet to the formation of kyopo 
identity. In order to fully comprehend the complex processes of identity negotiation, it 
is necessary to explore the ‘German aspect’ of kyopo identity narration, setting them 
aside from parent generation, adding another aspect that is unique to the second 
generation.  Central to these narratives are experiences of visiting Korea, and the 
realization that ‘Korea’ is insufficient as an essentialized point of identification, 
necessitating a more nuanced approach. I will briefly discuss cultural transmission and 
transformation by the way of food to illustrate the realization of hybridity, whose 
negotiation I will further explore in discussing the karaoke bar.  
Relative to the first generation, the process of self-identification of second generation 
children is more complex and often entails the juggling of competing allegiances and 
attachments (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001:150). By being situated within two cultural 
worlds, the children of migrants must define themselves in relation to multiple reference 
groups and to the classifications into which they are placed by their native peers, 
schools, the ethnic community, and the larger society. Pressure from peers and from 
parents can tighten the tug of war of ethnic and national loyalties (2001:152). Warner 
and Strole (in Portes and Rumbaut 2001) introduced their study of an American city as 
“part of the magnificent story of adjustment of ethnic groups to American life” and went 
on to predict that “oncoming generations of new ethnics will climb to the same heights 
[of adjustment]” (2001:45). However the tale of how foreign minorities come to terms 
with their new social surroundings and are eventually absorbed into the mainstream of 
the host society, is not as simple and inevitable as Warner and Strole portray it within 
the American context. The complexity and the transition of second generation identity 
depends on several factors, such as the history of the immigrant first generation, the 
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pace of acculturation amongst parents and children and its bearing on normative 
integration, the barriers, cultural and economic confronted by second generation youth 
in their quest for successful adaptation, and the family and community resources for 
confronting these barriers (2001:46). These are precisely the sort of challenges kyopos 
face the negotiation of identity. Narratives of visiting Korea shed a light on the 
complexity the second generation experiences, which play out in the karaoke bar. These 
narratives highlight the experience of “difference” and “othering”, where my informants 
did not quite expect it, leading to questions about belonging, after the expectation of 
‘belonging’ in Korea did not come true. Christina said about the first time she visited 
Korea, when she was twelve years old:  
“I remember that the first thing I thought was ‘wow, they all look like me’. 
Black hair, brown eyes, you know. I thought that that was cool. Meeting my 
family was really exciting too. I had only ever heard about them, and all the 
stories about Korea, as it used to be. Guess what, no rice paddies, no pagodas, it 
was all really urban. It wasn’t at all what I had imagined. It was nice to visit, but 
it was nice to come home.”  
 
The realization that Korea was not the parental generation’s reflection of Korea, is plain 
in the above statement. The ‘homeland’ of her imagination, and indeed her parents’ 
stories, did not exist, and neither did she feel she fitted in. Another informant said:  
“I only visited Korea two or three times, and it’s been a while since I went. It 
doesn’t really draw me back there, although I still have family there. I speak 
some Korean, and as long as I keep quiet, I can pass for Korean, but in Korea 
people told me how different, how very different I was. They act differently, and 
while I think I acted more Korean, than I do in Germany, I was still different.” 
 
My informant had expected to fit in seamlessly, and instead experienced a sense of 
alienation. The experience of the ancestral homeland became a confrontation with 
culture. ‘Origins’ combine ‘here’ and ‘there’. The language of origins emphasizes ideas 
about descent and roots, and substantiates ideas of an authentic, pure, a-historical core 
culture confined within the borders of the ‘fatherland’. This necessitates a return to the 
land of origin as a touchstone in the construction of a new identity, Fortier (2000:96) 
writes. This encounter was not one that mediated ‘Koreanness’ in known and 
experienced parameters, but one that “is localized, transposed, transformed and 
translated through the (postmodern) state” (Chrtstou, 2006:146) of Korea.  Christou 
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(2006) writes about return migrants to Greece, who experience a series of negotiations 
and deconstructions that ultimately lead to a redefinition of their own identities. “In a 
sense, their own personal plan of action, that is, the return to the ancestral homeland as a 
triadic project of identification (locating the self), closure (transplanting home) and 
belonging (eradicating migrancy), becomes a plan unfeasible to implement, a mission 
impossible and a life-story incomplete” (Christou, 2006:147).   
 My informants’ narratives were not about a desire to relocate, but about an expectation 
to fit into the parental Korea that they knew from their parents’ memories, and their own 
experiences at home, hence the ‘known and experienced parameters’. The result 
however, was what Christou (2006) calls “a life story incomplete”. Not incomplete as 
deficient, I argue, but the realization of another facet to my informants’ life story. 
Another informant said:  
“Growing up, I thought it was exciting to explore both the German and Korean 
side. I was curious about Korea, and worked for a Korean company for a while. I 
was in constant conflict with the way things were structured, and how everyone 
put pressure on the women to always look ‘nice’, like decoration, rather than 
honouring their hard work. It wasn’t for me. I was too German for that.” 
 
Rather than feeling “incomplete”, my informants experienced their visits to Korea, and 
their expectations as insufficient to encompass their personal experiences. Essentialized 
German and Korean discourses of identity are not broad and flexible enough to 
accommodate the experience of being kyopo.  Alexandra had a slightly different 
experience:   
“I’ve always been interested in Korea, and enjoyed visiting. It’s fascinating, and 
I never felt I had any problems fitting in. I think with Korean parents, patterns of 
behaviour are intuitive. You know what to do, how to do it, and when. But I 
wouldn’t want to live there. It’s different. I can’t really explain. Maybe, it’s 
because I’m a tourist. It’s always different when you’re a tourist.” 
 
 
Alexandra didn’t expect a sense of belonging in Korea, but enjoyed her visits as 
temporary stays, and identified patterns of behaviour that were familiar. She positioned 
herself as a tourist, finding both the exotic and the familiar. As a visitor, she felt she 
fitted in. Others set out to find themselves.  
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“I lived in America for a while, in a Korean neighbourhood. A real Korean 
ghetto. Everything was in Korean from TV channels to supermarkets. But the 
American Koreans are different. [...] I lived there because the rent was cheap, 
and I suppose, to find out who I really am. As a teenager, I used to feel like a 
mixture, but after living in a Korean ‘ghetto’ I am in no doubt anymore. I’m 
German. But that doesn’t change who I am.”  
 
What all these experiences have in common is the realization of hybridity. Parental 
forms of identification are insufficient for the second generation, who were born in 
Germany, and live their lives within a German context. Both the parental Korea, if it 
existed, and present-day Korea are too narrow as sole origin of identity. Yet the parental 
homeland retains a strong influence on a life lived in Germany.  
In his work about young Chinese in Britain, Parker (1995) asserts that “Chinese identity 
is held within the domestic and family sphere […] kept within, held in reserve as a 
source of pride” (1995:102). He writes about the importance of food and eating together 
as one of the cultural practices that perpetuate Chinese identity. This is true of almost 
every ethnic identity: that food is central in is transmission. Korean food is one of the 
ways in which tradition and ‘Koreanness’ are handed down from one generation to the 
next. Kimchi – pickled and seasoned cabbage- traditionally accompanies every Korean 
meal. In the interviews in which I asked about things my informants stereotypically 
considered Korean, kimchi was one item almost everyone mentioned. Amongst my 
second generation informants, a liking for kimchi is an example sometimes jokingly 
used to test if someone is Korean or not. Older, more fermented kimchi can be turned 
into a stew called kimchi jigae, adding various ingredients, though mostly fish. 
Depending on whether you get hungry or sick when you smell it, you’re Korean or not- 
the joking test goes. Thus, Kimchi is a symbolic ‘border guard’ (Armstrong, 1982), 
which identifies people as members and non-members of a specific collectivity (Yuval-
Davis, 2000: 195). Its strong smell, especially when fermented for a long time to make 
Kimchi jjigae
91
, can be quite offensive, and my informants considered liking it a Korean 
trait. But Korean food in Germany was often subject to alterations. The change of food 
for practical purposes or because Korean chillies were unavailable in Germany to make 
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 The most common form of kimchi is made of cabbage, which is fermented with garlic and other spices, 
and traditionally stored for winter. By the end of winter, it has fermented long enough to turn sour in 
smell and taste very sour, so that cooking it, usually with the addition of fish, is the only way of eating it. 
Hence kimchi jjigae doesn’t only smell of sour cabbage and garlic, but also of fish.  
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proper kimchi means that the second generation was often faced with ‘Korean-style’ 
food, rather than what the parents knew in Korea.  
Patterson (2000) observed about the Koreans in Hawaii that the second generation there 
had a similar experience in which Korean foods were integrated into Western food to 
which they had become accustomed, leading to sometimes strange combinations 
(2000:129). He cites the example of one girl saying: “I’d like to have milk and a kimchi 
sandwich, please.” A comparable example, in Germany, is Kim-bab, which is a type of 
sushi-roll, usually containing vegetables and fried meat.  Inviting an informant for 
dinner, he asked me if I could make Kimbab. I agreed, to which he said: “But you’re 
doing the sausage version, right? Not traditional.”  
The traditional preparation of beef to fill the rolls can be quite time-consuming. As I 
found out in conversation with other informants, my mother was far from the only 
Korean mother who substituted Fleischwurst (a particular type of mild sausage, usually 
made from pork) for convenience’s sake. As a result, most of my informants had grown 
up with the ‘Germanized version’ of this popular dish, and preferred it to the original 
recipe. Kim-bab- the sausage version- thus continues tradition, but the addition of the 
specific German sausage, adds a layer of differentiation. This makes the shared 
experience of the dish something unique to the second generation. Or as my dinner 
guest told me:  
“The first time I was in Korea, there was Kim-bab for lunch. I thought it was 
great, until I tasted it. Gah! That’s not real Kim-bab! I mean, it’s real in the 
Korean sense, but, you know what I mean!” 
 
The ubiquitous “you know what I mean”, obviously, only makes sense to someone who 
is aware of the “sausage version”, i.e.: someone who has grown up in Germany.  
Other than these new forms of food, some of my informants also pointed out to me that 
while food and eating together were places of continuity, they were also places of 
parent-guided change. Several of my informants told me that their parents took up the 
German habit of serving Kaffee und Kuchen [coffee and cake] for the family every 
Sunday afternoon. Patterson (2000) makes the same observation about the first 
generation in Hawaii saying that “the first generation also compromised by introducing 
coffee at meals and having a Western style breakfast (2000:130)”. Food in its many 
forms was also one of the ways in which the second generation noted difference from 
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Koreans living in Korea. These differences set them further apart from ‘Korea’ as a 
concept known to them by way of parents’ tales.  Eating habits have apparently changed 
in Korea since the first migrants to Germany left, so that many of my informants noted 
that they were used to eating larger portions of rice in Germany in their parents’ house 
or on their own. Many said that their relatives in Korea thought of them as ‘old-
fashioned’ for asking for bigger servings of rice. Rice used to be the staple, but these 
days other side-dishes are more numerous
92
. Thus, eating habits that are both changed 
and continuous, situate the second generation in a tradition yet also mark them as 
different, locating them within a German context. Far from being a “mission 
impossible” and a “life story incomplete” as Chrstou (2006) writes about return 
migrants, experiencing the ancestral homeland, led to a realization of hybridity. This 
realization of hybridity, which reflects both in narratives of visiting Korea, and in 
changed eating habits, plays out within the karaoke bar, where performing karaoke, and 
sociability become a narrative of self-production that encompasses these multifaceted 
experiences.  
 
7.3.‘Embodying kyopo-ness’- Bowing and Propriety 
 
In this section I am looking at embodiment and the importance of certain actions within 
the karaoke bar. These constitute in part, what Edensor (2002) calls “the common sense 
of dwelling within space”. It is part of a form of cognitive knowing that becomes 
apparent, especially when challenged, determining who, has access and who does not. 
In order to do so, I will first examine one of the most intrinsic acts performed within the 
karaoke bar, and then discuss notions of propriety, and modesty to explore how 
disruption shows invisible boundaries, and underlying restrictions that determine being 
kyopo.  
 
A space is rendered familiar and homely, through particular actions which create modes 
of habituation, while at the same time spatial constraints and opportunities which inhere 
in the organisation and affordances of places mesh with the bodily dispositions 
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 Korean meals generally consist of a dish of rice and several side-dishes that everyone can help 
themselves to on the table. More side-dishes of meat etc, mean that one doesn’t need to eat as much rice 
anymore.  
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emerging out of routine practices of its inhabitants that become embedded over time 
(Edensor, 2002:54). This unnoticed framework of practices and concerns is something 
in which we dwell as ‘habituated body subjects’ (Fortier, 2000:91). Thus, an evening at 
the karaoke bar followed established patterns, which both continue and discontinue 
parental notions of ‘Koreanness’ that is lived at home, beginning with the very act of 
entering into the place. On entering, one habitually greets the bar-staff behind the 
counter with an indicated bow, not to do so would be impolite. Bowing is an unreflexive 
act. Bowing to the bar-staff who was usually an older man in his late fifties is 
considered to be natural, as a mark of respect to one’s elders. Kathrin alongside her 
friend Jong- Soon- both of whom still lived at home and had their misgivings about 
Korean elders-, would bow to the barkeeper too, since age confers status in traditional 
Korean society (Patterson, 2000:144), age itself commanding respect. However the 
extent of the bow must be carefully measured, so as not to be too subservient, but to 
establish a respectful, if equal standing. Thus, while acknowledging the status conferred 
by age, the second generation modifies the traditional deference demanded from 
younger persons towards their elders.  
I discussed bowing with Alex, a kyopo student and informant. Neither of us could tell 
where we had learned and how. The ability to bow seemed nothing that ever needed to 
be consciously learned. Neither could any of my other informants tell, other than saying 
that it was something they picked up at home, even though it was far from 
commonplace. “I sometimes catch myself doing small things that are Korean. I don’t 
know, small sounds and gestures, nothing overt, but I notice them.” Sarah explained, 
musing that she had probably picked up such habits in childhood, without consciously 
remembering. Or, as Alexandra said: “I think with Korean parents, patterns of 
behaviour are intuitive. You know what to do, how to do it, and when.” 
How difficult bowing correctly is actually to accomplish, I managed to observe one day 
in summer while drinking coffee outside in a café opposite the hotel “Frankfurter Hof”. 
The hotel staff seemed to be expecting a travel group. A young German woman and a 
young South-East Asian man, both of them dressed in the hotel’s staff uniform were 
standing by the entrance, and he was teaching her how to bow. Her trouble consisted in 
pulling her shoulders up, bowing her back each time she bowed and not keeping her 
hands folded properly while doing it. By the time the travel group’s bus pulled into the 
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car-park, the young woman still had not succeeded in bowing without making the young 
man laugh. 
One can ‘identify the small differences in style, of speech or behaviour, of someone 
who has learned our ways yet was not bred to them’ (Williams, 1961:42). Bodies are 
trained to adopt dispositions and actions in keeping with certain venues, determining the 
proper conduct within a certain spatial setting. Being the product of the incorporation of 
the fundamental structures of a society, these principles of division are common to all 
the agents of the society and make possible the production of a common, meaningful 
world, a common-sense world (Bourdieu, 1979:486). Hence, it is understood that in the 
setting of the karaoke bar- (NB.: not at other kyopo social gatherings), bowing is part of 
the common sense of dwelling within and the performing of identity. It is a ‘stylized 
repetition of acts’ (Butler, 1990:140) that cultivate a sense of belonging. As it is not 
something my informants were used to doing at home. Bowing when entering, sets the 
karaoke bar apart from home, while linking it strongly to tradition. At the same time, 
the fact that bowing is a gesture that needs to be learned, a gesture that is uncommon in 
the everyday German environment, more serves as a border guard that regulates access, 
while literally marking the entrance into a kyopo space.  
Similarly, jostling and pushing one another on the way to the stage was not part of the 
common sense of dwelling, but improper. The two young German women attending one 
evening, clashed with the unspoken rules, their behaviour and their attire, revealing the 
underlying common sense inherent in the karaoke bar. Their behaviour and clothes 
opposed Korean Confucian ideas of dignity and modesty, which merit brief examination 
to put into proper context. As mentioned previously, in passing, in chapter 5, Johanna’s 
mother constantly told her to dress ordentlich [orderly/modestly]. Most of my male and 
female informants mentioned their parents having instilled a sense of ordentliche 
clothes, which in practice meant nothing too revealing, often muted colours, long 
trousers, skirts to either to the knee or just above, and for females mostly subtle make-
up. Sarah said:  
“Who doesn’t want to experiment with clothes, hair and make-up as a teenager? 
I would have loved to colour my hair, and experiment with what I wear. But 
whenever I thought I was wearing something fashionable, and it didn’t even 
have to be revealing, my mother would make me change. ‘You’re not leaving 
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the house looking unordentlich’! You always have to look dignified, modest, 
keeping face and all that. But not cheap either. Your stuff has to be good quality, 
so people can see.” 
  Markus:  
“I used to get into the biggest fights with my mother, because I was such a rebel. 
I wore jeans with holes in them, over the knee and such. It was fashionable. 
Everyone was wearing them. But you should have seen my mother! [Imitates 
wheezing breathing and angry expression] You can’t go out like that! What are 
people going to think? That’s a disgrace! People are going to talk about us! 
Everyone is going to think I didn’t raise you properly if you walk about that 
unordentlich!” 
The two German women wore sparkly bright tops and tracksuit bottoms, which 
although fashionable that year, did not fit into the definition of ordentlich, and the idea 
of traditional Korean attire reflecting modesty and dignity (Yi, 2005). In fact the word 
ordentlich comes from Ordnung [order], meaning that something is done within the 
framework of certain rules, and the two women were disorderly in the sense that their 
clothes and their behaviour did not accord to deeply held ideas about order. Clothes and 
behaviour being meant to reflect dignity and modesty, called into question the moral 
character of the two women- and their whole families, as Markus’ mother’s statements 
indicated-, threatening the order of the entire place. Dress for the bar was informal, but 
tracksuit bottoms are considered for exercise and exertion, not for singing publicly, and 
they are not ordentlich. The two young German women broke the unwritten dress-code 
that confers the status of respectability.  
Like me, the two young women could only sing English songs and settled on a fast pop 
tune to sing together. Again, by doing so they broke the unwritten rules that regulate 
singing. Singing and drinking being traditional forms of entertainment in Korea, they 
are nonetheless taken seriously. Hence, the fact that the two young women went on 
stage loudly laughing and jostling one another again differentiated them sharply from 
the usual accepted behaviour. Ways of walking, carrying one’s body and sitting 
continue to be infused with resonances about appropriate comportment (Edensor, 
2002:94). The two young women broke the “normative kinds of manners or etiquette, 
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which instantiate what forms of conduct are appropriate in particular contexts […] 
which constitute shared worlds of meaning and action” (Edensor, 2002:94). Edensor 
(2002) calls this ‘expressive competence’, which the two young women clearly did not 
possess, showing it by laughing loudly and pushing one another. According to Bourdieu 
(1979) the two young German women could be said to have “scandalously flouted 
common sense”, by going challenging “the principles of the incarnate social order” 
(1979:474) inherent in the setting of the karaoke bar.  
The failure to conform to accepted norms may appear trivial, but according to Bourdieu 
those in power “extort the essential while seeming to demand the insignificant 
(1977:95)”, as it was that evening, when the two young German women attended, who 
disrupted “the production of a common, meaningful world, a common-sense world” 
(Bourdieu, 1979:486). Their presence, their lack of cognitive knowledge of kyopo 
spaces, threatened “the continuity in ways of doing things” (Edensor, 2002:56). Alex’s 
comment at the end, saying how they probably just did not enjoy themselves is 
revealing. It trivializes the events. The triviality of many of the things people do, doing 
what ‘proper’ and ‘good’ people should, not only block them from consciousness since 
they constitute acts of utter common sense, but also serve to trivialize protest (Cowan, 
1991:181).  By saying that they maybe just did not like it and that not everyone does, he 
restored the common sense of the space and defused the challenge the two women 
might have presented.  
 
7.4.‘Speaking German, Singing Korean’- Kyopo Language Use in the karaoke bar 
 
In this section I am looking at the use of language in the karaoke bar, and its 
significance for performance of identity. Conversations amongst the kyopos were in 
German, but the majority of songs were in Korean and the behaviour in keeping with 
‘traditional’ Korean socialising. Yet at the same time, the word ‘karaoke’ was used, 
rather than the Korean ‘norae bang’, marking it as a kyopo hybridity rather than wholly 
Korean space.  
However, it is not ‘Korean tradition’ that is instantly recognizable to Koreans from 
Korea, or even the parent generation, but ‘Korean tradition’ as defined by the kyopos. 
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Employing German, while socializing in a perceived traditional Korean way, is 
particular to the kyopos. Language is often considered crucial to the development of 
ethnic identity. Kibria’s (2000) work on identity negotiations of second generation 
Chinese and Korean Americans, deals with language as a cultural marker of ethnic 
membership. She observes: “Given its potency as a cultural marker of ethnic 
membership, it is not surprising that language figured prominently in the second 
generation's experiences of their expected ethnic knowledge. Those who did not speak 
much Korean or Chinese were particularly conscious of the power of this expectation 
(2000:90).”  The expectation Kibria (2000) refers to is the expectation of American 
society assuming ethnic difference to indicate certain knowledge or lack thereof, e.g.; 
not being able to speak fluent English.  
The same expectation can be found in Germany. Language, and particularly the 
discrepancy in the languages used inside the karaoke bar, are significant. The bar being 
a place for kyopos and not the parent generation, both languages are used but in 
different activities. Conversations are held in German, but most of the songs chosen 
were in Korean. As Appadurai (1991) suggests it is a space for the creation of difference 
in several ways, providing a space for the negotiation of identity as different from the 
parent generation as well as different from the larger German society. The expectation 
of  performing ‘Koreanness’ is reflected in the choice of songs and one evening a young 
woman asked me outright in considerable wonder why I never sang Korean songs. She 
was surprised to hear that I couldn’t. I never considered it odd to sing along to a song 
that I didn’t understand phonetically, but unlike my informants’ parents, my own 
mother never played Korean pop music to me when I grew up, and later my contact 
remained minimal. But language is also a link with the past through which younger 
generations can get in touch with the lives and experiences of their forbears. Rather than 
indubitable expression of identity, learning [Korean] is a gesture of remembrance that 
traces lines of continuity between generations (Fortier, 2000:84).  
Music is a key to identity since in making and listening to music- especially when done 
in a language imbued with meaning-, we undergo direct experiences of the body, time 
and sociability and gain the capacity to move between social groups and subject 
positions (Frith, 1996:124). Singing in Korean while conducting conversations in 
German, makes a statement about the discrepancy between notions of ‘Koreanness’ and 
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notions of ‘Germanness’. By making a public display of ‘Koreanness’, singing modern 
pop songs in a perceived traditional form of entertainment, singing in a language that is 
not the language of conversation, and in which the singer is mostly not even fluent in, 
the singer enacts a lack of proficiency in essentialized ‘Koreanness’ as well as a 
rejection of essentialized ‘Germanness’. Kyopo identity on the stage is deliberately 
enacted to fuse, reject and mould concepts of ‘Koreanness’ and ‘Germanness’ through 
performance.  
 
 
7.5.‘Good Korean Daughters and Modern Kyopo Women’: Gender  
 
My male informants spoke about kyopo identity as gender-neutral, gender playing no 
overt role when speaking specifically of kyopo identity. Nationality mattered more to 
them since both Korea and Germany have a national service system. Those that had 
German passports had to either serve in the army or do Zivildienst
93
 [literally: civilian 
service]. By contrast, my female informants spoke of kyopo identity as a gendered 
identity. In this his section I am exploring this discrepancy, by looking at gender and 
how gender categories and relations are produced, reproduced and changed within the 
karaoke bar. Gender being a relational concept, I am looking at both men and women, 
beginning with women, before looking at men.   
Most forms of space are gendered in nature, showing a division whereby gendered 
spaces and spheres of activity are arranged in diverse cultural ways (Edensor, 2002:61). 
The karaoke bar, at first glance would seem to be a male sphere that contrasts with the 
kitchen. Most forms of space are gendered in nature, showing a division whereby 
gendered spaces and spheres of activity are arranged in diverse cultural ways (Edensor, 
2002:61). Traditionally, in Korea singing, drinking and dancing, are male pursuits, 
while ‘respectable’ women would not do so, as that was the realm of the déclassé 
kisaeng [dancing girls] (Patterson, 2000:130). Kendall (2002), working on gender 
constructions in Korea, quotes a Korean businessman summing up the purpose of 
                                                 
93
 The civilian branch of the national service system, which allows conscientious objectors to fulfil their 
duty in a field of social work e.g.: hospitals. All of my male informants chose this route.  
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drinking and the notion of masculinity connected with it as: ‘Drinks make all men 
become friends, especially when they get naked and sleep with women (2002:09). 
At first glance, an establishment where the above described pursuits might take place 
could probably be a karaoke bar in Korea. Indeed, ‘karaoke bars’ in Korea cater mainly 
to men, implying that the women who are there are déclassé like the kisaeng (Hotake & 
Osakawa, 1998). This does not apply to the karaoke bar in the Korea Haus. The modern 
Korean meaning of ‘karaoke bar’ doesn’t translate to what the kyopos mean by it. They 
used the word to describe ‘Norae-Bang’, which has none of the dubious connotations. 
At the same time, the word ‘karaoke’ made no sense to the first generation. They 
repeatedly told me that ‘karaoke’ was not Korean at all, but something Japanese. These 
distinctions, while the second generation used the Japanese word minus the immoral 
connotations, and the first generation did not regard karaoke as something Korean, 
allow leeway for kyopo women to remain within the Korean category of female 
respectability. In short, neither the first generation, nor the kyopos make the connection 
between the presence of women at the karaoke bar, and the kisaeng dancing girls.  
Thus the karaoke bar in the Korea Haus is not a place for sexual encounters, but one for 
socializing in a mixed group. Modernity and discontinuity from home are expressed in 
the presence of women, in the choice of a location and the presence of modern 
technology. The kyopo girls and women always dressed in accordance with their 
parents’ ideas of ‘orderliness’ and ‘decency’, adhering to the idea of Korean modesty 
and respectability. They reproduced the gender patterns to a certain extent, while at the 
same time changing them by being present. Karaoke with regards to kyopo women is 
both modern and traditional. It is a pastime that is constructed around a certain idea of 
Korean socializing, indicating the understanding of the second generation of ‘traditional 
Korean socializing’ and its modern Korean connotations. At the same time it draws on 
traditional Korean notions of gender and fuses them with the perceived German 
modernity that kyopo women live in their everyday lives. One could say that the 
karaoke bar is a place where traditional Korean ideals of the ‘wise mother and good 
wife’ are rejected through the presence of women and the extension of respectability to 
them; however this is not the case. My female informants, when speaking about ideas of 
traditional Korean gender roles, did not classify themselves as women, but as daughters. 
The relational term is important to understand that they did not consider the ‘wise 
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mother and good wife’ ideal as applicable to them. They spoke of being ‘Good Korean 
daughters’. Thus it is not the traditional woman’s role that is rejected, but the traditional 
unmarried daughter’s role.  
The karaoke bar subtly reiterates traditional images of men and women, and their 
different roles. Sociability reproduces gender notions, which often only become 
apparent when someone does not conform to them. An example of this occurred one 
evening, when Alex said to me: “It’s so nice talking to you. You don’t do that thing 
with your voice.” At first, I didn’t know what he meant. “You know, where your voice 
rises by an octave and you sound like a cartoon character, because that’s cute.” He 
explained to me. Females using a high-pitched voice are a phenomenon mainly known 
from Japan, where the high pitch is used to convey desirable femininity (Okamoto & 
Smith, 2004). A high-pitched voice is connected to psychological and physical 
powerlessness (small, weak, indirect, modest etc), which are desirable and therefore 
women may elevate their voices to be heard as smaller, weaker and more modest 
(2004:224). Thus norms and expectations lead women to employ a high-pitched voice 
to explicitly express their femininity. My female informants showed their ambiguity 
about this phenomenon, when I asked them about it. Kathrin said:  
“I hate when women do that. It sounds so fake [das hört sich so gekünstelt an]. 
And they only do it when there’s boys around. It hurts my ears and it makes you 
look and sound so, so stupid. Like this frail little girl that doesn’t know anything. 
And I absolutely hate it, when I catch myself doing it. It’s one of those things, 
you know? […] German boys just find it annoying, I guess. I don’t know, I’ve 
never caught myself doing it around them.”  
One of Hyung’s (2008) second generation German- Korean informants described the 
same ambiguity: 
“Among Koreans, I am a daughter that stays true to the norms, who does dishes, 
cooks and does whatever is demanded. I notice that often my voice is very soft, 
meek and frail, and I try not to draw attention by making myself as small as 
possible […] With Germans I’m the self-assured one again, the one that doesn’t 
hold back and sometimes gives orders to people. I have firm opinions about 
things and voice them, don’t avoid verbal confrontations and get the feeling that 
I truly blossom then [ich blühe förmlich auf]” (2008:232). 
Using a high-pitched voice in Korean company is behaviour learnt at home. While 
through their presence the women subverted and negotiated gender identity, they still 
remained respectable ‘Korean daughters’. The karaoke bar thus became an extension of 
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the family home that put young women into a disempowered position, separating them 
from the lifestyles their German friends lead. Being a ‘good Korean daughter’ remained 
an intrinsic part of being a kyopo woman.  
Also, in a mixed group in the karaoke bar it was a matter of course that the present men 
paid for the women’s drinks. This habit was so accepted that Kathrin and Jong- Soon 
once complained that they don’t like going out with German men, because they expect 
you to pay for your own drinks. Such a statement indicates a very clear expectation of 
prevalent gender roles, making clear demands on masculinity, and being indicative of 
the status of women within the karaoke bar. What I mean by this becomes clearer when 
looking at the presence of exclusively female groups. There would have been no social 
repercussions, but in my time on fieldwork, I never once observed an all-female kyopo 
group singing karaoke. By the same token all male groups did attend, albeit rarely. 
Based on this, it appears that women always attended the karaoke bar as guests, as the 
friends of their male companions, not as independent patrons. “It’s something you do 
with your male friends,” according to Kathrin, “one of those things.” ‘One of those 
things’ generally meant something that no one questioned and were seen as part of the 
fabric of social interactions. The karaoke bar thus, would seem to be a male sphere, into 
which women were allowed without losing their respectability.  
Gender displays are “culturally established sets of behaviours, appearances, mannerisms 
and other cues that we have learned to associate with members of a particular gender” 
(Lucal, 1999:784). These displays ‘cast particular pursuits as expressions of masculine 
and feminine “natures” (West and Zimmerman, 1987:126)’.  The kyopo- perceived 
origins and traditional notions bound up with the karaoke bar recreate Confucian gender 
ideology (Moon, 2002:84). By this, I mean that while women are allowed into the 
karaoke bar, the space remains masculine. The karaoke bar in the Korea Haus was not a 
place for sexual encounters, but one for socializing in mixed groups within a setting that 
was determined by notions of Korean masculinity.  
Use and meaning of the karaoke bar differs for kyopo males from the females. The 
karaoke bar embodies the predicament of Korean masculinity against the felt demands 
of the German hegemonic masculinity of everyday life. Given the socio-historical and 
cultural constructions of emotional display, power and the man/woman relations, the 
prevailing Western paradigms for conceptualizing the development of social manhood 
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cannot be applied globally (Margold, 1995:279). For men, singing and drinking within 
the context of the karaoke bar is a performance of perceived Korean masculinity, whose 
expression would be devalued in a German setting. In my experience of karaoke events 
in Germany, women would sing much more often and alone, while men tend to sing in 
groups and make a joke of it. Kyopo men in the setting of the Korea Haus however, 
would go up on stage individually and mostly perform sad love songs. The ability to do 
so well, even when very drunk is an expression of masculinity that is at odds with 
German hegemonic masculinity. Not so much the lyrics as the nature of the songs is 
revealing. Women occasionally sang sad songs, but were generally more upbeat, while 
men, when singing individually, would always choose a slow, sad ballad that often 
required a good vocal range.  
Sophie said that it was one of the reasons she disliked the pastime.  
“I don’t like going out to sing karaoke. It’s always the same. You get drunk, and 
then the guys will howl [heulen und brüllen] their hearts out on stage! They 
always sing the soppiest love songs! I think, back in Korea, it was supposed to 
impress women, but here it’s because they lack recognition in their manliness, 
and that’s the way they express it.” 
 
My male informants denied such an assertion, claiming that slow ballads were easier to 
sing, or that they simply liked certain songs. My female informants suspected them of 
the same reasons as Sophie, and it was one of the rare cases when they mentioned Han. 
Alexandra said:  
“Han is the resentment you felt towards your mother-in-law, and you know 
Korean mothers-in-law had absolute power over you [the daughter-in-law]. 
Singing was one of the ways you could express yourself freely in Korea, like 
when your mother-in-law treated you badly. You could sing while you were 
working, until your heart and soul felt lighter. That’s what the guys are doing.”  
 
The “howling” was reminiscent of Mrs Pak’s way of coping with ill-treatment she 
experienced from her German environment (see chapter 4), and in an oddly 
desexualized, male space, seemed to explain the choices of lamenting songs as an 
expression of male Han. Korean masculinity does not exist within majority society, by 
which I mean that Asians are generally considered to be feminine rather than masculine. 
Asian men are constructed as passive, malleable and even asexual (Espiritu, 1997:90). 
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Singing is a way of performing identity on an individual level, while at the same time 
due to its nature in being public turns into the “mediating concept between the external 
and the internal, the individual and society” (Sarup, 1996).  My female informants 
identified anguish, and made a connection between the feeling of lacking recognition as 
masculine men, and the Han that “yearns for vengeance, but does not seek it. Han is 
held close to the heart, hoping and patient but never aggressive. It becomes part of the 
blood and breath of a person. There is a sense of lamentation and even of reproach 
toward the destiny that led to such misery.” (Ahn, 1987) Whether that perception on 
part of my female informants was correct or not, the feeling of the songs, seems to 
mirror kyopo relationships with the majority society, with the women feeling more 
accepted, and finding German partners, hence, the lighter songs.  
Korean masculinity is strongly influenced by the Confucian gender system, which 
ascribes different spheres and places the responsibility for the social status of a family 
on the man’s shoulders. While the kyopo women and girls are concerned with being ‘a 
good Korean daughter’ or giving their parents that impression, kyopo males do not 
make distinctions between different roles that they play. Kyopo males are expected to 
graduate from university with good grades, and thus raise the social status of their entire 
family. No such heightened pressure exists on kyopo women, who are mostly expected 
to be ‘good’ and ‘respectable’, while a university education is desirable, is not quite as 
important as it is with their male contemporaries. Hence, what defines kyopo 
masculinity is much more ‘Korean’ than the corresponding notion for women. Kyopo 
males in majority society do not gain recognition as masculine, but within a Korean 
framework are recognized as masculine. For kyopo women, Korean femininity arises 
mainly in the relational experience of being a daughter. For the purpose of socializing, 
one could say that in this context women are masculinized to a degree. On the one hand 
the karaoke bar reiterates and reproduces a perceived essentialized Korean masculinity, 
by way of reproducing Korean patterns of behaviour, while on the other hand it fuses 
traditional patriarchy with women’s liberation the same way the traditional 
entertainment of singing and drinking is fused with new technology, i.e.: the karaoke 
machines, without actually questioning gender hierarchies.  
Such modifications, distinguish the karaoke bar from home, while at the same time the 
familiar is present. The reproduction of gestures and patterns of behaviour, transferred 
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from the familiar setting of home into the setting of the karaoke bar, taps into “a 
universe of ready-made feelings and experiences” (Bourdieu, 1979: 474). But, at the 
same time home is a multiple site, a place of both oppression and liberty, it can restore 
and stifle (Watkins, 2001). Thus, within the setting of the karaoke bar, while behaviour 
is reproduced, it is also modified, and its modified reproduction becomes a performance 
of kyopo-ness. Removed from the parental home and the everyday German 
environment, it is a place of liberation for kyopo women, in which they assert 
themselves as kyopo women rather than ‘Good Korean daughters’. But by adhering to 
their upbringing and reproducing patterns of behaviour, they also don’t question the 
logic of the space, which is inherently masculine. Thus, while on the surface, customs 
and patterns are changed, the overall gender structures remain, and serve to reassert 
masculinity.  
 
7.6.Conclusion 
 
Essentialised notions of what it means to ‘be’ a kyopo, trying to fix the word with a 
multitude of attributes that qualify who and who is not ‘kyopo’, are futile for the 
purpose of determining the meaning of being kyopo. Kyoponess expresses both 
continuity and discontinuity with the parent generation, reproducing social structures 
and patterns of behaviour. At the same time kyopos create boundaries and incorporate 
social structures and patterns of behaviour of wider German society. People do not 
simply learn a traditional system of ideals, symbols, metaphors, and norms inside the 
family and a modern system from progressive agents of cultural transmission outside it, 
but rather they construct notions of ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ from what they are told 
by all agents of cultural transmission and what they experience both inside and outside 
families (Yanagisako, 1985). 
Reference to Korea as a source of identity due to the circumstances of Korean migration 
necessarily means referring to the parent generation’s Korea. Having no lived 
experience in the parental Korea, the kyopos use ‘Korea’ as a timeless concept that is 
the source of essentialized ‘Koreanness’. Having been translated into another language, 
transmitted onto another generation, the concept of ‘Korea’ as the kyopos use it is 
intrinsically ‘Korean’ only to them. It reflects the parent generation’s ideas, but is 
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divorced from present-day Korea and Korean society.  Kyopo identity is expressed by 
drawing on a particular perception of what is considered intrinsically Korean and the 
everyday experiences within the majority society.  
The experiences of the everyday German environment with its ethnic expectations that 
most of my informants could and would not fulfil, do not provide an identity that 
sufficiently encompasses the experience of being second- generation German-Korean. 
Such experiences do inform the negotiation of kyopo identity through living and 
interacting every day. Alba (1990) claims that “it is not only that individuals can choose 
to identify or not, and choose also precisely which elements in an ancestry mixture to 
emphasize and how important an ethnic identity should be for them, but they also have 
a wide latitude of choice when it comes to the manifestations or expressions of 
ethnicity” (1990: 303). However the complex processes, which make kyopo identity are 
not such a free choice, but are dependent on a variety of factors.  
Majority society discourses contrast ‘Germanness’ with ‘Koreanness’, leaving 
kyoponess the space ‘in between’, whose physical manifestation and stage can be seen 
in the karaoke bar in the Korea Haus. In this microcosm ‘choice’, as Alba (1990) 
claims, becomes a factor. Certain elements of Koreanness are reproduced, fused with 
elements of Germanness, allowing the exploration of possibilities of expression of 
identity. “Elements of culture, its signs and symbols may be transformed or filled with 
new meaning and significance in this process” (Wilpert, 1989:21). Han, in this process 
receives a new meaning, which is both timeless, and particular to a certain generation’s 
experiences. Taken out of context, the concept becomes the fluid, hard to define 
‘essence’ of Koreanness again, but within the karaoke bar, it is the (ascribed) expression 
of experiencing negative stereotypes, a sense of displacement, and a way of coping 
creatively in Germany.  
The karaoke bar provides a space that remains connected, and yet is removed, making it 
a ‘space in between’, and yet firmly in both worlds at the same time. It is a shared 
experience of identity performance, as well as an individual identity. Up on stage, the 
performer usually begins alone, but others can join, thereby making the individual 
performance of identity an encompassing event for all those present. Performing 
becomes a simultaneous synthesis, a process that revolves around social interaction, 
creating habits, routines and understandings by drawing on different sets of everyday, 
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lived experience. It creates a link between the past and the present, between perceived 
tradition and perceived modernity. One of the key elements of the process of 
identification is the drawing of boundaries between the ‘self’ and other (Edensor, 2002: 
24). Hence, as a self-description the word kyopo provides a marker of common identity 
for self-identification, and as a means of locating and defining the individual self in the 
world, whilst at the same time providing the individual with social bonds to others 
sharing the same self-identification by means of a common identity (Smith, 1991:15).  
But this common identity is not unproblematic with regards to gender. Most of my 
female informants experienced parental expectations of ‘good Korean daughters’ as 
stifling when they compared that expectation to the perceived liberty of their German 
friends. The everyday German environment for my female informants provided a 
discursive point of departure to renegotiate gender roles for themselves, while it 
reasserted Korean notions of masculinity, rather than challenging them.  
 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
My informants, nearly all of them, supported Korea during the football world 
championship in 2002. “It was a little bit sad when they lost against Germany, but then, 
we became world champion.” Melanie said. ‘They’ lost, but ‘we’ won. “It wouldn’t 
have mattered either way. We’d have won regardless.”  
Melanie’s statement in relation to football illustrates kyopo shifting positionality. Her 
allegiances transferred easily to the winning team, which she also identified with. Far 
from betraying an identity crisis, which German theorists
94
 are still fond of diagnosing 
among migrant children, Melanie’s assertions narrate the possibilities of identification. 
All of my informants expressed regret that Korea didn’t win, but celebrated Germany’s 
subsequent success. “After all, we’re Germans too.” Alex said.  
 In this thesis, I set out to explore the negotiation of identity among second generation 
German-Korean women. I began with wondering curiously about national identities that 
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 Cf chapter 1 
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theorists like Smith (1986; 1991) explored from the perspective of ethno-cultural 
constructions. How, I wondered, do migrant second-generations conceptualize identity, 
and understand themselves, in discourses that deny them participation on the basis of 
their origin? Brubaker (1992) and Soysal (1994) offered alternative concepts of 
belonging, moving away from essentialized national identities to post-national 
citizenship, and civic citizenship as forms of identification. Soysal (1994) advocated 
removing citizenship from the realm of ethno-nationalism, thus outlining a possibility 
for membership in a state, distinct from other forms of identity. The German media 
echoed such ideas, and the discourse on integration in Germany seemed to embrace 
them as well. What I wanted to know was, whether or not such an approach worked in 
everyday life. The media was full of articles and reports about the Turkish minority 
(compare chapter 3), but little to nothing examined other minorities, who appeared 
“unproblematic”, and “integrated”. Were they? Had they? Had they successfully taken 
on a “German identity”, as the media and assorted theorists demanded? Was being a 
“civic” German an option? And what were the implications for women? 
When I began researching, some of my informants asked me, if I had an identity crisis. 
The talk about identity crises was, and remains ubiquitous in the media and German 
society, as the only logical outcome for migrant children growing up in two cultures. 
Ideas about civic citizenship seemed to provide an answer to such problems, allowing 
different allegiances, but ignoring the everyday lived experience of second generations. 
‘Civic citizenship’ merely pushes the debate about identity and belonging into another 
realm, where it remains as contested as it was before. Identity is a relational concept, but 
the idea of pure civic citizenship as a territorial-based form of identity, still regards 
identities as essentialized. It separates culture from politics, allowing migrant children 
to ‘retain their culture’, while blithely ignoring that ‘their’ culture also includes the 
everyday lived experience in Germany. Paul Gilroy (1987) makes an argument that 
culture is conceived along ethnically absolute lines, not as something intrinsically fluid, 
changing, unstable and dynamic, but as a fixed property of social groups rather than a 
relational field in which they encounter one another and live out social and historical 
relationships. Attempts to relocate debates about identity, access to the same, and 
integration in the ‘cultural’ realm retain the same essentialized properties. Thus, rather 
than looking at identity as ‘essentialized’, but as a process and a category of practice, 
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provides deeper insights and a more nuanced understanding of everyday social 
practices, activities, particular social worlds and histories.  
I explored identity as a multifaceted process of negotiation, but like Parker (1995) in his 
study on British Chinese identities in the UK, I felt a tension in my research. Stuart Hall 
in his works on identity identifies and criticises “essentialist conceptions of subjectivity, 
a unitary notion of culture [that] is constructed through closed and originary forms of 
narrative” (Parker 1995:37). There is nonetheless a tension between “recognizing the 
subjected as decentred and culture as hybrid, and acknowledging the political exigencies 
of constructing and affirming collective identity” (Parry, 1992:30). In the case that I 
have examined, Kyopo identity is a fluid identity that provides an alternative to 
essentialized identities, but remains situated in a discourse of “Koreanness” and 
“Germanness” as precisely these kinds of essentialized identities. In the thesis, I have 
attempted to explore this tension and gain an understanding of the complexities of 
kyopo identity negotiation.  
But understanding these processes is not, and cannot be an end in itself. Instead, I 
argued that the processes of identity construction allow us to explore relational 
complexities that determine cultural, social and political participation within societal 
discourses. Billig said that “one can eat Chinese tomorrow, and Turkish the day after; 
one can even dress in Chinese and Turkish styles. But being Chinese and Turkish are 
not commercially available options” (1995:139). While Billig is right in asserting that 
identities are not commercially available options- and a logical question would be: why 
can one not become Chinese/Turkish- I ask how one can become ‘Chinese’ or 
‘Turkish’. The process of ‘becoming’ is far more revealing about the underlying 
concepts, assumptions and relationships than a list of what is ‘typically 
Chinese/Turkish’. Indeed, I asked all of my informants in formal interviews the 
questions ‘what is typically German? What is typically Korean?’ Asking helped me 
identify trends, but my informants’ answers would often make comparisons. “Koreans 
are quieter, whereas Germans will always insist on their rights.” Was one such 
comparative answer, indicating experience in both, Koreanness and Germanness. In 
itself, the answer is banal. It becomes meaningful only in context: “I notice that I am 
sometimes a little too quiet for the Germans, so I try asserting myself more.” In order to 
participate in professional and social settings, my informant took on what he saw as 
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essentially German traits, positioning himself in a certain way and ‘becoming’ rather 
than being. On the surface, one might say that my informant was trying to become 
‘German’, but such a conclusion ignores the relational aspect of identity. His statement 
said nothing about becoming ‘German’, but about the way he perceives those around 
him, the way he believes they perceive him, what he does to participate, how he 
identifies certain behaviours and positions himself accordingly.        
I approached identity as a process and a category of practice. Kyopo identity is far more 
complex, and allows for a far greater range of identifications and ambivalent positions 
than the binary oppositions of a discourses on ‘culture conflict’ and ‘identity crisis’ 
would allow. The idea of bounded identities lie at the heart of such ideas of culture 
conflict and crisis, especially in Germany, where an underlying racial ideology limited 
the first generation of migrants, keeping them eternal ‘guests’. With second and third 
generations in present-day Germany, the question of integration has become pertinent. 
But ‘integration’ is a fashionable and undefined term, which at best came in connection 
to a vague notion of multiculturalism. In 2010, German prime-minister Angela Merkel, 
declared that German multiculturalism had been an utter failure, and demanded of 
migrants to do more to integrate. Unfortunately, her assertions failed to consider the 
decades of German inertia, the unwillingness of the state to change naturalization laws, 
and a deeply ethno-cultural understanding of what Germanness means. Multiculturalism 
failed, because the majority society still largely understands itself as homogenous and 
German, and sees migrants and second generations still as innately foreign. In the 
meantime, despite much theorizing, the kyopos are finding ways to position themselves 
within these discourses, making an identity that encompasses the experience of being 
second-generation German-Korean in Germany, the process of which shows the many 
shortcomings of prevailing approaches to identity, especially within the German 
context.  
Part of this process is the experience of the first generation, especially the mothers. 
Their migration stories, experiences of Korea and Germany, and their desire to see their 
children succeed, are the basis of what Hall calls the “memory, fantasy, narrative and 
myth” (1989:71) of identity negotiation. The position, the self-representation and the 
self-understanding of the first generation, are part of a narrative of the self for the 
kyopos. But Hwang (1999) found that the first generation still consider themselves 
203 
 
 
foreigners in Germany, while following the practice of giving the second generation 
German names for ‘a German life’. On the 18th of July, 2008, the Korean weekly in 
Germany Kyoposhinmun
95
, published an article written by a first generation German-
Korean woman addressing the second generation:  
“I understand integration like this: Not blindly swallowing96 another culture or 
subordinating. I understand it as equality. […] I admit that the German laws 
aren’t perfect for foreigners. It’s not a society that’s particularly friendly towards 
young people or foreigners. The German society is a very conservative society, 
different from e.g.: America. But Germany is your country. Then you mustn’t 
complain. Because the moment you do, you take on another role, the role of the 
guest. But you are not guests, you are hosts. You are the ones who must assume 
responsibility. You think this country isn’t friendly towards foreigners? Well, 
then do something so it will be foreigner-friendly!” (Jung-Ja Park-Fornacon)  
The snippet casts kyopos as the ones who are not only German, but also hints that the 
first generation is aware of the continuity and change among the second, while also 
voicing dismay. In the narratives of the second generation about the first, the latter were 
brave pioneers, the first generation demands that they live German lives, and participate 
in changing society, without losing ‘Koreanness’.  
‘Koreanness’ is transmitted at home. Hyung (2008) positions the second generation in 
this quote as ‘between cultures’ and claims that the second generation has rejected the 
first generations’ values and practices so entirely that they are almost entirely 
assimilated to the majority society. He implies that there is a rift between the first and 
the second generation, and a culture-conflict in which the second generation has to 
choose sides, ending up displaced between all sides. In doing so, he falls into the trap of 
essentialized identities, claiming that the second generation’s experiences make them 
reject the first generation’s practices and values, and assimilate to the majority society. 
The resulting- inevitable cultural conflict- victimises the second generations, as 
“vulnerable to identity conflicts and low self-esteem” (Parker, 1995:12). Such an 
approach fails to take into account the possibilities and agency of second generations, 
positing the parent generation and the majority society as polar opposites. Identity is not 
a readily measurable attribute, but more of an ongoing construction (1995:13) and 
negotiation that does not happen ‘in spite’ of different cultures. Having Korean parents 
                                                 
95
 This is a nation-wide weekly newspaper by the first generation, for the first generation. Since ca 2008 it 
runs a column called ‘Yellow Press’ for the second generation by the second generation- in German.  
96
 In the original it’s ‘unterschlucken’, which means as much as swallowing, but this is meant to express 
‘blindly assimilating’.  
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serves as a point of departure, and a commonality among kyopos. “You have to have 
Korean parents to understand” goes hand in hand with “If you have to ask, you will 
never understand”. These statements do not concern a rejection of the first generation, 
or being ‘Korean’ or the feeling of an identity conflict, but refer to the particular 
experience of growing up in Germany with Korean parents. And rather than telling 
about a conflict, they are the means of communality, and boundaries. Common culture 
is only implicitly shared in commonly understood meanings and values, with common 
myths and symbols. This can be regarded as a useful means of boundary creation i.e.: 
where people stop understanding the myths and symbols boundaries are drawn. (Smith, 
1986:138) 
But common understandings are not the only boundaries. Identity is formed through 
narratives of self-production and through defences against unwelcome attributions by 
others (Parker, 1995:173). The kyopos are aware of their phenotypical difference from 
the majority society, and consider themselves ‘the good foreigners’ in the eyes of the 
majority society. Identity formation is an ongoing process of identification that creates 
“a wholeness, which is filled from the outside us by the way we imagine ourselves to be 
seen by others” (Hall, 1996:287), thus the kyopos reacted to the way they perceived 
themselves to be seen. ‘Vanishing’ into the majority society being impossible, they 
narrated a success story of ‘good foreigners’, who fulfilled all the criteria of successful 
integration, without overtly challenging the underlying racial ideologies inherent in the 
German discourse on identity and integration. However, they expressed their awareness 
of being and remaining ‘foreign’ in the eyes of the majority society. The experience of 
constantly being ‘othered’ and exoticized created another facet of identity formation, as 
a defence against outward ascriptions, while articulating and narrating the possibilities 
of self-production within a restrictive framework.  
The second generation further explored such possibilities in communal activities, such 
as singing karaoke. In practices of sociability and through performance, different 
experiences come together. Neither essentialized Koreanness, nor essentialized 
Germanness provide possibilities for the kyopos. The narrow definitions of both fail to 
encompass their experiences, which many of my informants found out when visiting 
Korea. The realization of difference from the ancestral homeland, however, did not 
become “a life-story incomplete” (Christou, 2006:147), but a realization of hybridity. 
Social spaces like the kyopo parties, and the karaoke bar, provided both physical and 
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mental space to articulate such hybridity through social practices. Remaining connected 
to the parental version of Koreanness through certain practices and language use, 
replicating patterns and behaviours, while fusing them with German practices and 
language, such spaces served as the stage for expressing possibilities. They were a place 
for a semi-departure from the parent generation's form of socializing, in technological 
form, transplanted into a German context that is actually relevant to kyopos in the 
present.   
But kyopo identity is a gendered identity. It challenges essentialized identities and 
senses of belonging, but: in its collective negotiation, it is restrictive for women. 
Focussing on gender, or rather the experiences of women, can add to previous 
approaches of understanding hybrid identities, and highlight the challenges of identity 
negotiation. It's the gender perspective- one that retains a keen sense of the dynamic 
between structure and agency- that allows one to see the specific implications for 
women. A theory on free-floating notions of identity and the negotiation thereof is not 
enough to explain the limitations of what one can, and cannot claim for oneself. The 
focus on gender helps to show underlying structures and self-understandings- that differ 
for men and women respectively- that limit the possibilities of identity negotiation, and 
highlight the tension in the binary opposition of essentialized against open identities. 
At its heart the German self-understanding is a masculine self-understanding that 
constructs foreign men as a threat to German women. In a discourse in which German 
Leitkultur is summed up as: German language, constitution, and the position of women 
(Schuhmann in Kavoori and Fraley, 2006:96), the position of women is something that 
men allow. One reading of such discourses would be: German men are the ones that 
allow German women to have the same rights as they. They are the ones that 
benevolently permit others – German women and foreign men- to participate in German 
society. Foreign women- or rather foreign men’s treatment of ‘their’ women- serves as a 
marker of difference (Schuhmann, 2006; Chin, 2007). Superficially the recipe for 
becoming German, for being accepted by the majority society, goes out to men: Learn 
to speak German fluently, adhere to the constitution and treat your women as we treat 
ours. The German discourse on the undefined concept of integration would then seem 
like a process of male assimilation, in which the male migrant must become as 
‘German’ as possible, and accept the superiority of German language, laws and gender 
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relations. The treatment of women- not the women themselves as individuals and free 
agents- serves as the “litmus test to determine whether foreigners- and especially Turks- 
possessed the capacity to function effectively within a Western liberal democratic 
society” (Chin, 2007:143).  
The definition of German Leitkultur as given above, is a form of what Floya Anthias 
and Nira Yuval-Davis (1992:33) have named gendered “border management”, in which 
women are used as symbolic border guards. Schuhmann (2006) argues that feminism is 
nowadays “defined as the proper behaviour for German white women, at least as long as 
it is comfortable and doesn’t hurt” (2006:98). Thus, seemingly progressive 
masculinities- that allow liberated German women- are constructed as typically German 
(2006:98). The position of German women is granted “by the enlightened way that 
German men treat women” (2006:96). And women who are perceived as ‘foreign’? 
Schuhmann (2006) asks how German men treat foreign women, and concludes that “the 
image of the Other woman […] is used in the self-inventing process of male German 
identity. The Other woman is used to define the specifics of the German woman; the 
German woman is needed to finally provide German masculinity the point of reference 
for its own modernity” (2006:97). And the German woman is directly opposed to the 
position of ‘other’ women, who are the victims of oppression. This “oppression and 
victimization” of migrant women is used as evidence for an unbridgeable chasm 
between foreigners and Germans (Chin, 2007:143).  
The first generation Korean women transferred the aspirations many of them had come 
to Germany with onto their children. The second generation was raised to speak fluent 
German, and to be academically successful. However, the second generation women 
saw their treatment as markedly different from the treatment their brothers received. 
While they were encouraged to do well academically, they saw their brothers as having 
more liberties, less chores and being valued higher. Many gave that as a reason for not 
wanting a kyopo boyfriend or husband. The tension between having to be a ‘good 
Korean daughter’ at home, and wanting the same liberties they saw their German 
friends have, while their brothers had no such obligations, however did not lead kyopo 
women to reject kyopo identity. Instead, it added another form of ‘code’ among women, 
and practices particular to them, like hiding boyfriends and hiding cigarettes. Such 
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practices were a point of commonality between kyopo women, creating different spheres 
for males and females.  
In communal settings, the discourse about identity among kyopos was male-dominated, 
marginalizing the experiences of women. Majority society discourses utilize women as 
objects rather than as part of society, making Germanness intrinsically male. And the 
kyopos use much of the same discourse to prove their own success. Yet, when kyopo 
women speak, this difference of experience is pushed to the background. They tend to 
unite with kyopo men against the conceptions and constructions that define them both. 
But: being kyopo is experienced in different ways for kyopo men and kyopo women. 
They are both identified as ‘the Other’, but while the former are desexualized and 
emasculated, the latter fear being objectified. For the kyopo women this means being 
identified as ‘Asian women’, and stereotyped as ‘gentle, demure and humble’. On the 
one hand, my female informants constructed the ‘positive’ image the majority society 
had of them as an opportunity (cf chapter 5). “Asian women are idealized to be more 
‘truly’ feminine (i.e., devoted, dependent, domestic), and therefore more desirable, than 
their more modern, emancipated Western sisters” (Espiritu, 1997:113). This seemingly 
‘positive’ view can mean that the majority society is more willing to accept them, but 
also works against them, when they seek to assert themselves. Women’s experiences are 
again marginalized in the social activity of singing karaoke. In the karaoke bar, the 
kyopos enacted ‘Koreanness’ and everyday ‘Germanness’, and their understanding of 
‘Koreanness’ circumscribed the possibilities for women. Gender relations were 
modelled on transmitted conceptions of ‘Koreanness’. While these were altered and 
transformed, inside the karaoke bar, female kyopos remained the ‘good Korean 
daughters’ they felt their parents expected them to be.  
Challenges shine through, nonetheless, in seemingly small acts of defiance, like 
smoking, and “telling white lies” as Kathrin put it. To the outside, my female 
informants- through ordentliche [neat] clothes- presented the image of ‘good Korean 
daughters’, and orderly and well-dressed students and professionals. Clothes are a way 
of presenting an image and conveying a message to the environment. My female 
informants, who always wore neat, discreetly expensive clothes, signalled to their 
parents that they were ‘good Korean daughters’, and to the majority society that they 
were not the epitome of sexualized, exotic femininity, but rather, modern, self-confident 
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women. Kyopo women usually united with their male peers, even when that 
marginalized their position. Yet, like Hyung (2008), I also observed that kyopo women 
tend to have German partners and husbands, rather than marry or form relationships 
with male kyopos. Hanamoto (1992:42) claims- about a similar pattern amongst Asian 
Americans- that due to the persistent desexualisation of the Asian male, many Asian 
females do not perceive their ethnic counterparts as desirable marriage partners. Thus 
the women “unwittingly enforce the Eurocentric gender ideology that objectifies and 
racializes Asians” (Espiritu, 1997:97).  
My informants never said that they didn’t consider male kyopos attractive. In fact, some 
like Kathrin, wanted a kyopo partner. The choice of a German partner, however, was a 
challenge to the masculinist discourses in which they moved. Such challenges shine 
through in comments such as Sophie’s: “Why would I want to marry some Korean 
mother’s spoilt little boy?” Or as Hyung (2008) reports about one of his informants: 
“Maybe it was a defiant reaction […]. With my German boyfriends, I was always free 
of restrictions, and could show myself as an emancipated individual” (2008:232). And 
another says: “Maybe German culture has shown us that this [Korean] role for women 
is old-fashioned. […] Many of us are emancipated and want equality, but we wouldn’t 
get that from Korean [meaning the second generation] men” (2008:232). Their ability to 
“transform traditional patriarchy is often constrained by their social-structural location 
in the dominant society” (Espiritu, 1997:118), but that does not mean that kyopo women 
do not challenge it. My female informants formed relationships with German men of 
similar or equal class and education, with whom they could negotiate partnerships that 
they perceived as more equal than the ones they saw possible with male kyopos.  
Far from being “assimilated to the point of being unrecognizable” as Hyung (2008:139) 
claims, or facing the difficulty of negotiating two incommensurable value systems 
(Solomos 1988), the second generation of Korean migrants to Germany creatively 
negotiates kyopo identity as a form of positioning that allows them to participate within 
exclusivist discourses, and subtly challenge them. Being kyopo is not an essential 
identity in itself, but a simultaneous synthesis of internal self-definition and ascription 
by others (Jenkins, 1996: 20). An element of that identity is the experience of being 
identified. The experience of being ‘othered, being identified as a ‘foreigner’ on the 
grounds of phenotypical appearance, informs kyopo identity negotiation as much as the 
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shared experience of having Korean parents. The German national self-understanding 
and vague notions of integration limit the possibilities of identity negotiation, because it 
is based on essentialized ideas about identity and gender.  
The stress on education, and also pointedly on female education, contrasts not merely 
with the perceived lack thereof among the Turkish minority, but subtly challenges the 
racial hierarchies within Germany. In a lingering framework of racial perceptions of 
intelligence, and therefore status, the kyopos’ academic success and social mobility, on 
the one hand plays into the discourse on integration, while on the other, challenging far 
subtler, but deeply ingrained notions. This holds especially true for the highly educated 
second generation of women. Negotiating kyopo identity as an alternative, highlights 
these underlying structures and ideologies, bringing out the true problems with 
‘integration’ and Merkel’s failed multiculturalism that still demand one choose an 
essentialized identity, while failing to grasp the implications of outward ascription.  
The idea of a civic citizenship that lies at the heart of debates about multiculturalism 
and integration in Germany, appealing as it is, ignores the complexities of people’s 
lives. It ignores their self-understanding, when situating themselves in a framework that 
does not, and cannot divorce civic citizenship from understandings about ethno-cultural 
identities, and belonging. It merely shifts the debate into another realm, where the 
question of identity becomes essentialized again. Identity, like gender, is a relational 
category, but like gender, in a national discourse, is often closely linked to biology, and 
ethno-cultural understandings of who can claim an identity and who cannot. Saying that 
identity formation is always fluid, would disregard the very real implications these 
notions have on everyday lives. The example of the “Negermischlinge” illustrated that 
those identified as ‘the other’, are denied a formalized identity they had claim to, in this 
case being German. But kyopo identity as a category of practice shows these 
shortcomings, and reveals the complexities and tensions, showing that it is possible to 
“be a bit of both”, making identities more positional, more plural and diverse.  “Identity 
is subject to the play of history, politics, representation and difference, so that it is 
unlikely ever again to be unitary or ‘pure’.” (Hall, 1996:309) But understanding identity 
as a constant relational process of negotiation and renegotiation, and the articulation of 
possibilities, allows us a more nuanced understanding; not about being, but as a 
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situating practice that sheds light onto the complexities of human interaction, self-
understanding and underlying societal and ideological structures. 
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